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Verification of access control systems against vulnerabilities has always been a challenging
problem in the world of computer security. The complication of security policies in large-
scale multi-agent systems increases the possible existence of vulnerabilities as a result of
mistakes in policy definition.
This thesis explores automated methods in order to verify temporal and epistemic
properties of access control systems. While temporal property verification can reveal a
considerable number of security holes, verification of epistemic properties in multi-agent
systems enable us to infer about agents’ knowledge in the system and hence, to detect
unauthorized information flow.
This thesis first presents a framework for knowledge-based verification of dynamic
access control policies. This framework models a coalition-based system, which evaluates
if a property or a goal can be achieved by a coalition of agents restricted by a set of
permissions defined in the policy. Knowledge is restricted to the information that agents
can acquire by reading system information in order to increase time and memory efficiency.
The framework has its own model-checking method and is implemented in Java and
released as an open source tool named PoliVer.
In order to detect information leakage as a result of reasoning, the second part of
this thesis presents a complimentary technique that evaluates access control policies
over temporal-epistemic properties where the knowledge is gained by reasoning. We will
demonstrate several case studies for a subset of properties that deal with reasoning about
knowledge. To increase the efficiency, we develop an automated abstraction refinement
technique for evaluating temporal-epistemic properties.
For the last part of the thesis, we develop a sound and complete algorithm in order to
identify information leakage in Datalog-based trust management systems.
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Social networks like Facebook and LinkedIn, cloud computing networks like Salesforce and
Google docs, conference paper review systems like Easychair and HotCRP are examples
of applications that huge numbers of users deal with every day. In such systems, a group
of agents interact with each other to access resources and services. Such multi-agent
collaborative systems are getting more and more complex which raises the possibility of
there being vulnerabilities in their information access rules.
All the above systems have a built-in access control system with a set of rules, named
access control policy. Policy designers have a human readable form of the access policy
for the principals in the system which should be enforced. Further developments of the
system cause the access control policy to become more complicated and as a consequence,
it may not comply with the organization information security requirements. For such
complex systems, reasoning about the correctness of access control policy by hand is not
feasible. Automated verification is a solution which enables policy designers to verify their
policies against required properties. For instance, in Google docs, we need to verify “if
Alice shares a document with Bob, it is not possible for Bob to share it with Charlie unless
Alice agrees”, or in HotCRP, “if Bob is not chair, it is not possible for him to promote
himself to be a reviewer of a paper submitted to the conference”. If such properties do
not hold, it can imply a security hole in the system that needs to be investigated and
fixed by policy designers.
One of the most challenging aspects of verifying access control systems is knowledge,
which is the information that an agent or group of agents gain about the system. In-
formation leakage is the knowledge that is acquired by some unauthorized principals. In
general, finding information leakage in the systems is not straightforward. This is because
not all the information is gained by direct access, but some is gained by reasoning. Suc-
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cessful hackers are in general talented in reasoning. They use the information gathered by
social engineering together with the ones gained by interacting with the system in order
to find a way to penetrate the system.
An important question that arises is: Is it possible to verify the knowledge that a
principal can acquire in a system which is regulated by a set of access control rules? To
answer this question, we first divide access control policies into two categories: dynamic
or state-based, and stateless. In dynamic policies [94, 11, 42, 78], the permissions for an
agent depend on the state of the system. As a consequence, permissions for an agent
can be changed by the actions of other agents. In such policies, the knowledge also may
change when the state changes. In stateless policies [13, 70, 48], access decision does not
change the state of the system.
We first look at the category of dynamic policies, which is the main contribution
of this thesis. While the majority of the research is focused on verification of temporal
properties, formal reasoning for information leakage and anonymity is not well automated
by the state of the art tools [88]. One of the frameworks for the verification of temporal-
epistemic properties over dynamic policies is proposed by Zhang et al. [95, 94] which
is implemented as a tool named AcPeg. Although their framework models a memoryful
system (perfect recall) by building the system around knowledge states, it suffers from
several problems. We will discuss the problems later in the related work section, but in
the context of knowledge verification, they only consider the knowledge gained by reading
system information. Their framework is not able to verify the information leaked as a
result of reasoning. As a positive point, modelling knowledge by the information gained
by reading system information reduces the complexity and improves the efficiency. On
the other hand, this approach is unable to detect some specific but important information
leakage vulnerabilities in the policies.
In the category of stateless policies, the first research that adequately formalized the
information flow in trust management frameworks was performed by Becker [12]. He
proposes an algorithm which is able to find if some private information can be leaked to an
unauthorized principal in a Datalog-based policy through sending legitimate credentials,
called probes, to the system. His work is well formalized and the soundness of the algorithm
is formally proved. Becker’s approach has two weaknesses: first, the algorithm that
investigates if some information is detectable in a policy is sound but not complete, and
second, the algorithm is difficult to automate. Therefore, there is still the requirement of
finding a sound and complete algorithm which is also easier to implement.
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1.2 Knowledge-based verification in dynamic policies
This research was motivated at the beginning by RW, the formal verification framework
developed by Zhang, Ryan and Guelev [94, 95] at the University of Birmingham. RW
(Read and Write) is built around the states that store the knowledge of the agents or
in the other words, knowledge states and uses model-checking techniques for property
verification. The knowledge in RW is the accumulation of the knowledge the agents in a
coalition gain by reading system variables. Our main idea was that building the system
around knowledge states is not essential when the knowledge is the result of reading system
information. In the case of knowledge by readability and when perfect recall is required,
reading a variable can be introduced into the policy as an action together with some extra
variables that support memory of reading. In the original RW framework, introducing
memory into the policy is not possible as we require actions to update multiple variables
at the same time. In RW, each write action can only update one variable at a time. Our
idea resulted in designing and implementing a new tool, which we named PoliVer 1.
Verification of knowledge by readability is simpler and more efficient than the knowl-
edge gained by reasoning. While a high percentage of vulnerabilities can be detected by
RW, PoliVer, DynPAL and other policy verification tools, there still exists some infor-
mation leakage vulnerabilities that the state of the art tools are not able to detect. Let
us demonstrate it with an example.
Example 1.1. Assume a conference paper review system in which all the PC members
have access to the number of papers assigned to each reviewer. Further assume that each
PC member can see the list of the papers assigned to the reviewers which does not contain
the papers that he is the author of.
An important security requirement in a conference paper review system is that no
author should be able to find out who is the reviewer of his or her paper. This property
does not hold in the above system. Assume that Alice is a PC member and also the author
of a paper which is submitted to the conference and Bob is allocated as the reviewer of
her paper. By the policy, Alice knows how many papers Bob is allocated to review. When
Alice checks the list of the papers assigned to Bob, she finds that the number of the papers
she can see in the list is less than total number of papers assigned to Bob. Therefore, Alice
can reason that Bob is the reviewer of her paper, which violates the security requirement
in the system. Such information leakage vulnerabilities can not be detected by the tools
that model knowledge by readability of information.
In addition and in this research, we develop a method that enables us to verify the
1PoliVer is available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mdr/research/projects/11-AccessControl/
poliver/
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knowledge expressed by the modal logic KT45n [58] using Interpreted systems framework
[45, 46]. We also use abstraction and refinement techniques in order to overcome time
and memory limitations when verifying temporal-epistemic properties.
Model-checking and abstraction This research uses model-checking as the for-
mal verification method. The Interpreted systems framework allows us to reason about
knowledge in multi-agent systems, and will be used as our framework later in this re-
search. Model-checking temporal-epistemic properties often becomes intractable when
the number of variables and therefore the state space grows. For large state space sys-
tems, abstraction techniques can be adopted in order to simplify the model. Abstraction
in multi-agent systems has received few attention in recent years [33, 96, 44]. As another
important point, automated refinement methods for epistemic properties is not as de-
veloped as those for temporal properties [30, 91]. Therefore, design and development of
automated abstraction and refinement is of considerable importance when realistic large
systems come into account. This research also contributes to designing an automated ab-
straction refinement in order to optimize the verification of temporal-epistemic properties
over access control systems.
1.3 Information leakage in static policies
The detectability and opacity of information in trust management systems in not fully
investigated yet. In distributed systems, the trust management framework is subject to
some attacks called probing attacks which were first introduced by Becker [12]. Gurevich
and Neeman [50] demonstrated a similar attack on SecPAL [13], which is a Datalog-
based policy language. In probing attacks, an adversary can infer information about
the system by submitting a series of probes, which are access requests together with
conditional credentials. To demonstrate the problem, let’s have a look to the following
example [12, 50]:
Example 1.2. Imagine a service policy, which allows principals to park their car according
to some terms and conditions. The service policy also contains some confidential facts
like if a principal is a secret agent written in SecPAL [13]:
Service says x can park if x consents to parking rules
Service says x can say x consents to parking rules
In the above policy, says denotes the intension or digital signature of an agent over the
assertions, and can say denotes the delegation of authority. The query 〈Service says
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Alice can park〉 succeeds if the assertions Service says Alice consents to parking
rules evaluates to true, which can result from the second assertion union with the asser-
tion Alice says Alice consents to parking rules. Now Alice submits two self-issued
credentials together with the request for parking permission to the service:
1. Alice says Alice consents to parking rules if Bob is a secret agent
2. Alice says Service can say Bob is a secret agent
If the above assertions together with the query 〈Service says Alice can park〉 suc-
ceeds, then we need to find out if the fact Service says Bob is a secret agent is crucial
for the succession of the query. Therefore, Alice needs another step in order to complete
the attack. She submits only the first credential together with the query. In the case of
denial of the permission, Alice can infer that Bob is a secret agent.
For complicated policies in Datalog-based trust management systems, the problem
of decidability of opacity (the negation of detectability) is open. The third part of this
research solves this problem by proposing a sound and complete algorithm that has the
power to determine if a property is opaque in a given policy.
1.4 Our solution
For the category of dynamic policies and in this thesis, we cover verifying interesting
temporal-epistemic properties over dynamic access control policies. We divide our ap-
proach into two categories and compare the outcomes:
Knowledge gained by reading (Chapter 4):
1. We develop a model-checking framework that deals with knowledge by readability.
We will show that even in the case of memoryful knowledge, it is not practically
efficient to verify such properties in knowledge state. We prove this argument by
comparing the runtime and memory usage of our algorithm with RW, which works
on knowledge space. To have a memoryful approach, the memory of reading system
variables can be introduced into the policy and therefore system states instead of
incorporating knowledge states for each agent.
2. Based on our framework, we implement the tool PoliVer. PoliVer keeps some useful
features of RW (guessing strategies) as we found them to be important in verification
of properties over access control policies. The policy language is expressive and
the query language is reach enough to handle nested queries. We apply a post
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processing algorithm in order to verify the knowledge of agents over the information
that agents require in order to achieve the goal. Finally, we compare the results
with its predecessor AcPeg. PoliVer is implemented in Java and performs symbolic
model-checking using the binary decision diagram library BuDDy [71].
Knowledge gained by reasoning: (Chapter 5)
1. We introduce the second framework as the complimentary which is now able to
verify epistemic properties that deal with reasoning. The new framework is less
time and memory efficient, but is able to detect information leakage vulnerabilities
in policies which are not possible to be detected by the state of art verification tools.
We use interpreted systems as our basic framework.
2. Our framework in general uses a larger number of state space and higher verifica-
tion time compared to our approach in the first category (knowledge by readability).
In order to make the verification method competitive and more practical for large
systems, we design an automated abstraction and refinement method for temporal-
epistemic safety properties which dramatically reduces the time and memory con-
sumption. Our abstraction and refinement method is applicable when verifying
safety properties.
Datalog-based policies: (chapter 6)
Regarding to the category of Datalog-based authorization systems, Becker first in-
troduced a method that detects information leakage by verifying if a property is detectable.
As we discussed before, the algorithm is not complete and is difficult to implement. In this
research, we verify the detectability by checking if a property is not opaque. We propose
the first sound and complete algorithm which is also easy to implement. As verifying
knowledge in Datalog-based policies grows exponentially when the number of available
probes increases, similar to the dynamic systems, we need to apply optimization. Hence,
we develop several methods that reduce the state space search and then compare the
results with the ones in the absence of optimization.
1.5 Research contribution
Our research focuses on finding automated methods in order to check if required properties
hold in an access control policy. Our research consists of three parts:
First, we investigate knowledge-based verification of properties over access control
policies when the knowledge comes from reading system information. In this research, we
implement and release a model-checking tool called PoliVer, with the following properties:
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• The tool handles co-operation of agents in a collaborative environment, together
with interaction of the rules and multi-step actions.
• It provides a user friendly syntax that covers action rules, which are able to update
a group of system variables at one step, and read permission rules, that define the
conditions in which system variables are allowed to be read by the agents.
• The query language is flexible and supports nested goals with possible different
coalitions active for each goal.
• The model-checking algorithm finds the propositions that the coalition requires their
value in order to proceed through the goal. A complementary algorithm checks if
the agent is able to find the values of those propositions or needs to take the risk of
guessing the values.
• Various case studies demonstrate the experimental results and enhancements over
the previous knowledge-based approach (RW framework [94, 95]).
Second, we develop a complimentary verification method based on interpreted systems
with the ability of reasoning about the knowledge of the agents in access control systems.
In this part of the research, we use a model-checker for multi-agent systems called MC-
MAS1 [74, 72] as our model-checking engine, and build our framework on top of it. Our
approach has the following properties:
• The policy language is similar to the one for PoliVer, which supports action rules
and read permission rules. The query language is the standard CTLK (CTL logic
with knowledge modality K).
• Time and memory usage is reduced by implementing a fully automated abstrac-
tion and refinement algorithm over temporal-epistemic properties. Although the
optimization is mainly available for safety properties in ACTLK (CTLK containing
only universal path quantifier), we also provide an interactive refinement for some
security properties that do not fall into the category of ACTLK.
• In the absence of abstraction, all properties in CTLK logic can be verified over the
policy. Without optimization, the verification may not be practical for medium to
large policies.
• The verification tool is implemented in F# programming language. Our case studies
compare the results of our new approach with PoliVer and RW.
1MCMAS is available at http://www-lai.doc.ic.ac.uk/mcmas/
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Thirdly, we carefully investigate information leakage vulnerability in Datalog-based
trust management systems. The outcome of the result is a tool written in F# functional
programming language, which accepts an input policy and available probes, and deter-
mines whether a property is opaque in the policy or not. This research has the following
properties:
• A formal definition for probing attacks over trust management systems is provided,
which is handled in verifying opacity in Datalog-based policies. Datalog-based
policies are vastly used in various trust management frameworks.
• Our algorithm is proved to be sound, complete and terminating: If it proves the
opacity of a property when the property is not detectable (soundness), and if it fails
to prove the opacity, then the property is provably detectable. The proof procedure
always terminates assuming that the number of available probes for the adversary
is finite.
• Several optimization mechanisms are provided. Our experimental results show that
they dramatically reduce verification time in many practical scenarios.
• Several realistic case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm. The
verification times for different optimization methods are also calculated and com-
pared with non-optimized algorithm.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
The reminder of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 covers the related work and
background of access control policy verification. This chapter also looks at the abstraction
refinement techniques in model-checking as it will be used in our research. Chapter 3
is the preliminary chapter, which provides the required materials like policy language
and some definitions for the rest of the thesis. In Chapter 4, we present a verification
algorithm that investigates temporal-epistemic properties over an access control system
described by a policy and when the knowledge is gained by the readability of information.
We demonstrate the performance of the implemented tool in the experimental results.
Chapter 5 contains a complimentary framework that is able to verify epistemic properties
that demonstrate knowledge by reasoning. One of the important features of this chapter
is the abstraction refinement method that reduces the verification time and memory usage
for temporal-epistemic properties. Chapter 6 describes the opacity verification method on
Datalog-based policies and experimental results, and Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
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1.7 Notations
As the convention and for the rest of this thesis, we write constants in typewriter font,
variables in italic and key words in sans serif.
1.8 Publications
The thesis is partly based on the following publications:
• Moritz Y. Becker and Masoud Koleini. Opacity analysis in trust management sys-
tems. In 14th Information Security Conference (ISC 2011), 2011
• Masoud Koleini and Mark Ryan. A knowledge-based verification method for dy-
namic access control policies. In ICFEM 2011: Proceedings of 13th International
Conference on Formal Engineering Methods, 2011
• Masoud Koleini and Mark Ryan. A knowledge-based verification method for dy-
namic access control policies. Technical report, University of Birmingham, School
of Computer Science, Available at: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mdr/research/
projects/11-AccessControl/poliver/, 2010
• Masoud Koleini, Hasan Qunoo, and Mark Ryan. Towards modelling and verify-
ing dynamic access control policies for web-based collaborative systems. In W3C
Workshop on Access Control Application Scenarios, 2009
A journal version of the paper “Opacity analysis in trust management systems” is also




In this chapter, we briefly provide the definitions, features and categories of access control
systems. We then introduce model-checking techniques as the formal verification method,
which we will use in this thesis for modelling and verifying access control systems. Finally,
we will explain abstraction and refinement in model-checking. Abstraction techniques
enable us to reduce the size of state transition system and improve time and memory
efficiency in model-checking. We also review several major works in the field of access
control policy verification.
2.1 An overview of access control
Access control is the process of mediating the requests for accessing data in a system
and determining whether the request should be granted or denied. Access control can be
divided into three control categories [57]:
1. security policy : At the top of the access control is security policy, the high level
description of the conditions and rules under which a user or process can access some
resources in the system. Policies are in general dynamic and possible to change by
the administrators when some requirements in the system are changed.
2. security mechanism: Access control mechanism enforces the policy through trans-
lating the requests into system acceptable structure.
3. security model : Access control model, which formally presents how the policy is
enforced in the system, provides the link between the policy and the mechanism.
In general, access control models are divided into two major categories of discre-
tionary and non-discretionary access control which will be discussed later. Non-
discretionary models also contain two major reference models of mandatory and
role-based access control models.
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Several important features that need to be included in access control systems are
highlighted in [38, 57]. Some of the features are as follows:
• Conditional authorizations : Access permissions are granted or denied if some con-
ditions in the system holds. The conditions can be in the form of system predicates.
• Support for fine-grained and course-grained specifications : Access control should
support fine-grained authorization rules to be applied by the administrator in the
system. However, administrating fine-grained access control is difficult and error
prone. Therefore, access control should provide the support for administrating the
authorization of groups of users and resources, which is the main motivation of
designing role-based access control model.
• Separation of duty : This principle does not provide the sufficient authorization for
the individuals in the system to perform fraudulent actions [84].
• Delegation of authority : Access control should provide the possibility of passing
authorizations between agents. Delegation of authority enhances scalability and
flexibility, but increases the complexity of access control.
• Least privilege: This principle states that each individual should have the minimum
required permissions to perform his tasks. Least privilege in general is difficult or
costly to achieve [57].
We now introduce major access control security models in the following sections.
2.1.1 Access control matrix
The concept of access control matrix was first introduced by Harrison et al. [52]. In their
formal model of protection systems, a configuration is a triple (S,O, P ) where S is the
set of subjects (the entities that perform actions in the system), O is the set of objects
(resources in the system) and P is the access control matrix that contains a row for each
subject in S and a column for each object in O. The authors have considered S ⊆ O.
Let R be the set of generic rights is the system, for instance, read, write and execute
permissions in Unix-like file systems. If s ∈ S and o ∈ O, then we have P (s, o) ⊆ R.
In [52], commands contain the operations that are able to modify the contents of access
matrix. But in general, an access control matrix by itself does not provide a complete
view of security policy. This is because the matrix does not model the operations that





Figure 2.1: The general structure of an access matrix. r indicates the access rights that
s has on o.
Access control lists (ACL) are the list of permissions attached to an object can be
modelled by access matrices. Most of the operating systems have their own access control
lists implemented in their file system, mainly known as access control entries (ACE) .
2.1.2 Discretionary access control
In discretionary access control (DAC), the owner of an object or the authorized entity
decides about access permissions of the object. Therefore, access permissions are not
regulated by the organization policy or rules. In DAC, owners can delegate the control or
pass the permission of accessing the resources to other entities.
A security policy based on DAC can be presented by an access control matrix (defined
in section 2.1.1). One of the problems of DAC policies is their large memory for storage and
complicated administration. An example of DAC access control is file system permissions
in Unix-like operating systems. In such systems, each file has an owner that determines
the read/right/execute rights for the owner/group/other entities. Such access control is
not fine-grained, but is simple to manage by individuals1.
Discretionary access control suffers from several weaknesses like unauthorized infor-
mation flow (Alice grants Bob read access to her file, Bob copies the content of the file
into another file of his own and allows some unauthorized users to access the content of
Alice’s file), vulnerability to Trojan horses, unrestricted information usage and possibility
of violating organization policy [57].
1Linux kernel version 2.6 allows users to apply more fine-grained access control lists using the command
setfacl.
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2.1.3 Mandatory access control
In contrast with DAC where the owners have the ability to override the permissions
of their own objects, in mandatory access control (MAC) it is a central authority that
enforces authorization rules to the subjects and object in the system. One of the most
well-known examples of MAC is multi-level security (MLS) also known as BellLaPadula
model [18] developed for military applications. MLS assigns security levels to the objects
beginning from top-secret (most sensitive), secret, confidential and ends with public or
unclassified (least sensitive). The subjects are also assigned with similar security levels.
Bell-LaPadula model enforces two mandatory access rules:
• No read-up: A subject with a specified security level can not read the object with
higher security levels. For instance, an entity with security level confidential can
not read a document labelled with secret.
• No write-down: A subject with a specified security level can not write over the
objects with lower security levels. This rule is also known as *-property.
The model also defines strong *-property, where a subject can write only over the
objects of the same security level.
Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is the commercial implementation of mandatory
access control in Linux distributions1 supported by National Security Agency. SELinux
applies least privilege principle to the system and server in such a way that the programs
have the minimum required privileges to perform their task. This feature prevents the
programs to harm the whole system if they get compromised.
2.1.4 Role-based access control
The main motivation for designing role-based access control model (RBAC) is to facilitate
the administration in medium to large-scale multi-user systems [87]. RBAC as a form of
non-discretionary access control first introduced by Ferraiolo and Kuhn [47] and officially
maintained and developed by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology).
Sandhu et al. [87] introduced four conceptual reference models. RBAC0 is the basic model
containing the minimum requirement for systems supporting RBAC. RBAC contains three
core set of entities: users, roles and permissions. Users are in general human-beings,
roles are job titles, responsibilities and ranks in the organization that are extractable
from organization documents and charts, and permissions are the conditions under which
the roles can access objects and resources. The permissions are application-specific, like
1SELinux is integrated in Linux kernel version 2.6.
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read/write/execute in a file system or issue prescription, read prescription and read patient
personal information in a healthcare system. The key feature of RBAC is the two relations
of user assignment (UA) and permission assignment (PA). Users can dynamically be
allocated to a set of roles, a role can be related to a group of users, a role can have several
permissions and permission can be shared between a group of roles. The assignment of
users to roles and roles to permissions can be changed dynamically by the administrator
and changes in organization roles and policy.
Another component of RBAC is the session. Each session in the system is mapped
to a user and to a group of roles that user has activated. In the case that more than
one role are activated in a session, the permission is the union of the permissions of the
activated roles. In RBAC0, there is no restriction for the user to activate a subset of roles
he belongs to simultaneously and still the principle of least privilege applies. That means
the permissions of the user is the union of the permissions of the invoked roles, not all
the roles that he is assigned.
RBAC1 extends RBAC0 by introducing role hierarchies. In RBAC1, role hierarchy is
a partial order over the set of roles with seniority relation. A senior role inherits the
permissions of the related junior roles. The anti-symmetric property of the partial order
prevents two roles to inherit from each other at the same time. Therefore, if a user is
assigned to a role, he is implicitly assigned to all the corresponding junior roles.
The only difference between RBAC2 and RBAC0 is the application of constraints over
the values. For instance, it should be impossible to allocate a user to mutually exclusive
roles, as it may raise the risk of fraud in the system. Therefore, RBAC2 supports separa-
tion of duties by applying the constraints to user assignments and permission assignments.
Cardinality constraints like restricting the number of roles a user or a permission can be
assigned is another way of maintaining organization’s discipline, which is supported in
RBAC2 model. RBAC3 combines the features of role hierarchy and constraints.
Sindhu et al. in [85, 86] proposed an RBAC-based model called ARBAC97 (Adminis-
trative RBAC 97) for administrating RBAC. Their model simplifies the administration of
the systems with thousands of users and roles in a decentralized way. SARBAC [35, 36]
modifies ARBAC by defining administrative functions in terms of administrative scope,
which is used to control the user to role and role to permission assignments.
Role-based access control is actively implemented and used in various products like























































Figure 2.2: RBAC reference models [87].
2.2 Access control policy
An access control policy is a set of rules that is written in a formal policy language [10].
The rules express the regulations that should be enforced and the policy language needs to
be flexible and expressive enough to accommodate the common requirements (also known
as policy idioms [10]) like constraints, delegation of authority, separation of duty and role
hierarchy.
Policy languages can provide language constructs to facilitate the definition of re-
quirements and constraints. For instance, some languages use the constructs that fa-
cilitate encoding the policies of role-based systems [63, 79]. In addition, [79] supports
the definition of static and dynamic separation of duty and cardinality constraints in the
policy. SecPAL [13] uses the constructs says and can say to support digital signature
in a decentralized networks and delegation of authority. SPL [83] is a policy language
that is specifically designed for expressing various constraints of type history constraints,
enforcing and expressing obligations, and invariant constraints.
One of the important classification of access control policies is dynamic (or state-
based) and static. In dynamic policies [11, 94, 82, 42], performing actions depend on
the authorization states and action performance results in changing the authorizations.
Static policies [77, 13, 70, 48] express the conditions where access request, which can
be complicated and contain lots of dependencies, are granted or rejected in a specific
authorization state. Static policies (simply consider an access matrix) does not provide
the details of the actions, and access requests does not change the authorization states.
Now, we will discuss different languages for access control policies and explains their
specifications, advantages and disadvantages.
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2.2.1 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [77] is an XML-based policy
language approved by the OASIS committee. The main motivation for defining a stan-
dard for authorization languages is that lots of application -specific policy languages are
designed, but the authorization rules can not be shared between different applications.
XACML acts as a common language for the applications to interact and share their au-
thorization rules1. The policy language is flexible enough in the context of extensibility
and can be extended to accommodate application-specific requirements.
Security policy in general is separated from enforcing the decisions. In XACML data-
flow model, policy is created and stored in policy administration point (PAP). When
an authorization request is submitted, policy decision point (PDP) renders access deci-
sions. Access control decisions are enforced by policy enforcement point (PEP), and policy
information point (PIP) acts as a store of resource attributes and returns the required in-
formation to PEP. The data-flow model contains the entity context handler with the duty
of translating decision requests in native format to XACML and translating authorization
decisions in XACML to the native form.
The data-flow in XACML is as follows: PAP makes the policy accessible to PDP.
Access requests are submitted to PEP. PEP sends the access requests to context handler,
including the attributes (characteristics) which is passed to PDP after translating to
the XACML request. If PDP requires additional attributes, it sends the request to the
context handler. Context handler collects the required attributes (optionally including
the resources) from PIP and sends them to PDP. PDP evaluates the policy, prepares the
response including the authorization decision and send them to context handler. Context
handler translates the decision back to the native form and sends it to PEP, which enforces
the decision. In the case that access is granted, PEP permits access to the requested
resources.
XACML language model v3.0 is composed of three top-level components rule, policy-
set and policy. Rule is the basic unit of the XACML language with the main components:
a target, an effect, a condition, obligations and advice. target defines the decision requests
where the rule applies. The effect of a rule is the intended decision that should be enforced
if the rule is evaluated to true, which is always permit or deny. Condition is a Boolean
expression over the predicates implied by the target, which refines the applicability of the
rule. The rule is applicable if both the target and the condition evaluate to true, and then
the effect will be returned.
The policy in XACML is composed of the main components: a target, a rule-combining
algorithm, a set of rules, obligations and advice. Obligations are included in the context
1XACML v3.0 was approved by OASIS in 2009.
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which is returned by the PDP to PEP (through context handler) after evaluating the
rules. Similar to obligations, advice is also included in the context returned by PDP,
but in spite of obligations, it can be ignored by PEP. Rule-combining algorithm specifies
the procedure of combining the result of evaluating the rules in the policy. In general, it
handles conflict resolution in the cases that several rules in the policy are applicable.
The policy-set contains a target, a policy-combining algorithm, a set of policies, obli-
gations and advice. Similar to rule-combining algorithm, the policy-combining algorithm
define the procedure of combining the results of verifying the included policies. Obliga-
tions and advice is defined similar to the policy.
Combining algorithms (rules and policies) divide into four categories. In divide over-
rides, if at least one of the rules or policies evaluates to deny, then the result is deny. In
permit overrides, the result is permit if some rules or policies return permit. The algo-
rithm first-applicable evaluates to the result of the first rule or policy, which is applicable
to the decision request. Only-one-applicable applies only to the policies, and if only one
policy or policy-set is applicable in the context of a target, it evaluates to the result of that
policy. Otherwise, it evaluates to not applicable if no policy or policy-set is applicable,
and evaluates to indeterminate, if more than one is applicable.
XACML policy language suffers from several weaknesses. The policies written in
XACML are verbose and complex. They are hard to read by someone who is not familiar
with the rules and difficult to analyse. Interactions between the main components like
PEP and PDP are not standardized and policy administration in XACML is not modelled
or discussed.
2.2.2 Role-based trust management framework (RT)
The term trust management was first introduced by Blaze et al. [21]. The trust manage-
ment problem deals with the following question which is also known as proof-of-compliance
problem:
Given a request to perform a specific action and a set of credentials (signed by different
authorities), does the request comply with the local policy?
In [21], the authors argue that the simple name to certificate binding does not provide
enough security in terms of legal actions (names to actions mapping problem). Policy-
Maker [22] uses a trust management engine over the submitted credentials in order to
process the authorization queries, which are the requests by one or a sequence of entities
(public keys in the context of decentralized trust management system) to perform an
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action regarding to the local policy. The queries in PolicyMaker are of the form:
key1, . . . , keyn Requests Action
The queries are processes based on the assertions which contain the trust information.
Each assertion contains a source which is the local policy or in the case of signed assertions,
public key of a third authority, an authority structure which is a sequence of public keys
representing identities whom the assertion applies, and a predicate called filter :
source Asserts authority structure Where filter
KeyNote [20, 19] is the successor of PolicyMaker. The advantages of KeyNote over its
ancestor is simpler C-like syntactic notations for the predicates and assertions, expressive-
ness in terms of delegation of trust, and extensibility while preserving the compatibility
with PolicyMaker.
Role-based Trust-management framework (RT) [70] is logic-programming-based policy
languages which combines trust management with role based access control (RBAC). The
delegation of the authority in PolicyMaker and KeyNote is restricted. For instance, a book
store can not simply specify the policy statement “anyone who is a student is entitled
to discount” [68]. The solution is the delegation of the discount permission by the book
store to the university, and then explicitly delegation of the permission by the university
to each student’s key. The above approach makes the access control system inefficient and
difficult to manage. To overcome such limitations, RT uses Delegation Logic [68] which
is specifically designed to facilitate expressing delegation of authorities.
RT has a family of languages: RT0 is the basic language where the roles are simply
the names without any arguments, RT1 expands RT0 by adding parameterized roles, RT
T
adds the construct manifold roles and role-product operator for expressing threshold and
separation of duty policies. Delegation of role activations is supported in RTD.
In RT, a role is named by a principal (identity which is identified by its public key)
and a role term. For A as a principal and R as a role term, A.R denotes the role R defined
by A. The basic language RT0 contains the following rules:
• Simple member: A.R←− B means B is a member of the role A.R.
• Simple containment: A.R ←− B.R1 means the role A.R contains all the princi-
pals of the role B.R1.
• Linking containment: A.R←− A.R1.R2 means the role A.R contains the princi-
pals of B.R2 (R2 is the role defined by B) for every B that is a member of A.R1.
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• Intersection containment: A.R ←− B1.R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn.Rn means the role A.R
contains the principals that are the members of all the roles B1.R1,. . . ,Bn.Rn.
The following extra rules define the simple and linking delegation and are definable
by the above basic rules:
• Simple delegations: A.R⇐= B : C.R1 where the part C.R1 is optional. This rule
means A delegates its authority over the role R to B. The optional part restricts B
to the members of the role C.R1. This rule is equivalent to A.R←− B.R ∩ C.R1.
• Linking delegation: A.R⇐= A.R1 : C.R2 where the part C.R2 is optional. This
rule means that A delegates its authority over the role A.R to the members of A.R1.
The whole rule can be written as A.R←− A.R1.R ∩ C.R2.
RT framework uses DatalogC (Datalog with constraints) [69] for the deduction
engine. Datalog as a subset of Prolog is a logic programming language without func-
tion symbols, with restricted use of negation and recursion (stratification restriction) and
range-restricted variables. The query evaluation in Datalog is sound and complete.
The lack of function symbols disables Datalog-based languages to express structured re-
sources, but makes the language tractable. The constraints in DatalogC enable the trust
management language designers to define access permissions over structured resources.
2.2.3 SecPAL
Similar to RT, SecPAL is a declarative authorization language based on DatalogC. The
major success of SecPAL is in its flexible delegation of authority, which allows defining
unlimited delegation path in one policy assertion. The definition of constraints in SecPAL
is unrestricted and constraints does not make the language intractable (In RT, constraint
domains are not guaranteed to be tractable [70]). Although SecPAL does not allow
negation in the assertions in order to prevent intractability and ambiguity, it permits
negation inside the queries.
Abadi et al. [1] first used the term says in their access control calculus to denote the
intention or signature of an agent over an assertion. The type of the assertion can be
imperative or factual. For instance, Alice says “Delete AliceSecret.wmv” is an imper-
ative assertion, while TrustedParty says “Alice is the owner of AliceSecret.wmv”
is factual.
SecPAL uses the same notation “says” for issuing an assertion as in [1], and uses the
term “can say” for delegation of authority, which is similar to controls in [1]. The following
is a part of a local policy for a conference paper review system, where TTP is a trusted
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third party and CPRS is a particular conference paper review system (like easyChair or
HotCRP):
TTP says Alice is a chair (1)
CPRS says TTP can say x is a chair (2)
CPRS says x can allocate y as the reviewer of p if (3)
x is a chair,
y is a PC member,
p is a paper
CPRS says x can allocate y as the sub-reviewer of p if (4)
x is the reviewer of p
The above is an example of a decentralized conference paper review system, where
the chair submits assertion (1) to the conference system in order to prove his identity.
SecPAL uses can act as, for principal aliasing. Consider the following assertion:
CPRS says x can act as proceeding author if (5)
x is an author,
currentTime() ≤ 12/3/2011
The assertion states that all the facts that apply to a proceeding author also applies
to a principal which is an author and before the specified deadline. The general form
of an assertion is of the form A says fact if fact1, . . . , factn, c where A is the principal
who issues (or digitally signs, in the context of distributed systems) the assertion, facts
specify properties over the principals and c is constraint. Constraints (as currentTime() ≤
12/3/2011 in the above assertion) contain equality (=), numerical inequality (≤), regular
expressions (r matches pattern), negation and conjunction of constraints. Inequality and
disjunction can be expressed combining basic constraints. In general, the expressiveness
of SecPAL policy language is the result of its flexible and supporting class of constraints.
SecPAL can act as the engine of a reference monitor, which validates access requests
to the resources and enforces the policy. A principal sends a set of assertions (also known
as credentials) and then requests access. SecPAL evaluates the query against the union of
local policy and submitted assertions and verifies if the access is granted or rejected. While
negation in recursive policies may result in complexity and undecidability1, SecPAL allows
negation in the authorization query. Queries can contain constraints in the form of the
ones used in assertions, conjunction, disjunction, negation and existential quantification.
Authorization query table introduced by SecPAL which provides a mapping between
1Some declarative languages like Prolog define negation in the form of negation as failure. Prolog
derives not p if it fails to derive p.
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parameterised access requests and authorization queries in SecPAL query language. For
instance and in a file sharing server, read(x, f) 7→ FileServer says x can read f is the
mapping from the request for reading file f by the principal x to the query language.
Using authorization query table preserves separation of duty in declarative languages
like SecPAL which does not let negation in the assertions. Negation plays an important
role in preserving separation of duties. Let’s consider assertion (3). Integrity constraints
in the system do not let the author to be assigned as the reviewer of his paper. Therefore,
we would like to have ¬(x is the author of p) as a fact, while negation is not allowed in
facts. Authorization query table provides the support for such cases. So, the request for
adding a principal as the reviewer will be mapped to the query in the following way:
addReviewer(x, y, p) 7→ (6)
CPRS says x can allocate y as the reviewer of p,
not (y is the author of p)
SecPAL can easily express different access control models like discretionary access
control (DAC):
Bob says Alice can read f if (7)
f is a file, Bob is the owner of f
and mandatory access control (MAC):
FileServer says user can access file if (8)
user is a manager, file  ManagementDir, isConfidential(file)=TRUE
where  is the path constraint and shows that the directory ManagementDir includes
the file.
Role hierarchies can be easily explained by using the keyword can act as. The asser-
tions and queries will be translated into DatalogC and then evaluated.
SecPAL and RT are the two well-known authorization languages based on DatalogC
and are categorized as stateless policies. Given a policy and a set of submitted credentials,
their trust management engine decides whether a request should be granted or denied.
This thesis focuses on finding vulnerabilities over access control systems. As a part of
our research, we will try to find if a set of available credentials and queries for a princi-
pal enables him to infer some confidential information contained in the policy. We will




As reviewed in section 2.2.1, XACML is a standard language designed for access control
policy definition. Zhang et al. [94] introduced a framework that has its own policy
language and synthesising mechanism, but is able to translate the policy written in its
formal language into XACML. The modelling formalism is called RW and is supported
by a model-checking tool called AcPeg (access control policy evaluator and generator).
The formal verification support provides the opportunity to ensure that first, legitimate
properties hold in the policy which means the users have enough permission to carry
out the required actions, and second, malicious behaviour is prohibited. In spite of the
existence of various model-checking tools like NuSMV [27, 26], Alloy [59, 60] and SPIN
[56], RW has its own model-checking mechanism.
RW formalism uses propositional variables which are Boolean variables. the policy
language allows defining two classes of parameterized rule-definitions over predicates: read
and write. Read rules define the permissions for reading the truth values of instanced
predicates, and write rules define the permissions for overwriting their values. For example
in a conference paper review system, the following fragment of the policy specifies the
condition in which user (the agent that performs reading or overwriting) can read the
value of reviewer(p, a) and the condition he can overwrite the value (assigning a principal
as the reviewer of a paper) [94]:
reviewer(p, a){
read : pcmember(user) ∧ ¬author(p, user)
write : (chair(user) ∧ pcmember(a) ∧ ¬author(p, user)) ∨
(pcmember(user) ∧ user = a ∧ reviewer(p, user)) ∧ ¬ (∃b subreviewer(p, user, b))
The rules in the policy specify dynamic state changes when a read or write is per-
formed. Overwriting action changes the state of the system and therefore, changes access
permissions for other agents.
The model-checking algorithm in RW checks if a property (or goal) is achievable by
a coalition of agents and through a sequence of reading/overwriting actions in the model
build based on the policy. A coalition is a set of agents which co-operate together in order
to achieve the goal. In the case that the goal is achievable, the model checker produces a
sequence of actions that leads the coalition to the goal and is called strategy.
Transition system: The states in RW are called knowledge states where each state
accumulates the initial knowledge of the coalition and the knowledge gained by sampling
or overwriting the propositions when executing a strategy. If the value of a proposition
is overwritten by an agent, the agent learns the current value of that proposition and he
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does not need to sample its value in future steps. Reading the truth value of a proposition
also adds the knowledge about the current and initial value of that proposition. For each
proposition p, four Boolean knowledge variables v0p, t0p, vp and tp are used: v0p is true
if the initial value of p is known by the coalition, t0p stores the initial value of p when
v0p is true, vp is true if the current value of p is known by the coalition and tp stores
the current value when vp is true. If P is the set of propositions, the knowledge state
is defined by (V0, T0, V, T ) where V0 = {p ∈ P | v0p = >}, T0 = {p ∈ P | t0p = >},
V = {p ∈ P | vp = >}, T = {p ∈ P | tp = >} and the transitions are as follows:
(V0, T0, V, T )
sampling p returns >−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (V0 ∪ {p}, T0 ∪ {p}, V ∪ {p}, T ∪ {p})
(V0, T0, V, T )
sampling p returns ⊥−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (V0 ∪ {p}, T0 ∪ {p}, V \{p}, T\{p})
(V0, T0, V, T )
p:=>−−−→ (V0, T0, V ∪ {p}, T ∪ {p})
(V0, T0, V, T )
p:=⊥−−−→ (V0, T0, V \{p}, T\{p})
The first two transitions are the result of sampling proposition p and the last two are
the transitions made by overwriting p. Sampling p is only permitted when the value of p is
not known (p 6∈ V0). If KG represents the knowledge states in which the coalition “knows”
that the goal is achieved, then a strategy is a sequence of sampling/overwriting steps that
lead the coalition from initial knowledge states to KG. In strategy finding algorithm, it is
assumed that an agent performs an action if he knows that he has the right permission.
Constraint definition in RW is flexible by allowing negation and universal and existen-
tial quantifiers in permissions. But the framework suffers from several major weaknesses:
• Overwriting steps are able to update only one proposition. This weakness reduces
the expressiveness of the language as some scenarios require updating several propo-
sitions in one step. For instance, if Alice is a reviewer in a conference paper review
system, when she resigns as the reviewer of a paper, all the sub-reviewers she allo-
cated to the paper should get deleted at the same time. Such bulk updating rules
can not be specified in RW policy language.
• For each proposition p, there are 7 relevant valuation of knowledge variables. There-
fore, the total number of knowledge states increases by the factor of 7 when the
number of propositions increases which causes the state explosion even in small and
medium size models.
• The knowledge state in RW stores the history of reading or altering propositions.
The transition system shows that the knowledge is incremental during state transi-
tions. Knowledge variables for different propositions are also independent. A side
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effect of such an approach is that reasoning about knowledge is not possible. For
example, consider the case that whenever the variables p is true, variable q turns to
true. Then knowing that p evaluates to true should reveal the value of q, while RW
is unable to handle such reasoning.
This thesis addresses the weakness of RW by first introducing a policy language that
supports variable bulk update and corresponding verification framework. The framework
performs verification over system states and is able to verify knowledge gained by reading
system variables. Our method does not handle memoryful knowledge as in RW, but the
ability of the language to handle variable bulk update provides the potential of incorporat-
ing memory into the system states. Chapter 4 explains the framework and implemented
tool. To verify knowledge by reasoning, we have proposed another verification method,
which is described in chapter 5.
2.2.5 DynPAL
DynPAL is a dynamic authorization policy language designed by Becker [11]. Compar-
ing to RW, DynPAL provides the additional features of bulk updates, nested actions,
intermediate conditions and postconditions. One of the major features in DynPAL is
that variables may range over infinite domains as in decentralized systems, the number of
principles may be unbounded. Two analysing methods are proposed to verify reachability
and safety properties over the policy. Reachability deals with the problem of finding a
sequence of actions that lead to a state that satisfies the required property, beginning
from initial states. Safety is the complimentary problem: the states that satisfy an un-
wanted property are not reachable from some initial states. To verify the reachability of
a property over a policy in DynPAL authorization language, the policy and the query
are translated into the PDDL (Planning Domain Definition Language) [49, 92] which is
the standard artificial intelligence planning language, and verified by an AI planner [55].
In the case of reachability analysis, the variables as the arguments of predicates range
over finite domains, otherwise the problem is undecidable. When analysing safety prop-
erties (policy invariants), the policy and invariance hypothesis can be transformed into a
problem of first order logic (FOL) and solved using a first order logic theorem prover [81].
In DynPAL, a state is a set of extensional ground atoms known as extensional database
in Datalog. Actions in DynPAL change the state by adding some ground atoms into
the state or retracting some of them. For instance and in our example of a conference
paper review system, the following rule:
delReviewer(p, a)← reviewer(a),¬submittedReview(p, a),
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−reviewer(p, a),−{subReviewer(p′, a′, b) : p′ = p, a′ = a}
demonstrates the situation where a principal resigns as the reviewer if he has not submitted
his review yet. The effect of such resignation is the retraction of the reviewer and his
allocated sub-reviewers form the extensional database and therefore it changes the state.
In DynPAL, insertion or retraction of atoms into the state are executed from left to
write. In the above rule, sub-reviewers are retracted after the reviewer. In some cases, this
sequential execution may result in different states when the order of updates is changed.
For example after executing −p(0),+p(0), the atom p(0) will stay in the state, while it
will not appear in the state when +p(0),−p(0) is executed.
Becker in [11] argues that specifying an initial state for the verification of safety prop-
erties is a limitation. While Becker’s approach for evaluating the reachability of a property
requires a single initial state to be specified, his approach for evaluating a safety property
does not have such a requirement. Experimental results show that in the case of verifying
safety properties, theorem proving and model-checking may have better performance than
a planner. Planner performs considerably faster when a plan to the states that satisfy the
property exists.
Introducing only one single initial state is rather restrictive but eliminating the re-
quirement to specify the initial condition seems to be too liberal. In practice, we would
like to verify if all the states that are reachable from the states that satisfy the initial con-
dition also satisfy the safety property. Therefore, it is more desirable to consider a set of
initial states instead of a single state. Moreover for such definition of safety, the theorem
proving approach may produce false-negative results in some scenarios as the states sat-
isfying safety property may be legitimately reachable from some system states other than
the initial states. Comparing to our work in this thesis, DynPAL is unable to evaluate
dynamic policies against information leakage vulnerabilities as a result of reasoning.
2.2.6 Deontic logic for privacy policy
Aucher et al. [7] developed a framework for security policies to specify and reason about
epistemic properties and check if they comply with the policy. The privacy policies are de-
fined in terms of permitted or forbidden knowledge. A method for reasoning about privacy
policies using an extension of a modal logic framework for security policies is provided,
which also enables reasoning about confidentiality by expressing epistemic modalities [37].
Their approach uses deontic logic [90] with obligatory and permission modalities. In de-
ontic logic, the notation Oα means “it is obligatory (or it ought to be) that α”, and Pα
means “it is permitted that α”. Aucher et al. introduced dynamic and epistemic features
to the previously developed modal logic and proved the soundness and completeness of
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the new logic, named DEDL (Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic). The paper deals with
two agents as sender and receiver which communicate together. If sender transfers some
information to the receiver, then receiver knows the information. The paper deals with
verifying what information can be send from sender to the receiver so that the receiver
will not be able to use them to reason about confidential information in sender’s side, or
what information is required for the receiver in order to know the obligatory information.
The language uses modality operator Osα to say “it is obligatory for the sender that α”,
Krα to say “the receiver knows that α” and K
′
rα similar as before for “the receiver knows
that α” while the second one always places in the scope of obligation modality and is
known as ideal knowledge of the recipient.
The dynamic part of the logic deals with sending or promulgating data. The language
adds the properties that describe what happens after recipient learns a fact or sender
promulgates some information. [send ψ] φ stands for “after recipient learns ψ, φ holds”
and [prom α] φ says “after sender promulgates α, φ holds.
The model in [7] only contains one sender and one receiver. Therefore, a multi-agent
system and the knowledge gained by interaction of the agents cannot be modelled in their
framework.
2.3 Model-checking for policy verification
Researchers may use different policy verification methods depending on their require-
ments, system properties and experience. Formal verification techniques contain the fol-
lowing main parts: (1) a formal specification language to describe the properties (2) a
model that is presented by a description language, and (3) a verification method to deter-
mine if the model satisfies the property. The verification method can be divided into the
two categories of proof-based and model-based techniques:
• The proof-based technique tries to find if the specification formula φ is derivable in
a logical system specified by a set of rules and axioms.
• In a model-based technique, the system is presented as a model M , and verification
computes whether the model satisfies the specification formula φ (denoted by M |=
φ).
Model-checking approach is simpler, easier to describe and automated for finite-state
models. Other interesting features of model-checking are fast verification, independence
of proof theory, producing counterexamples consisting of execution traces, and expressive
logic for concurrency properties. The main disadvantage of model-checking that motivated
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us to propose a method for abstraction refinement is the state explosion problem which
happens when the number of variables in the model increases.
The model-checking is based on verifying a temporal property over a model M which
is a finite-state transition system. Temporal logic describes the rules and symbolisms for
the presentation and reasoning about the properties in terms of time, i.e. the properties
that can be true in some states and false in some other states.
2.3.1 Linear-time and branching-time temporal logic
The specification languages in general fall into two categories of logics: linear-time logics
and branching-time logics. In linear-time logics, time is thought to be a set of paths of
time instances. Branching-time logic considers the time to be as a tree that branches
from current time to future.
Linear-time temporal logic (LTL) contains the modalities (also known as connectives)
that refer to the time in future. The syntax of LTL is built over the propositional atoms,
logical operators and modality operators X (neXt state), F (some Future state), G (Glob-
ally or all future states), U (Until), R (Release) and W (Weak-until). It is easy to show
that the {X, U} is an adequate set of modalities, meaning that the other modalities can
be expressed in terms of X and U. As an example for LTL logic, in a microwave oven it
is impossible to get a state where the microwave is working and the door is open. This
property is specified in LTL as G¬(started ∧ doorIsOpen). A state s in a model M
satisfies an LTL property if the property holds on all the paths that begin from s.
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is a branching-time logic that allows existential and
universal quantifiers over paths. From the point of quantification over paths, CTL provides
more flexibility for defining specifications. On the other hand, LTL allows selecting a
range of paths by describing those paths with a formula, which is not possible in CTL.
CTL keeps the modalities U, F, G and X of LTL and adds universal path quantifier
that expresses “for all paths” and existential quantifiers that means “a path exists”. For
example AG(p → EFq) expresses the property that for all paths and for all the states
along the paths (denoted by G), if p holds in a state, then there exists a path that a state
along it satisfies q. CTL* is an expressive logic that combines the expressive powers of
CTL and LTL.
NuSMV (New Symbolic Model Verifier) [27, 26] is a well-known model-checking tools
which verifies the properties of type LTL and CTL. NuSMV accepts a model written in
its description or modelling language together with some specifications and checks if the
model satisfies the specifications. Another well-known model-checker for LTL is SPIN
[56]. The name SPIN stands for “Simple Promela (Process Meta Language) Interpreter”.
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SPIN uses Bu¨chi automata as a part of model-checking algorithm.
A part of this research (chapter 4) deals with the properties that can not be expressed
in CTL or LTL. Therefore, we need to implement our own model-checking tool to verify
such properties. In chapter 5, we express our properties in CTLK, which is CTL logic
integrated with knowledge modality (refer to section 2.3.3 for more information).
2.3.2 Alternating-time temporal logic
Alur et al. [5] introduced alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) which generalises branching-
time temporal logic. ATL allows selective path quantifiers and defines a natural language
for open systems while LTL and CTL are specification languages for closed systems. In
closed systems, the system behaviour is determined by its own internal state, but in an
open system, the interaction between the external environment and the system affects
the behaviour of the system. Besides existential and universal quantifications over com-
putation paths, ATL deals with the question “can the system resolve the internal state
in such a way that the satisfaction of the specification in guaranteed, no matter how the
environment reacts?” [5].
ATL is suited for multi-agent or multi-process distributed systems as a concurrent
game structure. Each state transition is the result of the combination of movements
of the agents in each (time) step. To compare the properties in CTL and LTL, let’s
assume a property for the cache in a multi-processor system which states that deadlock
for the processor a should never happen (a cache-coherence property). The property
in CTL can be specified as (in modal logic notation): ∀2(∃3read ∧ ∃3write). The
property says “is it possible for all the processors to collaborate so that the processor a
can eventually read and write” which is called collaborative possibility. The ATL formula is
of the form ∀2(〈〈a〉〉3read∧〈〈a〉〉3write). The property specifies “always the processor
a can eventually access the memory, no matter what other processors do” which is known
as adversarial possibility.
Mocha [3, 2, 4] is the model-checker for ATL which supports modular specifications,
reasoning about synchronous and asynchronous heterogeneous systems, system execu-
tion simulation using randomization and manual techniques and requirement verification.
Some early experiences show that the capability of Mocha in verifying large systems is
limited [93].
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2.3.3 Model-checking epistemic properties
One of the most commonly used approaches in the concept of logic of knowledge is KT45n
or in some resources, S5n. Modal logic of knowledge KT45
n is generally used in multi-
agent systems, where each agent has its own knowledge about the world. A multi-agent
system contains a fixed set of agents. The modality Ki where i is an agent denotes the
knowledge of the agent i. For example, K1p ∧K1¬K2p means that agent 1 knows p, and
also knows that agent 2 does not know p. KT45n also introduces modalities EG that means
everyone in group G knows and CG as the common knowledge that means everyone knows,
and everyone knows that everyone knows, and everyone knows that everyone knows that
everyone knows, and so on. Distributed knowledge DG means the knowledge is distributed
among the members of the group and they can work the value out together if they do not
have the knowledge individually.
The model that linear-time and branching-time temporal logic will be evaluated on is
a Kripke model [58], which defines temporal transitions between the states. Interpreted
systems [45, 46] are the state transition models with one local state assigned for each
agent. Interpreted systems are specifically designed to reason about distributed systems
in terms of knowledge. Interpreted systems are multi-agent frameworks where the global
states are the Cartesian product of the local states, and the local states represent the
accessible information for the agents. The system is synchronised with an external clock.
In each clock cycle, each agent submits an action that is permitted according to the
local state he is in (determined by the concept of protocols) and the joint action is the
Cartesian product of the actions each agent submit. We will discuss the framework in
detail in future sections and when we model reasoning about knowledge in access control
systems.
One of the well developed model-checkers that evaluates knowledge-based properties
over interpreted systems is MCMAS (Model-Checker for Multi-Agent Systems) [75, 72].
MCMAS accepts an input script file containing the model in a description language called
ISPL, together with the specification. The specification formula is in ATLK (Alternating-
time temporal logic with knowledge). As an example and in the bit transmission problem
[45], a sender sends the value of a bit over a noisy channel that may drop the message, but
does not tamper it. In the case that the message receives the other end of the channel,
receiver replies by sending back an acknowledgement. Therefore if the sender receives the
acknowledgement, it knows that the receiver knows the value of the transmitted bit. This
property is expressed in MCMAS by the following syntax:
AG(recack -> K(Sender,(K(Receiver,bit0) or K(Receiver,bit1))))
where recack is the proposition that shows the acknowledgement has received to the
sender and K(x,y) means x knows that y.
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The main trade-off for the expressiveness of the properties that can be verified in
interpreted systems is the large number of state space and high verification time specially
when verifying epistemic properties. Therefore to verify medium to large systems, we
need to adopt abstraction techniques to overcome state explosion problem. One of the
main contributions of the thesis is adopting abstraction techniques to verify temporal and
epistemic properties over interpreted systems. We will review the common abstraction
techniques in the next section.
2.4 Abstraction techniques
Clarke et al. introduced existential abstraction technique for model-checking large state-
space systems [31]. The concept of abstraction for temporal-logic model-checking is build
over the theory of abstract interpretation [34]. Introducing binary decision diagrams
(BDD) [23] in 1986 improved the capability of verifying specifications over medium-
scale finite-state models, but it was still unable to handle complex properties over large-
industrial designs. Although the model-checking algorithm for verifying branching time
temporal logic CTL [29] is linear in the size of transition system and the length of specifi-
cation, the size of transition system increases exponentially when the number of variables
increases. This problem is known as state explosion problem in model-checking.
While applying BDD techniques in 1990 significantly increased the size of models from
1020 to 10100 states [24], Clarke et al. in 1994 claimed that using abstraction techniques
enabled them to verify large systems with 101300 reachable states [31]. The first abstrac-
tion technique called existential abstraction [31] which overestimates the concrete model
with the abstract one. CTL* is an expressive logic that combines the expressive power
of branching-time and linear time logic (LTL) [80, 89]. In existential abstraction, if a
property in ACTL* holds in the abstract model, then it holds in the concrete (original)
one. ACTL* is the fragment of CTL* where only universal path quantifier and negation
over atomic formulas is used.
In [30], Clarke et al. propose a complimentary approach for the existential abstraction.
They used the feature of model-checking ACTL* that returns a counterexample in the
case that the property does not hold in order to refine the abstract model. In existential
abstraction, the states are partitioned into clusters that construct the states in the abstract
model. For the refinement, the clusters split up into different sets to make the model more
precise. The power of counterexample-guided refinement is the intelligent splitting of the
clusters, in a way that the previous counterexample does not occur in the refined model.
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2.4.1 Counterexample-guided abstract refinement (CEGAR)
Clarke et al. [30] proposed a method to refine an abstract Kripke model build by ex-
istentially abstracting the concrete model. They combined two techniques of symbolic
model-checking [43, 28] and abstraction to achieve the best results for overcoming state
explosion problem. Symbolic model-checking prevents explicit construction of the Kripke
structure by encoding the set of states and transition relation into Boolean formulas. Set
operations like union and intersection can be transformed into disjunction and conjunction
of Boolean formulas. BDD techniques traditionally play an important role in presenting
Boolean formulas.
Simulation relation relates the states in the concrete model with the abstract one.
Let the relation H ⊆ S × S ′ be a simulation relation between the two Kripke models M
and M ′ where S and S ′ are the set of states in M and M ′. If (s, s′) ∈ H and there is
a transition from s to s1 ∈ S in the model M , then there exists s′1 ∈ S ′ where s′ has a
transition to s′1 and (s1, s
′
1) ∈ H. There are some other constraints that make a relation
to become a simulation relation between Kripke models, but it will be discussed later in
technical sections. If such a relation exists, we say that model M ′ simulates M denoted
by M  M ′. The important property that will hold between the two models is that if
ϕ is an ACTL* property over the atomic propositions of M ′, M  M ′ and M ′ |= ϕ,
then M |= ϕ (the notation |= stands for the satisfaction relation). In practice, we use
an abstraction function that maps the states in the concrete model to the corresponding
states in the abstract model [30].
The process of counterexample-guided abstraction refinement consists of three steps:
(1) generating the initial abstraction, (2) model-checking abstract model, (3) refining the
abstraction. In a model described by a program like a hardware description language,
the states are the different valuations of the variables. It is assumed that the number of
variables and the domains in which the variables are associated are finite. Therefore, we
will have a finite state model. To have a symbolic approach for clustering the states, the
variable domains are split into the variable clusters. The initial abstracted model is built
in such a way that it simulates the original one.
The result of model-checking the abstract model falls in one of the following: (1) the
property holds in the abstract model, (2) the property does not hold in the abstract model
and therefore a counterexample is generated. In case (1) and by the above discussions,
if the property holds in the abstract model, it also holds in the concrete model. In the
case that the model-checking results is an counterexample, it should be checked in order
to find out if it corresponds to a counterexample in the concrete model or it is spurious.
Spurious counterexample identification: The counterexample generated by the




Figure 2.3: The generated counterexample may not be valid on the concrete one. In the
abstract model, s˜0 is the abstract initial state that can reach to the abstract goal state
through a path. As demonstrated in the figure, there is no path in the concrete model
that begins with the initial state s0.
in the model, or loop when a liveness property fails. Let S0 be the set of initial states in
the concrete model, s˜0 be the initial state in counterexample c˜e and h be the abstraction
function. The counterexample identification algorithm (SplitPATH) [30] begins from
the states of st0 = h
−1(s˜0)∩S0. For all 0 < i < n where n−1 is the number of states over
c˜e, sti contains all the successor states (or images) of sti−1 that fall into the set h−1(s˜i).
It is proved that c˜e corresponds to a concrete counterexample if for all 0 < i < n we have
sti 6= ∅. In the case that i is the smallest index where sti = ∅, then the counterexample
c˜e is spurious and the state s˜i−1 is called failure state. If s˜i−1 is the failure state, then
dead-end states are the reachable states in sti−1 with no outgoing transition to another
state and bad states are unreachable states with outgoing transition to some states in
sti. The states that are not dead-end states or bad states are called irrelevant states.
To prevent the spurious counterexample to occur again, we separate the set of dead-end
states and bad states by splitting sti−1. Clarke et al. proved that finding the coarsest
refinement which separates the sets into the smallest size is NP-hard.
To identify spurious loop counterexamples, the loops will be unwinded and turned into
a finite path. In general, unwinding algorithm may become exponential time, but the
paper shows that only a polynomial time process is sufficient for spurious counterexample
identification. The algorithm SplitLOOP in the paper finds the appropriate index of the
failure state in the original counterexample.
CEGAR is used as the basic framework for many abstraction refinement techniques for
software and hardware verification [91, 67] and have been used in various model-checking
tools like SLAM [9, 8], BLAST [53, 54] and MAGIC [25]. The basic CEGAR framework is
restricted to finite or infinite path counterexamples. In 2002, Clarke et al. [32] proposed
a method for the generation of tree-like counterexamples for ACTL in such a way that
they can be easily handled in the process of abstraction refinement.
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2.4.2 Abstraction in model-checking multi-agent systems
In the recent years, several attempts have been made in the field of abstraction for multi-
agent systems [44, 40]. Cohen et al. [33] first adopted the existential abstraction for
interpreted systems. The specification is expressed in ACTLK, which is the ACTL logic
with knowledge modality K. They modified the simulation relation defined in [30] for
interpreted systems with respect to the epistemic possibility relation between the local
states. It is proved in the paper that if model I˜ simulates I, ϕ is an ACTLK formula and
ϕ holds in I˜, then ϕ holds in I. In their paper, they have shown that a quotient of an
interpreted system which maps the local states, actions, local transitions and protocols
into the equivalent classes will simulates the original one.
The paper has the importance of introducing the concept of existential abstraction into
the multi-agent framework of interpreted systems. On the other hand, the abstraction
mechanism is not automated. Moreover, no refinement methods is proposed in the case
the abstract model does not satisfy the property.
2.4.3 Abstraction refinement for multi-agent systems
Maybe the first attempt to overcome the difficulties of abstraction refinement for the
verification of epistemic properties is the recent research done by Zhou et al. [96]. They
modified the tree-like counterexample generation method in [32] to cover the ACTLK
specifications. The paper adopts similar approach as in [33] to build up an abstract
model in which overestimates the concrete one. The main difference is that Cohen et al.
approach is to abstract the model by first abstracting the agent-specific components like
local states and local transitions, and then building up the abstract interpreted system.
In this paper of Zhou et al. the global states will be split into equivalent classes and the
global transition relation will get existentially quantified.
The main contribution of the paper more than abstraction and refinement is proposing
a method for tree-like counterexample generation for ACTLK. A counterexample gener-
ated by verifying the specification ϕ is defined as an interpreted system in which (1)
satisfies ¬ϕ (2) underestimates the concrete model or in the other words, the concrete
model simulates the counterexample. To find the counterexample, the mode-checker first
builds the parse tree of the formula ¬ϕ and traverses the tree in a depth-first manner.
This process is not simple in the case when ¬Ki appears in the formula. The authors
proposed the procedure print witnessK¯i to output the counterexample related to the
epistemic property. The paper have several major issues like (1) the authors consider a
system with single initial state by assuming the possibility of transforming every inter-
preted system to the one with a single initial state (2) the refinement approach is not
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well explained especially when the counterexample is the result of verifying an epistemic
property (3) case studies does not properly shows how the states are partitioned, what
are the valuation of the propositions in each partition, and how the process of refinement
proceeds.





This chapter provides a policy language definition together with the materials and termi-
nologies that are used in chapters 4 and 5 for the verification of dynamic access control
systems.
3.1 Introduction
In a multi-agent system, the agents authenticate themselves by using the provided au-
thentication mechanisms, such as login by username and password, and it is assumed that
the mechanism is secure and reliable. Each agent is authorized to perform actions, which
can change the system state by changing the values of several system variables (in our
case, atomic propositions). Performing actions in the system encapsulates three aspects:
the agent request for the action, allowance by the system and system transition to another
state. In this thesis, we consider agents performing different actions asynchronously ; a
realistic approach in computer systems.
Asynchronous system: In synchronous systems agents can perform actions in parallel
in each clock cycle, whereas in an asynchronous systems only one of the agents performs
an action per clock cycle. One of the common problems in synchronous systems is the
race condition. Let us demonstrate this problem with an example:
Example 3.1. Imagine a conference paper review system and two agents Alice and Bob
as the reviewers of paper p. Consider the case where both the agents decide to assign
Tom as the sub-reviewer of paper p, which is not a reviewer or sub-reviewer of p. Further
assume that the security policy of the system contains the following rule:
• An agent can be assigned as the sub-reviewer of a paper if he is not already a
reviewer or sub-reviewer of that paper.
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If both Alice and Bob assign Tom as their sub-reviewer at the same time (same clock
cycle), the precondition for the assignment is satisfied for both the reviewers. But after
the assignment, Tom is assigned to the same paper by two reviewers, which is an unwanted
situation. This problem does not occur when actions are performed asynchronously.
In our approach, we are not interested in security breaches caused by race condition.
We consider that such issues are handled by memory locks or other application level
methods. In general and in real systems, different requests are held in a queue and
processed one at a time asynchronously. So, it is a realistic approach to model access
control systems in asynchronous manner.
3.2 Access control policy
We present a simple policy language that is expressive enough to handle integrity con-
straints which are the rules that must remain true to preserve integrity of data, and policy
invariants.
Syntax definition: Let T be a set of types which includes a special type Agent for
agents and Pred be a finite set of predicates such that each n-ary predicate has a type
t1 × · · · × tn → {>,⊥}, for some ti ∈ T , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let V be a finite set of typed
variables where the types are from the set T . We use the notation ~v to specify a sequence
of distinct variables. An atomic formula is a predicate that is applied to a sequence of
variables with the appropriate length and type.
The syntax of access control policy language is as follows:
L ::= > | ⊥ | w(~v) | L ∨ L | L ∧ L | L→ L | ¬L | ∀v : t [L] | ∃v : t [L]
W ::= + w(~v) | − w(~v) | ∀v : t. W
Ws ::= W | Ws,W
Action rule AR ::= id(~v) : {Ws} ← L
Read rule RR ::= id(~v) : w(~v)← L
In the above syntax, L is a logical formula and consists of atomic formulas combined
by logical connectives and existential and universal quantifiers, w ∈ Pred , and w(~v) is an
atomic formula. The formula L defines the condition for performing an action or reading
an atomic formula. {Ws} is the effect of the action rule that includes the updates. +w(~v)
in the effect means executing the action will set the value of w(~v) to true and −w(~v)
means setting the value to false. In the case of ∀v.W in the effect, the action updates
the signed atomic formula in W for all possible values of v. In the case that an atomic
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formula appears with different signs in multiple quantifications in the effect (for instance,
w(c, d) in ∀x. + w(c, x),∀y. − w(y, d)), then only the sign of the last quantification is
considered. The notation id indicates the rule identifier.
Let a(~v) : E ← L be an action rule. The free variables of the logical formula L are
denoted by fv(L) and are defined in the standard way. We also define fv(E) =
⋃
e∈E fv(e)
where fv(±w(~x)) = ~x and fv(∀x.W )=fv(W )\x. We stipulate: fv(E)∪fv(L) ⊆ ~v. If
r(~v) : w(~u)← L is a read rule, then ~u ∪fv(L) ⊆ ~v.
In an asynchronous multi-agent system, it is crucial to know the agent that performs
an action. Multi-agent system are any collection of interacting agents [46]. By definition,
the first argument of an action rule is the agent that performs the action. The first
argument of a read permission rule is the agent that reads the atomic formula to the left
of the arrow.
Example 3.2. A conference paper review system policy contains the following properties
for unassigning a reviewer from a paper:
• A chair is permitted to unassign the reviewers (rev).
• If a reviewer is removed, all the corresponding subreviewers (subRev) should be
removed from the system at the same time.
The unassignment action rule can be formalized as follows:
delRev(u, p, a) : {-rev(p, a),∀b : Agent. -subRev(p, a, b)} ← chair(u) ∧ rev(p, a)
Example 3.2 shows how updating several variables synchronously can preserve integrity
constraints. The RW framework is unable to handle such integrity constraint as it can
only update one proposition at a time.
3.3 Policy rule instantiation
Let Σ be a finite set of objects such that each object in Σ has a type. Σt ⊆ Σ is the set
of objects of type t. An atomic formula is ground if it is variable-free; i.e. its variables
are substituted with the objects of the same type in Σ. For instance, if reviewer∈ Pred
with two arities of type Agent, and Bob,Paper∈ ΣAgent, then reviewer(Bob,Paper) is a
ground atomic formula. In the context of this thesis, we call the ground atomic formulas
(atomic) propositions, since they only evaluate to true and false.
An action α : ε ← ` contains an identifier α together with the evolution rule ε ← `,
which is constructed by instantiating all the arguments in an action rule a(~v) : E ← L
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with the objects of the same type in Σ. We refer to the whole action by its identifier α.
Since the number of objects is finite, each quantified logical formula in L will be expanded
to a finite number of conjunctions (for ∀ quantifier) or disjunctions (for ∃ quantifier) of
logical formulas during the instantiation phase. The ground formula `, which is the
instantiation of L, determines the condition in which action α can be performed and is
called permission. During the instantiation, the universal quantifiers in the effect will be
expanded into a finite number of signed atomic propositions. If after instantiation, an
atomic formula appears in the effect with different signs, we only consider the sign of the
last occurrence.
For instance, if the policy contains the rule:
assignReviewer(x, y, p) : {+reviewer(y, p)} ← chair(x) ∧ pcMember(y) ∧ ¬author(p, y)
and Alice, Bob ∈ ΣAgent, Paper1 ∈ ΣPaper, then the following instantiation of the rule:
assignReviewer(Alice,Bob,Paper1) : {+reviewer(Bob,Paper1)}
← chair(Alice) ∧ pcMember(Bob) ∧ ¬author(Paper1,Bob)
denotes an action where Alice assigns Bob as the reviewer of Paper1. The right hand side
of the arrow is a ground formula produced by substituting the variables x, y and p which
is permission. If the permission is satisfied, then performing the action makes the system
evolve by setting the value of reviewer(Bob,Paper1) to true. During the evolution, the
values of all the propositions except the ones that appear in the effect remain the same.
A read permission ρ : p ← ` is constructed by instantiating the arguments in read
permission rule r(~v) : w(~u)← L with the objects of the same type in Σ. ρ is the identifier,
p is a proposition and ` is the condition for reading p.
Definition 3.1 (Active agent). If α is an action, then Ag(α) denotes the agent that
performs α. As previously stated, this agent is the first argument of an action. For
instance:
Ag(assignReviewer(Alice,Bob,Paper1)) = Alice
For a read permission ρ : p← `, Ag(ρ) denotes the agent that reads the proposition p.
Definition 3.2 (Policy). An access control policy denoted by C is a finite set of actions
and read permissions derived by instantiating a set of rules with a finite set of typed
objects.
Definition 3.3 (Action effect). Let α : ε← ` be an action. Then we define:
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effect+(α) = {p | + p ∈ ε}
effect−(α) = {p | − p ∈ ε}
effect(α) = effect+(α) ∪ effect−(α)
Example 3.3. In the action rule presented in example 3.2, assume we have 3 objects as
ΣAgent = {a1, a2} and Σpaper = {p1}. During instantiation phase, the action rule will be
compiled into four instances: delRev(a1, p1, a1), delRev(a1, p1, a2), delRev(a2, p1, a1) and
delRev(a2, p1, a2). The effect of the action delRev(a1, p1, a2) will be:
effect+(delRev(a1, p1, a2)) = {}
effect−(delRev(a1, p1, a2)) = {rev(p1, a2), subRev(p1, a2, a1), subRev(p1, a2, a2)}
effect(delRev(a1, p1, a2)) = {rev(p1, a2), subRev(p1, a2, a1), subRev(p1, a2, a2)}
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we first introduced a policy language and then described the process of
generating a set of actions and read permissions called policy, given a set of rules and
a finite set of objects. In chapters 4 and 5, we use the same policy language for the
description of access rules in order to build an access control model, but we evaluate the
properties of different types.
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CHAPTER 4
POLIVER: A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ACCESS
CONTROL VERIFICATION TOOL
In this chapter, a new approach for automated knowledge-based verification of dynamic
access control policies is presented. The verification method not only discovers if a vulner-
ability exists, but also produces the strategies that can be used by the attacker to exploit
the vulnerability. It investigates the information needed by the attacker to achieve the
goal and whether he acquires that information when he proceeds through the strategy or
not. The algorithm is implemented and released as an open source policy verification tool
called PoliVer.
The knowledge verification in PoliVer is limited to knowledge by readability. This
abstraction of knowledge enhances the verification speed and memory usage of the tool.
We argue that most - but not all - of the vulnerabilities can be investigated by this
simplified concept of knowledge. In the next chapter, we will extend the knowledge-based
verification to the knowledge by reasoning and present some vulnerabilities that can not
be discovered by PoliVer and other access control verification tools.
Given the policy language in chapter 3, in this chapter we provide a verification algo-
rithm which is able to find a strategy in a more efficient way than the guessing approach in
a similar knowledge-based verification framework called RW [94]. This is because unlike
RW which the verification algorithm is build around knowledge states and supports mem-
oryful knowledge, the knowledge in our algorithm is memoryless and it is build around
system states. But as our policy language supports variable bulk update, knowledge
variables can be easily incorporated into the policy when it is required.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The transition system and query lan-
guage are introduced in Section 4.1. Model-checking strategy is explained in Section 4.2.
Knowledge evaluation of the strategies is presented in Section 4.3. Experimental results
are provided in section 4.5 and conclusions and future work are explained in Section 4.6.
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4.1 Definitions
In this section, we describe how to build a labelled transition system from a policy. We
also present a query language, which specifies the properties that we aim to verify over
the system.
4.1.1 Building a labelled transition system from a policy
Given an access control policy (see definition 3.2), we build a labelled transition system
as in the following definition.
Definition 4.1. Let C be a policy. Then the labelled transition system derived from C
is:
MC = 〈S,Act, S0, P, τ, γ〉
where (1) P is the set of atomic propositions that appear in C (2) S is the set of states
where each state is a valuation of the propositions in P (3) Act is the set of actions in C
(4) S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states (5) γ : S × P → {>,⊥} is the labelling function (6)
τ : Act× S → S is the partial transition function. If α : ε← ` ∈ C and ` holds in s, then
τ(α, s) is defined as s′ such that
γ(s′, p) =

> if + p ∈ ε
⊥ if − p ∈ ε
γ(s, p) Otherwise
For the rest of this chapter, we use the shorthand notation s
α−→ s′ for stating τ(α, s) =
s′. Note that as the set of initial states is not determined by the policy, the number of
transition systems derivable from C is 2n where n = |S|. Also read permissions in C are
not involved in building the labelled transition system and will be considered in query
evaluation and knowledge verification over the system.
4.1.2 Query language
Verification of the policy deals with the reachability problem, one of the most common
properties arising in temporal logic verification. A state s is reachable if it can be reached
in a finite number of transitions from the initial states. In multi-agent access control
systems, the transitions are made by the agents performing actions.
The query language determines the initial condition and the specification. The syntax
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of the policy query is:
L ::= > | ⊥ | w(~v) | 〈w(~v)〉 | L ∨ L | L ∧ L | L→ L | ¬L | ∀v : t [L] | ∃v : t [L]
W ::= w(~v) | w(~v) ∗ | w(~v)! | w(~v)∗! | ¬W
Ws ::= null | Ws,W
G ::= C : (L) | C : (L THEN G)
Query ::= {Ws} → G
where w(~v) is an atomic formula and C is a set of variables of type Agent.
In the above definition, G is called a nested goal if it contains the keyword THEN,
otherwise it is called a simple goal. C is a coalition of agents interacting together to
achieve the goal in the system. Also the agents in a coalition share the knowledge gained
by reading system propositions or performing actions. The specification 〈w(~v)〉 means
w(~v) is readable by at least one of the agents in the coalition. The initial condition is
specified by the literals in {Ws}. Every literal W is optionally tagged with * when the
value of atomic formula is fixed during verification, and/or tagged with ! when the value
is initially known by at least one of the agents in the outermost coalition.
Example 4.1. One of the properties for a proper conference paper review system policy
is that the reviewers (rev) of a paper should not be able to read other submitted reviews
(submittedR) before they submit their own reviews. Consider the following query:
{chair(c)∗!,¬author(p, a)∗, submittedR(p, b), rev(p, a),¬submittedR(p, a)} →
{a} : (〈review(p, b)〉 ∧ ¬submittedR(p, a) THEN {a, c} : (submittedR(p, a)))
The query says “starting from the states satisfying the initial condition, is there any
reachable state that agent a can promote himself in such a way that he will be able to
read the review of the agent b for paper p while he has not submitted his own review
and after that, agent a and c collaborate together so that agent a can submit his review
of paper p?”. If the specification holds, then there exists a security hole in the policy
and should be fixed by policy designers. In the above query, the values of chair(c) and
author(p, a) are fixed and chair(c) is known to be true by the agent a at the beginning.
The above query is similar to the query 6.3 in RW [94] except the fact that in RW, the
readability of review(p, b) is memoryful (coalition memorizes the value of review(p, b)
whenever one of the agents reads its value), while in our case is memoryless.
Instantiation of the policy query: An instantiated query or simply query is the
policy query with the variables substituted with the objects of appropriate type.
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Definition 4.2 (Satisfaction relation). Let C be a ground policy, init → g a query, C
a coalition of agents, and MC a derived transition system from C with the set of initial
states S0 as defined by init . Let Ag be the function defined by the definition 3.1. For
any goal g, the notation (MC, s, C) |= g means that given the coalition C, g holds in state
s of the model MC. The satisfaction relation |= is defined inductively as follows:
(MC, s, C) |= p ⇔ γ(s, p) = >
(MC, s, C) |= ¬φ ⇔ (MC, s, C) 6|= φ
(MC, s, C) |= φ1 ∨ φ2 ⇔ (MC, s, C) |= φ1 or (MC, s, C) |= φ2
(MC, s, C) |= 〈p〉 ⇔ there exists a read permission ρ : p← ` ∈ C such that
Ag(ρ) ∈ C and (MC, s, C) |= `
(MC, s, C) |= C ′ : (φ) ⇔ there exists a path s1 α1−→ . . . αn−1−−−→ sn such that s = s1 and
(1) For all 1 ≤ i < n: Ag(αi) ∈ C ′
(2) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n: (MC, si, C ′) |= p if p∗ ∈ init and (MC, si, C ′) 6|= p if ¬p∗ ∈ init
(3) (MC, sn, C ′) |= φ
(MC, s, C) |= C ′ : (φ1 THEN φ2) ⇔ there exists a path s1 α1−→ . . . αn−1−−−→ sn such that s = s1 and
(1) For all 1 ≤ i < n: Ag(αi) ∈ C ′
(2) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n: (MC, si, C ′) |= p if p∗ ∈ init and (MC, si, C ′) 6|= p if ¬p∗ ∈ init
(3) (MC, sn, C ′) |= φ1 and (MC, sn, C ′) |= φ2
We use the notation MC |= g if for all s0 ∈ S0 : (MC, s0, ∅) |= g.
If a query is found to be positive in an access control system, then there exists a
conditional sequence of actions called strategy (defined below) that makes the agents
in the coalitions achieve the goal beginning from all the initial states. The strategy is
presented formally by the following syntax:
strategy ::=null | α; strategy | if(p) {strategy} else {strategy}
In the above syntax, p is an atomic proposition and α is an action. The value of p is
not defined in the initial condition and can be true in some initial states and false in the
others. If a strategy contains a condition over the proposition p, it means the value of p
determines the required sequence of actions to achieve the goal. p is known as an effective
proposition in our methodology.
Definition 4.3. (Transition relation). Given a labelled transition systemM , let s1, s2 ∈ S
where S is the set of states, and ξ be a strategy. We use s1 →ξ s2 to denote “strategy ξ
can be run in state s1 and result in s2”, which is defined inductively as follows:
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• s→null s.
• s→α;ξ1 s′ if
– If ` is the permission of α, then (M, s, ∅) |= `, and
– s′′ →ξ1 s′ where s α−→ s′′.
• s→if(p){ξ1} else {ξ2} s′ if:
– If γ(s, p) = > then s→ξ1 s′ else s→ξ2 s′.
A set of states st2 is reachable from the set of states st1 through strategy ξ (st1 →ξ st2)
if st1 contains all the states s1 which there exists s2 ∈ st2 such that s1 →ξ s2.
Definition 4.4. (State formula). If S is the set of states in labelled transition system M
and st ⊆ S then:
• fst is a propositional formula satisfying exactly the states in st:
s ∈ st ↔ (M, s, ∅) |= fst
• stf is the set of states satisfying f : s ∈ stf ↔ (M, s, ∅) |= f
4.2 Model-checking and strategy synthesis
Our method uses backward search to find a strategy. Given a query init → g and model
M with the initial states as defined by init , let goal states stg be the set of states that
satisfy the property of the innermost goal in g, and initials states be the states defined by
init . The algorithm begins from stg and finds all the states with transition to the current
state, called pre-states. The algorithm continues finding pre-states over all found states
until it gets all the initial states (success) or no new state could be found (fail).
The model-checking problem in this research is not a simple reachability question. As
illustrated in figure 4.1, the strategy is successful only if it works for all the outcomes
of reading or guessing a proposition in the model. Thus, reading/guessing behaviour
produces the need for a universal quantifier, while actions are existentially quantified.
The resulting requirement has an alternation of universal and existential quantifiers of
arbitrary length, and this cannot be expressed using standard temporal logics such as
CTL, LTL or ATL.
Notation 4.1. Assume f is a propositional formula. Then p ∈ prop(f) if proposition p




states with p = >
st1








Figure 4.1: Strategy finding method. Ovals represent sets of states. Solid lines show the
existence of an action that makes a transition between two sets of states. Dashed lines are
universally quantified over the outcome of reading or guessing the value of proposition p.
Definition 4.5. (Pre states). Let init → g be a query, MC be a labelled transition system
derived from policy C with the initial states as defined by init . If action α : ε← ` ∈ Act
and st ⊆ S, then PRE∃α(st) is the set of states in which action α is permitted to perform
and performing the action will make a transition to one of the states in st by changing
the values of the propositions in the effect of the action. Let Lit∗ be the set of literals
that are tagged by ∗ in init . Then:
PRE∃α(st) =
{
s ∈ S | (M, s, ∅) |= `, τ(α, s) = s′, s′ ∈ st and for all l ∈ Lit∗ : (M, s, ∅) |= l
}
The symbolic (BDD-based) presentation of PRE∃α is contained in appendix A.
4.2.1 Finding effective propositions
Definition 4.6. (Effective proposition). In labelled transition system M , atomic propo-
sition p is effective with respect to S0 as the set of initial states and stg as the set of goal
states if there exists a set of states st ⊆ S and strategies ξ0, ξ1 and ξ2 such that ξ1 6= ξ2
and:
• S0 →ξ0 st,
• st ∩ {s | γ(s, p) = >} →ξ1 stg,
• st ∩ {s | γ(s, p) = ⊥} →ξ2 stg and
• st ∩ {s | γ(s, p) = >} 6= ∅, st ∩ {s | γ(s, p) = ⊥} 6= ∅.
Effective propositions are important for the following reason:
The value of proposition p is not specified in the query and is not known by the agents
at the beginning. The agents need to know the value of p to select the appropriate strategy
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to achieve the goal. In the states of st, if the agent (or coalition of agents) knows the
value of p, he will perform the next action without taking any risk. Otherwise, he needs
to guess the value of p. This situation is risky and in the case of a wrong decision and
may not be repeatable.
The algorithm provided in this section is capable of finding effective propositions while
searching for strategies, and then, is able to verify the knowledge of the agents about
effective propositions in the decision states. The algorithm is guided by proposition 4.5
in order to detect effective propositions in backward search.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that f is a well-formed first order logic formula, C is a coalition
of agents, p is a proposition and s is a state in labelled transition system M . Suppose
that (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= f [>/p]. Then we have (M, s, C) |= f .
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction. Assume that f is in NNF (negation
normal form).
Base cases:
• f = p: By hypothesis, (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= >. Then (M, s, C) |= p.
• f = q, q 6= p: By hypothesis, (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= q. Then we have
(M, s, C) |= q.
• f = ¬p: By hypothesis, (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= ⊥. This case is impossible.
• f = ¬q, q 6= p: By hypothesis, (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= ¬q. Therefore
(M, s, C) |= ¬q.
Inductive cases:
Assume by inductive hypothesis that for two given well-formed logical formulas f1 and
f2 that are presented in NNF, if (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= f1[>/p] then (M, s, C) |=
f1, and if (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= f2[>/p] then (M, s, C) |= f2.
Case 1: We need to show that if (M, s, C) |= p and (M, s, C) |= (f1 ∧ f2)[>/p], then
(M, s, C) |= f1 ∧ f2.
If (M, s, C) |= (f1∧ f2)[>/p] then (M, s, C) |= f1[>/p] and (M, s, C) |= f2[>/p] holds.
By inductive hypothesis, we have (M, s, C) |= f1 and (M, s, C) |= f2, which is equivalent
to (M, s, C) |= f1 ∧ f2.
Case 2: For the second inductive case, we need to show that if (M, s, C) |= p and
(M, s, C) |= (f1 ∨ f2)[>/p], then (M, s, C) |= f1 ∨ f2.
If (M, s, C) |= (f1 ∨ f2)[>/p] then (M, s, C) |= f1[>/p] or (M, s, C) |= f2[>/p] holds.
By inductive hypothesis, we have (M, s, C) |= f1 or (M, s, C) |= f2, which is equivalent
to (M, s, C) |= f1 ∨ f2.
So, we can conclude that for every well-formed formula f , proposition 4.1 holds.
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Proposition 4.2. Suppose that f is a well-formed first order logic formula, C is a coalition
of agents, p is a proposition and s is a state in labelled transition system M . Suppose
that (M, s, C) |= ¬p and (M, s, C) |= f [⊥/p]. Then we can conclude that (M, s, C) |= f .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for the proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.3. Let st1 be a set of states in labelled transition system M and p ∈
prop(fst1). Suppose s ∈ stfst1[>/p] and γ(s, p) = >, then s ∈ st1.
Proof. By definition 4.4, s ∈ stfst1[>/p] is equivalent to (M, s, C) |= fst1 [>/p]. Also
γ(s, p) = > is equivalent to (M, s, C) |= p. By proposition 4.1, (M, s, C) |= fst1 , which
allows us to conclude s ∈ st1.
Proposition 4.4. Let st1 be a set of states in labelled transition system M and p ∈
prop(fst1). Suppose s ∈ stfst1[⊥/p] and γ(s, p) = ⊥, then s ∈ st1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for proposition 4.3.
Proposition 4.5. Let st1, st2 and stg be sets of states and ξ1 and ξ2 be strategies
such that st1 →ξ1 stg and st2 →ξ2 stg. Suppose p ∈ prop(fst1) ∩ prop(fst2), std =
stfst1[>/p] ∩ stfst2[⊥/p] and s ∈ std. Then if γ(s, p) = >, we conclude that s →ξ1 stg,
otherwise s→ξ2 stg will be concluded.
Proof. If s ∈ std then s ∈ stfst1 [>/p]. If γ(s, p) = > then by proposition 4.3, s ∈ st1 and
therefore s →ξ1 st. If γ(s, p) = ⊥, since s ∈ stfst2 [⊥/p], then by proposition 4.4 we have
s ∈ st2, resulting in s→ξ2 st.
Let stg in proposition 4.5 be the set of goal states, std the set of states found according
to the proposition 4.5 and S0 the set of initial states. If there exist a strategy ξ0 such that
S0 →ξ0 std, then by definition 4.6, the atomic proposition p is an effective proposition and
therefore std →if(p) {ξ1} else {ξ2} stg. The states in std are called decision states.
Example 4.2. Let the following be the policy rules for changing a password in a system
where the arguments of the predicates are of type Agent:
setTrick(a) : {+trick(a)} ← ¬permission(a),
changePass(a) : {+passChanged(a)} ← permission(a) ∨ trick(a)
In the above policy rules, the administrator of the system has defined permission for chang-
ing password. The permission declares that one of the atomic formulas permission(a)
or trick(a) is needed for changing password. permission(a) is write protected for the
agents and no action is defined for changing it. If an agent does not have permission
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to change his password, he can set trick(a) to true first and then, he will be able to
change the password. This can be seen as a mistake in the policy. We have excluded read
permission rules, as they are not required in this particular example for query verification
and will be considered only in knowledge verification phase.
Consider that we have just one object of type Agent in the system (ΣAgent = {a1}) and
we want to verify the query {} → {a} : (passChanged(a)). The only possible instantiation
of the query is when variable a is assigned to a1. As the initial condition is empty, no
condition is defined to specify the initial states and therefore they cover all the system
states. Let policy C be derived by instantiating the rules with agent a1 and MC be the
labelled transition system derived from C with S as the set of states where each state in
S is a valuation of the propositions trick(a1), permission(a1) and changePass(a1), and
S0 = S. The following procedures show how a strategy can be found:
fstg = passChanged(a1)
We can find one set of states as the pre-state of stg:
fPRE∃
changePass(a1)
(stg) = fst1 = permission(a1) ∨ trick(a1)
st1 →changePass(a1) stg
fstg and fst1 don’t share any proposition and hence, proposition 4.5 is not applicable.
For the set st1, we can find one pre-set:
fPRE∃
setTrick(a1)
(st1) = fst2 = ¬permission(a1)
st2 →setTrick(a1);changePass(a1) stg
Based on propositon 4.5 and for the states st1 and st2 and proposition p = permission(a1)
we have:
fst1 [>/p] = >, fst2 [⊥/p] = >, fst1 [>/p] ∧ fst2 [⊥/p] = >
st3 = st> = S st3 →ξ stg
ξ =if (permission(a1)){changePass(a1)} else {setTrick(a1); changePass(a1)}
Since S0 ⊆ st3, the goal is reachable and we output the strategy.
Backward search transition filtering: If an action changes a proposition, the
value of the proposition will be set and known for the rest of the strategy. So in backward
search algorithm, we filter out the transitions that alter effective propositions before their
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corresponding decision states are reached.
Definition 4.7. (State strategy). Consider stg as the set of goal states. State strategy is
the triple (st, ξ, efv) defined inductively as follows:
• (stg, null, ∅) is a state strategy.
• (st, α; ξ, efv) is a state strategy if:
– For all p ∈ effect(α): p 6∈ efv and
– (st′, ξ, efv) is a state strategy where st′ = {s′ | s α−→ s′, s ∈ st}.
• (st, if(p){ξ1} else {ξ2}, efv) is a state strategy if:
– p ∈ efv ,
– (stfst∧p, ξ1, efv\{p}) is a state strategy and
– (stfst∧¬p, ξ2, efv\{p}) is a state strategy.
In the above definition, st contains all the states that some states in stg are reachable
from them through the strategy ξ, and efv is the set of effective propositions in ξ. The
definition enforces a control condition in the verification process, preventing effective
propositions from being altered in previous steps.
4.2.2 Pseudocode for finding strategy
Let C be a policy, init → C(L) a simple query and M a derived labelled transition
system from C with the set of initial states S0 as defined by init . Let P be the set of
atomic propositions, AC ∈ Act the set of all the actions that the agents in coalition C
can perform, and stg the set of all the states s ∈ S where (M, s, C) |= L. KC contains
the propositions known by the agents in coalition C at the beginning (tagged with ! in
init). The triple (st, ξ, efv) is the state strategy, which keeps the set of states st found
during backward search, the strategy ξ to reach the goal from st and the set of effective
propositions efv occurring in ξ. The pseudocode for the strategy finding algorithm is
demonstrated in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, the outermost while loop checks the fixed point of the algorithm, where
no more state (or equivalently, state strategy) could be found in backward search. Inside
the while loop, the algorithm traverses the state strategy set that contains (stg, null, ∅)
at the beginning. For each state strategy (st, ξ, efv), it finds all the possible pre-states
for st and appends the corresponding state strategies to the set. It also finds effective
propositions and decision states by performing pairwise analysis between all the members
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Algorithm 1 Strategy finding algorithm
1: . Input: S0 is the set of initial states, stg is the set of goal states, P is the set of
atomic propositions, AC is the set of actions the coalition C can perform and KC is
the set of known propositions by the coalition C.
2: . Output: returns a set of strategies.
3:
4: state strategies :={(stg, null, ∅)}
5: states seen:=∅
6: old strategies :=∅
7:
8: while old strategies 6=state strategies do
9: old strategies :=state strategies
10: for all (st1, ξ1, efv 1) ∈ state strategies do
11: for all α ∈ AC do
12: if effect(α) ∩ efv 1 = ∅ then
13: PRE := PRE∃α(st1)
14: if PRE 6= ∅ and PRE 6⊆ states seen then
15: states seen := states seen ∪ PRE
16: ξ := “α; ” + ξ1
17: state strategies := state strategies ∪ {(PRE, ξ, efv 1)}







25: for all (st2, ξ2, efv 2) ∈ state strategies do
26: for all p ∈ P\KC do
27: if p ∈ prop(fst1) ∩ prop(fst2) then
28: PRE := stfst1[>/p] ∩ stfst2[⊥/p]
29: if PRE 6= ∅ and PRE 6⊆ states seen then
30: states seen := states seen ∪ PRE
31: ξ := “if(p)” + ξ1 + “else” + ξ2
32: state strategies := state strategies ∪ {(PRE, ξ, efv 1 ∪ efv 2 ∪
{p})}










of the state strategy set based on the proposition 4.5. The strategy will be returned if
the initial states are found in backward search.
Proposition 4.6. (Termination) The algorithm eventually terminates.
Proof. The algorithm terminates when the while-loop terminates. The loop terminates
if: the inner for-loops terminate, and no new state strategy could be found. The for-loops
in lines 11 and 26 iterate over fixed size sets and will eventually terminate. The for-loops
in lines 10 and 25 iterate over the set state strategies that may increase in size in each
loop iteration. The loops add a new state strategy to the set if some states that were
not seen before are encountered (lines 13 and 28). By the fact that the number of states
are finite, the size of state strategies is bounded by the maximum number of states and
correspondingly, the number of for-loop iterations are bounded. By the same reason, we
can conclude that the number of newly found states is also bounded by the maximum
number of states and the while-loop terminating condition will eventually satisfy.
Proposition 4.7. For all (st, ξ, efv) ∈ state strategies , st contains all the states s in
which ξ can be run in s and result in s′ ∈ stg.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction over the set state strategies .
Base case:
• state strategies = {(stg, null, ∅)}: The proposition trivially holds.
Inductive cases: We assume by inductive hypothesis that the proposition holds for all
(st, ξ, efv) ∈ state strategies . Then two different state strategies may be added to the set
in the next while loop iteration:
• (PRE∃α(st), α; ξ, efv) where (st, ξ, efv) ∈ state strategies :
The set PRE∃α(st) contains all the states s where s
α−→ s′ and s′ ∈ st. As st
contains all the states that can reach the states in stg though strategy ξ, therefore
PRE∃α(st) contains all the states that reach the states in stg through α; ξ. The
effective propositions in the two strategies are the same.
• (st′, if(p){ξ1} else {ξ2}, efv 1 ∪ efv 2 ∪ {p}) where
– (st1, ξ1, efv 1), (st2, ξ2, efv 2) ∈ state strategies , and
– st′ = stfst1[>/p] ∩ stfst2[⊥/p] .
Let s ∈ st′. If γ(s, p) = >, then by proposition 4.5, ξ1 can be run in s and result in
a state in stg. For the case of γ(s, p) = ⊥, the same is true with the strategy ξ2. So
the proposition holds for all the states in st′.
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Proposition 4.8. (Soundness) If the algorithm outputs a strategy, it can be run over S0
and results in stg.
Proof. The algorithm outputs a strategy whenever it finds a (st, ξ, efv) ∈ state strategies
such that S0 ⊆ st. By proposition 4.7, st contains all the states (icluding S0) which ξ can
be run on them and result in stg. Therefore, the proposition holds.
The following Lemma will be used in order to proof the completeness of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run with input stg and terminates with a value
for state strategies . Let st0 ⊆ S. If st0 →ξ stg, then there exists (PRE, ξ′, efv) ∈
state strategies such that st0 ⊆ PRE.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction over height of ξ.
Base case: ξ = null and therefore st0 = stg. By default, (stg, null, ∅) ∈ state strategies
and therefore the statement trivially holds, with PRE = stg, ξ
′ = null and efv= ∅.
Inductive case: Assume by inductive hypothesis that the statement holds for all the
strategies of height up to n. Let st0 →ξ stg where ξ is a strategy of length n+ 1. Then
• ξ = α; ξ1 where ξ1 is of height n. So we have st0 →α st1 →ξ1 stg. By hypothesis,
there exists (PRE1, ξ
′
1, efv 1) ∈ state strategies such that st1 ⊆ PRE1. By definition
4.7 and st0 →α st1 →ξ1 stn, the condition on line 12 of the algorithm holds. Hence,
the algorithm finds the set PRE = PRE∃α(PRE1) which is the set of all the states
with a transition to some states in PRE1 as the result of performing action α in
them. Therefore we have st0 ⊆ PRE. The set PRE is not empty as it already
contains the states in st0. If the states of PRE are met before (line 14), then the
state strategy (PRE, α; ξ′1, efv 1) will be added to the set state strategies and the
statement holds. Otherwise, such a state strategy already exists.
• ξ = if(p){ξ1}else{ξ2} where the maximum height of ξ1 and ξ2 is n. By def-
inition 4.7, stfst0∧p →ξ1 stg and stfst0∧¬p →ξ2 stg. By hypothesis, there exists
(PRE1, ξ
′
1, efv 1), (PRE2, ξ
′
2, efv 2) ∈ state strategies such that stfst0∧p ⊆ PRE1 and
stfst0∧¬p ⊆ PRE2. As p is found to be an effective proposition in a strategy,
p 6∈ KC and therefore the algorithm enters the loop on line 26 for p. Consider
three cases for line 27: (1) p 6∈ prop(PRE1). Then stfst0∧p ⊆ stfst0 = st0 ⊆
PRE1 and therefore the statement holds for the state strategy (PRE1, ξ
′
1, efv 1) (2)
p 6∈ prop(PRE2). Similar to the previous case, the statement holds for the state
strategy (PRE2, ξ
′
2, efv 2). (3) p ∈ prop(PRE1) ∩ prop(PRE2), Then we have
st0 ⊆ PRE1[>/p]∩PRE2[⊥/p]. Using the same arguments as the first item for the
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conditions on line 29, (PRE1[>/p]∩PRE2[⊥/p], if(p){ξ′1}else{ξ′2}, efv 1∪efv 2∪{p})
will be added to the set state strategies and the statement holds for that state
strategy.
Proposition 4.9. (Completeness) If some strategy exists from S0 to stg, then the algo-
rithm will find one.
Proof. If such strategy exists (let us say ξ), then by Lemma 4.1, the algorithm will find
a state strategy (PRE, ξ′, efv) where S0 ⊆ PRE. In that case lines 19 and 34 of the
algorithm guarantee that the strategy ξ′ will be delivered. Note that ξ′ may be different
from ξ.
Verification of the nested goals: To verify a nested goal, we begin from the inner-
most goal. By backward search, all backward reachable states will be found and their
intersection with the states for the outer goal will construct the new set of goal states.
For the outer-most goal, we look for the initial states between backward reachable states.
If we find them, we output the strategy. Otherwise, the nested goal is unreachable.
4.3 Knowledge vs. guessing in strategy
Agents in a coalition know the value of a proposition if: they have read the value before,
or they have performed an action that has affected that proposition1. If a strategy is
found, we are able to verify the knowledge of the agents over the strategy and specifically
for effective propositions, using read permissions defined in the policy. Read permissions
don’t lead to any transition or action, and are used just to detect if an agent or coalition
of agents can find out the way to the goal with complete or partial knowledge of the
system. The knowledge is shared between the agents in a coalition.
To find agent knowledge over effective propositions, we begin from the initial states,
run the strategy and verify the ability of the coalition to read the effective propositions.
If at least one of the agents in the coalition can read an effective proposition before or
at the corresponding decision states, then the coalition can find the path without taking
any risk. In the lack of knowledge, agents should guess the value in order to find the next
required action along the strategy.
Pseudocode for knowledge verification over the strategy: Let C be a policy,
init → C(L) a simple query and MC a derived labelled transition system from C with
1In this research, we do not consider reasoning about knowledge like the one in interpreted systems.
This approach makes the concept of knowledge weaker, but more efficient to verify.
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Procedure 2 Knowledge verification function
1: function KnowledgeAlgo(st, ξ, efv , C, kC)
2: . Input: st is a set states, ξ is a strategy, efv is the set of effective propositions
occurring in ξ, C is the coalition of agents, and kC is the knowledge of the coalition.
3: . Output: returns the annotated strategy.
4:
5: if ξ=null then
6: return null
7: end if
8: for all p ∈ efv , u1 ∈ C do
9: for all read permissions ρ(u1, ~o) : p← ` ∈ C do
10: if for all s ∈ st : (MC, s, C) |= ` then





16: if ξ = α; ξ1 then
17: st′ := {s′ | s α−→ s′, s ∈ st}
18: return “α;”+ KnowledgeAlgo(st′, ξ1, efv , C, kC ∪ effect(α))
19: else if ξ = if(p){ξ1} else {ξ2} then
20: if p ∈ kC then
21: str :=“”
22: else
23: str :=“Guess: ”
24: end if
25: return str+ “if(p){”+
26: KnowledgeAlgo(stfst∧p, ξ1, efv\{p}, C, kC) + “}else{”+




the set of initial states S0 as defined by init . Let ξ be the strategy that found by the
Algorithm 1 with the state strategy (S0, ξ, efv). Therefore we have S0 →ξ stg where
stg is the set of all the states s ∈ S in which (MC, s) |= L. If KC contains the set of
propositions that are tagged with ! in init at the beginning, then the recursive function
KnowledgeAlgo(S0, ξ, efv , C,KC) returns an annotated strategy with a string Guess:
added to the beginning of every if statement in ξ, where the coalition does not know the
value of the proposition inside if statement.
Knowledge verification for nested goals: To handle knowledge verification over
the strategies found by nested goal verification, we begin from the outermost goal. We
traverse over the strategy until the goal states are reached. For the next goal, all the
accumulated knowledge will be transferred to the new coalition if there exists at least one
common agent between the two coalitions. The algorithm proceeds until the strategy is
fully traversed.
4.4 Implementation and case studies
PoliVer is implemented by modifying the model-checker AcPeg [95, 94]. We have kept
some useful syntactic and functional properties implemented in AcPeg like the structure
of policy definition and query statement. In the implementation, the syntax of action
rules and read permission rules presented in chapter 3 is modified in order to provide a
more user friendly language. PoliVer is implemented in Java and can be run over different
platforms. For symbolic model-checking, we have used BuDDy as a well-known binary
decision diagram library.
4.4.1 PoliVer input script
An access control model in PoliVer script is composed of a policy, a run-statement and a
query-statement.
policy definition
The policy begin with the keyword AccessControlSystem followed by an identifier as the
name of the model. Type-definition is the first block of the policy which begins with the
keyword Class followed by comma separated identifiers for the types. Type identifiers
must begin with capital letter. Type-definition ends with a semicolon. The next block is
predicate-definition. This block starts with the keyword Predicate followed by comma
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separated parametrized predicates. Parameter names begin with lower case letters, they
must be distinct and their types should be declared. For example, in example 4.2 the
predicate permission has only one argument of type Agent.
The next component of a policy is action-rule definitions. Action rules begin with the
keyword Action and use the similar syntax as in chapter 3 with some modifications to
make the policy definition user friendly:
• Agent is a predefined type and it is not required to be defined in the type definition
block.
• The agent that performs the action is syntactically abstracted as the first parameter
of the action rule. The keyword user is reserved to demonstrate the agent that
performs the action in the body of the action rule.
• The operator “=” is used to define the equivalence of two objects of the same type.
For example, user = a where a is a parameter denotes that a is the same agent as
user.
Each action rule ends with a semicolon. In PoliVer syntax, the operator ∧ is replaced
with & and and, ∨ is replaced with | and or, ¬ is replaced with ∼ and quantifiers ∀ and
∃ are substituted by E and A respectively.
The last component of a policy is read permission rules. Read permission rules start
with the keyword Read. Again for simplicity, we have abstracted the agent who can read
the truth value of the instanced predicate from the arguments. We have replaced that
agent with the keyword user in the body of the rule. This abstraction leads to a more
simplified form of read permission rules where the identifier is completely abstracted. For
example:
Read reviewer(p, a) <- pcmember(user) & ∼author(p, user);
defines the condition in which the agent user is able to read reviewer(p, a). Note
that user, p and a are place holders and will be replaced with the appropriate objects
during instantiation phase.
Policy definition terminates with the keyword end.
Run-statement
Instead of explicitly defining the set of objects with different types and declaring the
objects in each set, we can simply let PoliVer automatically generate the objects and
populate the policy with them to build the model. The run statement declares the number
of objects for each type and is specified before the query statement. It begins with the
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keyword run for followed by comma separated pairs if numbers and types. For instance:
run for 2 Agents, 3 Papers
informs PoliVer to assign 2 elements to the set Agents and three to the set Papers.
For the above run-statement, the predicate reviewer(p:Papers, a:Agents) will be in-
stantiated into six system propositions.
Query-statement
The query-statement begins with the keyword check and is of the form check {L ||
Query} where L contains quantified variables that occur in Query, and Query is of the
form defined in section 4.1.2. For example and for a query in a conference paper review
system, L can be of the form E disj a,c:Agent, p:Paper. The existential quantification
of (typed) variables in L informs PoliVer to check if the property holds for some instance
of the variables a, c and p. In the case of universal quantification, PoliVer checks if the
property holds for all possible instances of a quantified variable. The keyword disj is
also used to notify PoliVer not to assign the same object to the variables in the scope of
a quantifier (a and c in the example).
The syntax of the initial condition in the query is also remained similar to the
one in AcPeg for the implementation. Therefore instead of a set of literals, we use a
conjunction of the literals for the initial condition. For instance, the initial condition
{chair(c)*!,¬author(p,a)*!} is transformed to chair(c)*! & ∼author(p,a)*! in
the implementation.
4.4.2 Case studies
A conference paper review system (CRS) Assume a conference paper review
system with the following rules:
1. A chair can assign an agent as a PC member and a PC member can resign his
membership.
2. A chair can assign a PC member as a reviewer of a paper with the constraint that
the reviewer should not be the author of his assigned papers.
3. A reviewer can resign as the reviewer of a paper. At the same time, all the sub-
reviewers that he has appointed to that paper should get removed. A sub-reviewer
can resign if he has not submitted his review.
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4. A reviewer of a paper can allocate an agent to be a sub-reviewer of the paper if the
agent is not the author and a sub-reviewer of that paper.
5. A reviewer or sub-reviewer of a paper can submit his review if he has not submitted
the review before.
6. A reviewer or sub-reviewer of a paper can write or update his review before submis-
sion.
7. Whether or not an agent is a chair or PC member is readable by everyone. The
authors of submitted papers are only readable by PC members.
8. The reviewers and sub-reviewers of a paper and whether a review is submitted is
readable by all the PC members except the authors of that paper.
9. A PC member can read the review of paper p if (1) he is not the author of p (2) the
review is already submitted (3) in the case that he is a reviewer or sub-reviewer of
p, then he has submitted his own review.
The policy definition for the conference paper review system in PoliVer syntax is
defined in figure 4.2. In the following, we present several queries for the policy in figure
4.2 in PoliVer query syntax.
Query 4.1.
run for 3 Paper, 4 Agent
check {E a:Agent, p:Paper || ∼chair(a) -> {a}:(reviewer(p,a))}
The above run-statement declares that system contains 3 objects of type Paper and 4
objects of type Agent. The query asks if for some agent a which is not a chair, there exists
a strategy in which a can promote himself to become the reviewer of a paper. PoliVer
finds no strategy for this query.
Query 4.2.
run for 3 Paper, 4 Agent
check {E disj a,c:Agent, p:Paper || chair(c) & ∼author(p,a) ->
{c}:(reviewer(p,a))}
This query looks for the strategy in which for two disjoint agents a and c and paper
p, where c is a chair and a is not the author of p, agent c can allocate a as the reviewer
of paper p. The output strategy of PoliVer shows that c can assign a as the PC member,





author(paper: Paper, agent: Agent),
pcmember(agent: Agent), chair(agent: Agent),
reviewer(paper: Paper, agent: Agent),
subreviewer(paper: Paper, appointer:Agent, appointee:Agent),
submittedreview(paper: Paper, agent: Agent),
review(paper: Paper, agent: Agent);
Action addPcmember(a: Agent): {+pcmember(a)} <- chair(user);
Action delPcmember(a: Agent): {-pcmember(a)} <- pcmember(a) and a=user;
Action addReviewer(p: Paper, a: Agent):
{+reviewer(p, a)} <- chair(user) & pcmember(a) & ∼author(p,a);
Action delReviewer(p: Paper, a: Agent):
{-reviewer(p, a), A b: Agent.-subreviewer(p,user,b)} <-
(pcmember(user) & user=a & reviewer(p,user));
Action addSubreviewer(p: Paper, a: Agent, b: Agent):
{+subreviewer(p, a, b)} <- reviewer(p,a) & ∼author(p,b) & user=a &
∼(E d: Agent [subreviewer(p,a,d) | subreviewer(p,d,b)]);
Action delSubreviewer(p: Paper, a: Agent, b: Agent):
{-subreviewer(p, a, b)} <- subreviewer(p,a,b) &
∼submittedreview(p,b) & user=b;
Action submitreview(p: Paper, a: Agent):
{+submittedreview(p, a)} <- (user=a) &
((E b: Agent [subreviewer(p, b, user)]) |
reviewer(p, user)) & ∼submittedreview(p, user);
Action addReview(p: Paper, a: Agent):
{+review(p, a)} <- user=a & ((E b: Agent [subreviewer(p, b, user)]) |
reviewer(p,a)) & ∼submittedreview(p, user);
Read chair(a) <- true;
Read pcmember(a) <- true;
Read author(p, a) <- pcmember(user);
Read reviewer(p, a) <- pcmember(user) & ∼author(p, user);
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Read subreviewer(p, a, b) <- (pcmember(user) & ∼author(p,user)) |
user=b | user=a;
Read submittedreview(p, a) <- pcmember(user) & ∼author(p, user);
Read review(p, a) <- pcmember(user) & ∼author(p, user) &
submittedreview(p, a) &
(((reviewer(p, user) -> submittedreview(p, user)) and
(E b: Agent [subreviewer(p, b, user)] -> submittedreview(p, user))));
End
Figure 4.2: The policy definition for a conference paper review system. Note that PoliVer
syntax for the rules is a simplified version of the original syntax presented in chapter 3
Query 4.3.
run for 3 Paper, 4 Agent
check {E dist a,b,c:Agent, p:Paper || chair(c)*! & ∼author(p,a)*! &
submittedreview(p,b)*! & ∼submittedreview(p,a)! & pcmember(a)*! &
reviewer(p,a)! & ∼subreviewer(p,b,a)*! & ∼subreviewer(p,c,a)*! &
∼subreviewer(p,a,a)*! -> {a}:(<review(p,b)> THEN
{a,c}:(submittedreview(p,a)))}
This nested query checks if for three disjoint agents a, b and c and paper p and in the
case that c is a chair, a is the reviewer of p and b has submitted his review for p, it is
possible for a to read the review that b has written for p and then, a and c collaborate in
such a way that a submits his review for p.
Verification of the property by PoliVer results in a strategy that says: a first resigns
as the reviewer of p and now, he is allowed to read the review that b has submitted. Then
a allocates him as the reviewer of p again. In the next step, a submits his own review for
paper p.
The variable assignment and output strategy of PoliVer is of the following form:
Assignment: [a=1 b=2 c=3 p=1]
[1]:Agent 1 performs delReviewer(1,1);
[1, 3]:Agent 3 performs addReviewer(1,1);
Agent 1 performs submitreview(1,1);
Goal;
As for the policy and query language, the syntax of the strategy in the implementation
has some differences with the basic syntax in section 4.1.2. The output strategy consists
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of two sections as the query contains a nested goal. The agents in the square brackets are
the coalitions that collaborate to achieve the goal. As the agent that performs the action
is not included in the arguments, he is presented apart from the action in the strategy.
Query 4.4.
run for 1 Paper, 3 Agent
check {E dist a,c :Agent || chair(c)*! & ∼chair(a)*! & ∼pcmember(a)!)
-> c:(pcmember(a) THEN a:(∼pcmember(a) THEN c:(pcmember(a) THEN
a:(∼pcmember(a) THEN c:(pcmember(a))))))}
The main reason of presenting of the above query is to compare the efficiency with
AcPeg in verifying highly nested queries. The query asks for the existence of any strategy
that an agent can be assigned as a PC member and then resign, and this procedure
continues multiple times. PoliVer shows that such strategy exists. The comparison of the
time and memory usage between PoliVer and AcPeg will be presented in the next section.
A student information system (SIS) Figure 4.3 demonstrates the policy for a
simple student information system written in PoliVar syntax. The rules of the system are
as follows:
• A lecturer can appoint a student in a higher year as the demonstrator of a student
in a lower year.
• The demonstrator of a student s can resign as being the demonstrator of s.
• The lecturers and demonstrators have the right to mark the students that are ap-
pointed to them.
• Whether an agent is a lecturer, demonstrator or student is readable by all the agents.
Student marks are also readable by all the agents.
Query 4.5.
run for 8 Agents
check {E dist l, a1, a2: Agent || lecturer(l)*! & student(a1)*! &
student(a2)*! & higher(a1,a2)*! ->
{l}:(demonstrator of(a2,a1) & demonstrator of(a1,a2))}
The query checks if there it is possible for a lecturer to assign two agents as the





lecturer(agent: Agent), student(agent: Agent),
demonstrator of(demonstrator: Agent, student: Agent),
higher(senior: Agent, junior: Agent),
mark(student: Agent);
Action assignAsDem(d:Agent, s:Agent):
{+demonstrator of(d,s)} <- lecturer(user) & higher(d,s) & ∼higher(s,d);
Action resignAsDem(d:Agent, s:Agent):
{-demonstrator of(d,s)} <- demonstrator of(d,s) & user=d;
Action MarkStudent(s: Agent):
{+mark(s)} <- lecturer(user) | demonstrator of(user, s);
Read higher(s,j) <- true;
Read student(s) <- true;
Read lecturer(l) <- true;
Read mark(s) <- true;
End





bonus(employee: Agent, bonus: Bonus), manager(employee: Agent),
director(employee: Agent),
advocate(appointer: Agent, appointee: Agent);
Action addBonus(a: Agent, b: Bonus):
{+bonus(a, b)} <- (manager(user) & ∼manager(a) & ∼director(a)) |
director(user);
Action delBonus(a: Agent, b: Bonus):





{-manager(a)} <- user=a & manager(a) & ∼director(a);
Action addAdvocate(a1: Agent, a2: Agent):
{+advocate(a1,a2)} <- user=a1;
Action delAdvocate(a1: Agent, a2: Agent):
{-advocate(a1,a2)} <- user=a2 and advocate(a1,a2);
Read bonus(a, b) <- (user=a or director(user))
| (manager(user) & ∼manager(a) & ∼director(a))
| (advocate(a,user));
Read manager(a) <- true;
Read director(a) <- true;
Read advocate(a1, a2) <- true;
End
Figure 4.4: The PoliVer policy script for employee information system.
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An employee information system (EIS) The policy for an employee information
system in PoliVer syntax is presented in figure 4.4. In the employee information system, a
director can appoint an employee to become a manager. A manager can allocate bonuses
of different options to other employees that are not managers or directors. A director
can allocate bonuses to all the employees. The allocated bonuses is readable to the
directors. The managers are able to access the allocated bonuses of the employees except
the bonuses of other managers and directors. An employee can assign another employee
as his advocate. An employee has access to the bonus information of his advocates.
Query 4.6.
run for 6 Bonus, 12 Agent
check {E dist a1,a2: Agent, b: Bonus || ∼director(a1)*! &
∼director(a2)*! & manager(a1)! & manager(a2)! & ∼bonus(a1,b)! ->
{a1,a2}:(bonus(a1,b))}
The query checks if it is possible for two employees that are initially managers to
collaborate in such a way that one of them can set the bonus for the other. PoliVer
outputs a strategy that shows if one of the agents resigns as the manager, then the other
one can set the bonus for him.
Query 4.7.
run for 6 Bonus, 12 Agent
check {dist a1,a2: Agent, b: Bonus || ∼director(a1)*! &
∼director(a2)*! & manager(a1)! & manager(a2)! & ∼bonus(a1,b)! ->
a1,a2:(bonus(a1,b) & manager(a1))}
The query is similar to the query 4.6 except that it checks the case in which the
employee with the bonus remains a manager. PoliVer finds no strategy for this query.
A password changing policy We recall the password changing policy in example
4.2 (figure 4.5) and add several actions that demonstrate joining end exiting some role,
and make some dependencies between accessing some information and being the member
of the roles.
Query 4.8.
run for 1 P, 2 Agent
check {A p: P, a: Agent || ∼roleA(p) & ∼roleB(p) -> {a}:(changePass(p))}
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The output of the PoliVer contains two different strategies. In one of them, agent a
needs to guess the value of password permission variable in order to find the appropriate
path. In the other strategy, a can reach the goal without any risk. So, agent a is able
choose the strategy that does not contain the risk of guessing the path.
Assignment: [p=1 a=1]
[1]:Agent 1 performs roleBEnrol(1);Agent 1 performs roleAEnrol(1);
(Guess:) if (changePassPerm(1) is true){
Agent 1 performs setChangePass(1);Goal;}
else {Agent 1 performs setTrick(1);
Agent 1 performs setChangePass(1);Goal;}
[1]:Agent 1 performs roleAEnrol(1);Agent 1 performs roleBEnrol(1);
if (changePassPerm(1) is true){
Agent 1 performs setChangePass(1);Goal;}
else {Agent 1 performs setTrick(1);
Agent 1 performs setChangePass(1);Goal;}
4.5 Experimental results
One of the outcomes of the implementation was the considerable reduction of binary
decision diagram (BDD) variable size compared to RW. In RW, there are 7 knowledge
states per proposition and therefore, an access control system with n propositions contains
7n different states. Our simplification of knowledge-state variables results in 2n states.
The post-processing time for knowledge verification over found strategies is negligible
compared to the whole process of strategy finding, while produces more expressive results.
We encoded authorization policies for a conference review system (CRS), employee
information system (EIS) and student information system (SIS) into our policy language.
We compared the performance in terms of verification time and memory usage for the
queries: query 4.2 for CRS with 7 objects (3 papers and 4 agents) that looks for strategies
which an agent can promote himself to become a reviewer of a paper, query 4.3 for CRS
which is a nested query that asks if a reviewer can submit his review for a paper while
he has read the review of someone else before, query 4.4 with 4 objects for CRS with
five-level nested queries that checks if an agents can be assigned as a PC member by the





roleA(p: P), roleB(p: P),
changePassPerm(p: P), trick(p: P), changePass(p: P);
Action roleAEnrol(p: P) : {+roleA(p)} <- true;
Action roleAExit(p: P) :{-roleA(p)} <- true;
Action roleBEnrol(p: P) :{+roleB(p)} <- true;
Action roleBExit(p: P) :{-roleB(p)} <- true;
Action setTrick(p: P) :
{+trick(p)} <- ∼changePassPerm(p) & roleA(p) & roleB(p);
Action resetTrick(p: P) :
{-trick(p)} <- ∼changePassPerm(p) & roleA(p) & roleB(p);
Action setChangePass(p: P) :
{+changePass(p)} <- trick(p) | changePassPerm(p);
Read roleA(p) <- true;
Read roleB(p) <- true;
Read changePassPerm(p) <- roleA(p) & ∼roleB(p);
Read trick(p) <- true;
Read changePass(p) <- true;
End
Figure 4.5: The PoliVer policy script for changing password.
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RW(Algo-1) PoliVer algorithm
Query Time Memory Time Memory
Query 4.2 2.05 18.18 0.27 3.4
Query 4.3 0.46 9.01 0.162 6.68
Query 4.4 6.45 59.95 0.52 6.61
Query 4.5 20.44 222.02 0.488 7.30
Query 4.6 9.10 102.35 0.8 12.92
Figure 4.6: A comparison of query verification time (in second) and runtime memory
usage (in MB) between RW and PoliVer.
Figure 4.7: Verification time vs. number of agents for RW and PoliVer (query 4.5)
lecturer can assign two students as the demonstrator of each other, and query 5.4 with
18 objects for EIS which evaluates if two managers can collaborate to set a bonus for one
of them .
Figure 4.6 shows a considerable reduction in time and memory usage by the proposed
algorithm compared to Algo-1 in RW (Algo-1 has slightly better performance and similar
memory usage compared to Algo-0). As a disadvantage for both systems, the verification
time and state space grow exponentially when more objects are added. But this situation
in PoliVer is much better than RW. Our experimental results demonstrate the correctness
of our claim in practice by comparing the verification time of query 6.8 for different number
of agents. Figure 4.7 sketches the verification time for both algorithms for different number
of agents in logarithmic scale. The verification time in RW increases as 2.5n where n is
the number of agents added, while the time increases as 1.4n in PoliVer. Note that this
case study does not show the worst case behaviour when the number of agents increases1.




Our language and tool is optimised for analysing the access control policies of web-based
collaborative systems such Facebook, LinkedIn and Easychair. These systems are likely
to become more and more critical in the future, so analysing them is important. More
specifically, in this work:
• We have developed a policy language and verification algorithm, which is also im-
plemented as a tool. The algorithm produces evidence (in the form of a strategy)
when the system satisfies a property.
• We remove the requirement to reason explicitly about knowledge, approximating
it with the simpler requirement to reason about readability as it is sufficient in
many cases. Compared to RW that has 7n states, we have only 2n states in our
approach (where n is the number of propositions). Also, complicated properties can
be evaluated over the policy by the query language provided.
• We detect the vulnerabilities in the policy that enable an attacker to discover the
strategy to achieve the goal, when some required information is not accessible. We
introduce the concept of effective propositions to detect such vulnerabilities.
• A set of propositions can be updated in one action. In the RW framework, each
write action can update only one proposition at a time.
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CHAPTER 5
REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE IN ACCESS
CONTROL SYSTEMS
In chapter 4, an access control policy verification tool (PoliVer) was introduced and im-
plemented, which is able to verify agents’ knowledge gained by reading system variables.
This complies with one of the meanings of the knowledge in its ordinary language, which
means that the agent sees the truth of a sentence when the question is present. The
question that arises is: in a multi-agent system, does a principal gain knowledge only by
directly reading system information? The answer is negative. Agent also knows a sen-
tence when he consciously assents to it [76]. Reasoning is one of the ways that an agent
gains knowledge about the information. Let us have a simple example:
Example 5.1. Assume a conference paper review system in which all the PC members
have access to the number of the papers assigned to each reviewer. Further assume that
each PC member can see the list of the papers assigned to the reviewers which does not
contain the papers that he is the author of. Then if Alice is a PC member and the author
of a submitted paper, she can find who the reviewer of her paper is by comparing the
number of papers assigned to each reviewer with the number of the assigned papers of
the reviewer that she has access to.
In this chapter, a method that is able to verify information leakage vulnerabilities
through reasoning about agents’ knowledge is provided. We use the concept of knowledge
as in epistemic modal logic. Moreover, we propose an abstraction and refinement algorithm
in order to reduce the verification time and memory usage when verifying safety properties.
5.1 Overview
Let’s consider a conference paper review system like EasyChair or HotCRP. For the pri-
vacy and accountability requirement, the following properties need to hold in the policy:
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• If Alice is the author of a submitted paper in the conference, there must be no way
for her to find out who is the reviewer of her paper (privacy).
• If the profile information of a PC member is changed (by himself or someone else, like
the chair of the conference), he will always know that his information has changed
(accountability).
The above properties takes the knowledge of the agents into account. The knowledge
can be gained by directly accessing the information, or by reasoning. Reasoning uses
local accessible data to infer information. In section 5.6 we will show that there are some
circumstances that accessible data like the number of the papers assigned to each reviewer
in a conference paper review system may result in leaking unauthorized information.
Such information leakage cannot be detected by the tools designed for verifying temporal
properties or the tools that approximate knowledge by readability, like PoliVer and RW.
In this chapter, we explain how to use interpreted systems [45, 46] in order to model
the access control system described by a policy. Using interpreted systems enables the
verification of temporal and epistemic properties. Our modelling approach allows us to
verify the knowledge gained by both reading and reasoning about information, which does
not occur in other verification tools.
The price we pay for verifying epistemic properties is the large number of states and
therefore, the occurrence of state explosion even in medium size systems. As another
outcome of the research, we develop an automated method for abstraction and refinement
of safety properties in CTLK (CTL with knowledge modality K) [73]. Our method ap-
plies counterexample guided refinement when the generated counterexample is tree-like
[32]. In this work, we only discuss the counterexamples with finite length paths pro-
duced by verifying safety properties, but this approach can be extended to the paths of
infinite length using unfolding mechanisms [30]. The proposed counterexample guided
refinement method is generic, but we only demonstrate the applications in asynchronous
access control policies.
This chapter is organized as follows: Interpreted systems are introduced in section 5.2,
deriving an interpreted system from a policy is described in section 5.3, abstraction and
refinement technique is given in sections 5.4, 5.4.2 and 5.5. Case studies and experimental




Fagin et al. [46] introduced interpreted systems as the framework to model multi-agent
systems in games scenarios. They introduced a detailed transition system which contains
agents, local states and actions. Such a framework enables reasoning about both tem-
poral and epistemic properties of the system. Lomuscio et al [75] have used a variant of
interpreted systems to verify ATLK (alternating time temporal logic [5] with knowledge)
properties over the interpreted systems. They have also developed a model-checker for in-
terpreted systems called MCMAS [74, 72] which we will use as the model-checking engine
in our implementation.
5.2.2 Definition of interpreted systems
The multi-agent system formalism known as interpreted systems (IS) [45, 46] contains a
set Ω = {e, 1, . . . , n} of agents including the environment e with the same specification
as the other agents. Interpreted systems contain the following elements:
• Local states: Each agent in a multi-agent framework has its own local state. The
set of local states for the agent i is denoted by Li. The local state of an agent
represents the information the agent has direct access to. The environment can be
seen as the agent which is capable of capturing or holding the information that is
inaccessible to the other agents. For example, the communication channel in a bit
transmission protocol can be modelled as the environment. The set of global states
is S = Le × L1 × · · · × Ln, representing the system at a specific time. The system
evolves as a function over the time. We also use the notation of Li as the function
that accepts a set of global states and returns the corresponding set of local states
for agent i. For each s ∈ S, li(s) denotes the local state of agent i in s.
• Actions: State transitions are the result of performing actions by different agents.
If i ∈ Ω, then ACTi is the set of actions accessible for the agent i. The set of joint
actions is defined as ACT = ACTe×ACT1× · · ·×ACTn. We also use ACTi as the
function that accepts a joint action and returns the action of agent i.
• Protocols: Protocols are defined as mappings from the set of local states to the
set of local actions and define the actions each agent can perform according to its
local state (Pi : Li → 2ACTi\{∅}, i ∈ Ω). In general, action performance is non-
deterministic.
71
We now provide the formal definition of interpreted systems based one the fundamental
elements we have defined.
Definition 5.1 (Interpreted system). Let Φ be a set of propositions and Ω = {e, 1, . . . , n}
be a set of agents. An interpreted system I is a tuple:
I = 〈(Li)i∈Ω, (Pi)i∈Ω, (ACTi)i∈Ω, S0, τ, γ〉
where (1) Li is the set of local states of agent i, and the set of global states is defined
as S = Le × L1 × · · · × Ln (2) ACTi is the set of actions that agent i can perform, and
ACT = ACTe × ACT1 × · · · × ACTn is defined as the set of joint actions (3) S0 ⊆ S
is the set of initial states (4) γ : S × Φ → {>,⊥} is called the interpretation function
(5) Pi : Li → 2ACTi\{∅} is the protocol for agent i (6) τ : ACT × S → S is called
the partial transition function with the property that if τ(α, s) is defined, then for all
i ∈ Ω : ACTi(α) ∈ Pi(li(s)). We also write s1 α−→ s2 if τ(α, s1) = s2.
Definition 5.2 (Reachability). A global state s ∈ S is reachable in the interpreted
system I if there exists s0 ∈ S0, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S and α1, . . . , αn ∈ ACT such that for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n : si = τ(αi, si−1) and s = sn. In this chapter, we use G to denote the set of
reachable states.
For an interpreted system I and each agent i we define an epistemic accessibility
relation on the global states as follows:
Definition 5.3 (Epistemic accessibility relation). Let I be an interpreted system and i
be an agent. We define the Epistemic accessibility relation for agent i, written ∼i, on the
global states of I by
s ∼i s′ iff li(s) = li(s′) and s and s′ are reachable
On the relation between interpreted systems and labelled transition systems:
Interpreted systems are a class of labelled transitions systems specifically designed as a
framework for formal verification of epistemic logic. To verify the temporal properties
introduced in chapter 4, a simple labelled transition system is the appropriate model,
which abstracts away the complexity of interpreted systems. We can prove that the
labelled transition system in chapter 4 can be modelled by a special case of interpreted
systems, which has the same semantic properties as the interpreted system which is derived
from the same policy (see section 5.3). The proof is presented in appendix C.
72
5.2.3 CTLK logic
We use CTLK [73] as the specification language. CTL (Computational Tree Logic) is
a branching-time temporal logic which has tree-like time model structure and allows
quantification over paths, and CTLK adds the epistemic modality K to the CTL. CTLK
is defined as follows:
Definition 5.4. Let Φ be a set of atomic propositions and Ω be a set of agents. If p ∈ Φ
and i ∈ Ω, then CTLK formulae are defined by:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | Kiφ | EXφ | EGφ | E(φUφ)
The symbol E is existential path quantifier which means “there exists at least one
path”’. Temporal connectives X, G and U mean “neXt state”, “all future states (Glob-
ally)” and “Until”’. EX, EG and EU provide the adequate set of CTLK connectives. For
instance, safety properties defined by AG(φ) (all future states (Globally)) where A is the
universal path quantifier, can be written as ¬E(>U¬φ), or the equivalence for liveness
properties AF (φ) (always for some future state) is ¬EG(¬φ). Epistemic connective Ki
means “agent i knows that”.
Example 5.2. Consider a conference paper review system. Assume that a1 is the author
of the paper p1. Then the safety property that says if all the papers are assigned to
the reviewers and a2 is the reviewer of p1, then a1 does not know the fact that a2 is the
reviewer of his paper can be defined as: AG(reviewer(p1, a2)→ ¬Ka1reviewer(p1, a2)).
In an student information system, the property that states no two students can be as-
signed as the demonstrator of each other is specified by: AG(¬(demonstratorOf(a2, a3)∧
demonstratorOf(a3, a2))).
Definition 5.5 (Satisfaction relation). Let I be an interpreted system, s ∈ G where G is
the set of reachable states and p ∈ Φ where Φ is the set of atomic propositions. For any
CTLK-formula φ, the notation (I, s) |= φ means φ holds at state s in interpreted system
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I. The relation |= is defined inductively as follows:
(I, s) |= p ⇔ γ(s, p) = >
(I, s) |= ¬φ ⇔ (I, s) 6|= φ
(I, s) |= φ1 ∨ φ2 ⇔ (I, s) |= φ1 or (I, s) |= φ2
(I, s) |= Kiφ ⇔ (I, s′) |= φ for all s′ ∈ G such that s ∼i s′
(I, s) |= EXφ ⇔ for some s′ such that s α−→ s′ : (I, s′) |= φ
(I, s) |= EGφ ⇔ there exists a path s1 α−→ . . . such that s = s0 and for all
i ≥ 0 : (I, si) |= φ
(I, s) |= E(φ1Uφ2) ⇔ there exists a path s1 α−→ . . . such that s = s1, there is
some i ≥ 1 such that (I, si) |= φ2 and for all j < i we have (I, sj) |= φ1
We use the notation I |= φ if for all s0 ∈ S0 : (I, s0) |= φ.
5.3 Building an interpreted system from a policy
In access control systems, we deal with read and write access procedures. Write proce-
dures, which update a set of variables, are contained in interpreted systems as actions.
In interpreted systems, a principal knows a fact if it is included in his local state or he
can deduce it by applying logical reasoning. In access control systems and in addition to
the local information, agents may obtain permission to directly access some resources in
the system. This permission may be granted by the system or other agents (delegation
of authority). For instance, in a web application users always have access to their own
profile, but they cannot access other users’ profile unless the permission is granted by
the owners. When a read permission to a resource is granted, the resource will become
a part of agent’s local state. When the permission is denied, it will be removed from
agent’s directly accessible information. This behaviour is similar to a system which uses
dynamically changing local states to model permissions.
Interpreted systems formally contain local states which cannot change during execu-
tion of the system. In order to model temporary read permissions, we need to introduce
some locally accessible information, which simulates the temporary read access. In this
section, we explain how to introduce temporary read permissions when modelling access
control systems. Moreover and as was discussed in chapter 3, we model access control
systems in asynchronous manner using interpreted systems framework. An interpreted
system is asynchronous if all joint actions contain at most one non-Λ agent action where
Λ denotes no-operation.
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Given a policy, we build an access control system based on interpreted systems frame-
work by considering the requirements above. Incorporating temporary read permissions
requires introducing some information into the local states. We say the proposition p is
local to the agent i if its value only depends on the local state of i. In the other words,
for all s, s′ ∈ S where s ∼i s′ we have γ(s, p) = γ(s′, p).
Definition 5.6 (Local interpretation). Let Li be the set of local states of agent i in inter-
preted system I and Φi be the set of local propositions. We define the local interpretation
for agent i as a function γi : Li ×Φi → {>,⊥} such that γi(l, p) = γ(s, p) where li(s) = l
for some global state s. We require the set of local propositions to be pairwise disjoint.
The following lemma provides the theoretical background of modelling knowledge by
readability in an interpreted system.
Lemma 5.1. Let I be an interpreted system, G the set of reachable states, i an agent,
Φ the set of propositions and p ∈ Φ. Suppose that p′, p′′ ∈ Φi. If for all s ∈ G:
if γi(li(s), p
′′) = > then (I, s) |= p ⇔ γi(li(s), p′) = > (5.1)
Then we have:
γi(li(s), p
′′) = > ⇒ (I, s) |= Kip ∨Ki¬p
Proof. We first prove that
γi(li(s), p
′′) = > and (I, s) |= p ⇒ (I, s) |= Kip (5.2)
Let us assume that γi(li(s), p
′′) = > and (I, s) |= p. By (5.1) we have γi(li(s), p′) = >.
Consider any state s1 ∈ G such that s1 ∼i s. By the definition of ∼i, we have li(s1) = li(s).
Therefore, γi(li(s1), p
′) = > and γi(li(s1), p′′) = > which implies (I, s1) |= p. Hence, by
the definition of Ki we are able to conclude that (I, s) |= Kip. The proof for the second
case:
γi(li(s), p
′′) = > and (I, s) |= ¬p⇒ (I, s) |= Ki¬p (5.3)
is similar to the first proof. Therefore, by (5.2) and (5.3) we have γi(li(s), p
′′) = > ⇒
(I, s) |= Kip ∨Ki¬p.
To model knowledge by readability, we incorporate all the atomic propositions that
appear in the policy into the environment. We call those propositions policy propositions.
Now for each policy proposition p and for each agent, we introduce two local atomic
propositions: pread (p
′′ in Lemma 5.1) as the read permission of proposition p, and ploc (p′
in Lemma 5.1) as the local copy of p. We modify the transition function in order to satisfy
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the following property: for all reachable states, if pread is true (agent has read access to
p) in a state, then ploc is assigned the same value as p. This property guarantees agent’s
knowledge of proposition p whenever his access to p is granted.
Building the interpreted system Given a policy C with ΣAg as the set of agents,
we build up an interpreted system that models the access control system in the following
way:
Let ΦC be the set of propositions that appear in C (policy propositions), and AC and
RC the set of actions and read permissions in C respectively. For an interpreted system
that corresponds to the policy C, the knowledge gained by reading system information
need to be incorporated into the local states of the agents.
Procedure 3 adopts Lemma 5.1 which describes a method to model temporary read
permissions. The function incKnowledge in procedure 3 accepts AC, RC, ΦC and ΣAg as
the input. For each agent i in ΣAg, Procedure 3 generates a set of local propositions Φi.
The local state of agent i consists of all valuations of Φi. For each proposition p ∈ ΦC,
the set Φi contains two propositions ploc, pread where ploc is the copy of p and gets updated
whenever pread as the access permission for p is true (refer to Lemma 5.1 for the details).
The procedure modifies the actions and corresponding evolutions in AC into the set AuC
in order to update the propositions in Φi in the appropriate way. For each action and for
each agent, if p appears in the effect (if-conditions in lines 12 and 18), then the action
will replace with two freshly created actions: one sets pread to true and ploc to the same
value as p if the read permission of p evaluates to true in the next state (lines 13 and
19). Otherwise (read permission of p evaluates to false in the next state), pread will set
to false and ploc remains unchanged (lines 15 and 21). If p does not appear in the effect
(line 24), ploc and pread will only get updated whenever the read permission of p is affected
by the action.
Calculating the symbolic transition function: We provide the details for cal-
culating the symbolic transition function we use for traversing over a path in our system.
The symbolic transition function accepts a set of states as input and returns the result of
performing an action over the states of that set.
As a convention, we use s[p 7→ m] where s ∈ S to denote the state that is like s except
that it maps the proposition p to the value m. Let st ⊆ S be a set of states. When
performing the action α : ε ← ` in the states of st, the transition is only performed in
the states that satisfy the permission `. In the resulting states, the propositions that do
not appear in ε remain the same as in the states that the transition begins. Therefore,
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Procedure 3 Incorporating read permissions into evolution rules
1: function incKnowledge(AC,RC,ΦC,ΣAg)
2: . Input: AC is the set of actions, RC is the set of read permissions, ΦC the set of
policy propositions and ΣAg the set of agents
3: . Output: returns the updated set of actions and the set of local propositions
4: AuC := AC
5: for all i ∈ ΣAg do
6: Φi := ∅
7: for all p ∈ ΦC do
8: determine r : p← `r ∈ RC where Ag(r) = i
9: Φi := Φi ∪ {ploc, pread}
10: AˆuC := ∅
11: for all α : ε← ` ∈ AuC do
12: if +p ∈ ε then
13: construct α1 : ε ∪ {+ploc,+pread} ←
14: ` ∧ (`r[>/v |+ v ∈ ε][⊥/v′ | − v′ ∈ ε]) where Ag(α1) = Ag(α)
15: construct α2 : ε ∪ {−pread} ←
16: `∧¬(`r[>/v |+v ∈ ε][⊥/v′ |−v′ ∈ ε]) where Ag(α2) = Ag(α)
17: AˆuC := AˆuC ∪ {α1, α2}
18: else if −p ∈ ε then
19: construct α1 : ε ∪ {−ploc,+pread} ←
20: ` ∧ (`r[>/v |+ v ∈ ε][⊥/v′ | − v′ ∈ ε]) where Ag(α1) = Ag(α)
21: construct α2 : ε ∪ {−pread} ←
22: `∧¬(`r[>/v |+v ∈ ε][⊥/v′ |−v′ ∈ ε]) where Ag(α2) = Ag(α)
23: AˆuC := AˆuC ∪ {α1, α2}
24: else
25: if for all q ∈ fv(`r) : +q 6∈ ε and −q 6∈ ε then
26: AˆuC := AˆuC ∪ {α}
27: else
28: construct α1 : ε ∪ {+ploc,+pread} ← `∧
29: (`r[>/v |+v ∈ ε][⊥/v′ |−v′ ∈ ε])∧p where Ag(α1) = Ag(α)
30: construct α2 : ε ∪ {−ploc,+pread} ← `∧
31: (`r[>/v |+v ∈ ε][⊥/v′ |−v′ ∈ ε])∧¬p where Ag(α2) = Ag(α)
32: construct α3 : ε ∪ {−pread} ← `∧
33: ¬(`r[>/v |+ v ∈ ε][⊥/v′ | − v′ ∈ ε]) where Ag(α3) = Ag(α)




38: AuC := AˆuC
39: end for
40: end for






s[p 7→ > | +p ∈ ε][p 7→ ⊥ | −p ∈ ε] ∣∣ s ∈ st, (I, s) |= `}
The symbolic (BDD-based) presentation of Θα is contained in appendix B.
Definition 5.7 (Derived interpreted system). Let C be a policy with ΣAg as the set of
agents, ΦC the set of policy propositions, and AuC and Φi, i ∈ ΣAg derived from procedure
3. Let Ω = {e} ∪ ΣAg and Φ =
⋃
i∈Ω Φi where Φe = ΦC. Then the interpreted system
derived from policy C is:
IC = 〈(Li)i∈Ω, (Pi)i∈Ω, (ACTi)i∈Ω, S0, τ, γ〉
where
1. Li is the set of local states of agent i, where each local state is a valuation of the
propositions in Φi. The set of global states is defined as S = Le × L1 × · · · × Ln
2. ACTi = {α ∈ AuC | Ag(α) = i} ∪ {Λ} where Λ denotes no operation, and a joint
action is a |Ω|-tuple such that at most one of the elements is non-Λ (asynchronous
interpreted system). For simplicity, we denote a joint action with its non-Λ element
3. S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states
4. γ is the interpretation function over S and Φ. If p ∈ Φi then we have γ(s, p) =
γi(li(s), p)
5. Pi is the protocol for agent i where for all l ∈ Li: Pi(l) = ACTi
6. τ is the transition function that is defined as follows: if α is a joint action (or simply,
an action) and s ∈ S, then τ(α, s) = s′ if Θα({s}) = {s′}.
The system that we derive from policy C is a special case of interpreted systems where
the local states are the valuation of local propositions that are generated by the procedure
incKnowledge.
5.4 Abstraction technique
In an interpreted system, the state space exponentially increases when extra propositions
are added into the system. Considering a fragment of CTLK properties known as ACTLK
as the specification language, we are able to apply abstraction and refinement techniques
in order to verify the properties. ACTLK is defined as follows:
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Definition 5.8. Let Φ be the set of atomic propositions and Ω set of agents. If p ∈ Φ
and i ∈ Ω, then ACTLK formulae are defined by:
φ ::= p | ¬p | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | Kiφ | AXφ | A(φUφ) | A(φRφ)
where the symbol A is universal path quantifier which means “for all the paths”.
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to the abstraction and refinement
technique and the notations we use in this thesis. To provide a relation between the
concrete model and the abstract one, we extend the simulation relation introduced in
[31] to cover the epistemic relation between states. Using the abstraction technique that
preserves simulation relation between the concrete model and the abstract one, we are
able to verify ACTLK specification formulas over the model.
In this thesis and for abstraction and refinement, we focus on safety properties ex-
pressed in ACTLK. The advantages of safety properties are first, they are capable of
expressing policy invariants, and second, the generated counterexample contains finite
sequence of actions (or transitions). We can extend the abstraction refinement method to
the full ACTLK by unfolding the loops in the counterexamples into finite transitions as
described in [30], which is outside the scope of this chapter. Note that some properties
like the first epistemic property in example 5.2 does not reside in the category of ACTLK
and the abstraction and refinement procedure can not directly be applied to that formula.
Later, we provide a method to verify such properties in an interactive manner.
5.4.1 Existential abstraction
The general framework of existential abstraction was first introduced by Clark et. al in
[31]. Existential abstraction partitions the states of a model into clusters, or equivalence
classes. The clusters form the states of the abstract model. The transitions between
the clusters in the abstract model give rise to an over-approximation of the original (or
concrete) model that simulates the original one. So, when a specification in ACTL (or in
the context of this paper, ACTLK) logic is true in the over-approximated model, it will
be true in the concrete one. Otherwise, a counterexample will be generated which needs
to be verified over the concrete model.
Notation 5.1. For simplicity, we use the same notation (∼i) for the epistemic accessibility
relation in both the concrete and abstract interpreted systems.
Definition 5.9 (Simulation). Let I and I˜ be two interpreted systems, Ω be the set of
agents in both systems, and Φ and Φ˜ the corresponding set of propositions where Φ˜ ⊆ Φ.
The relation H ⊆ S × S˜ is simulation relation between I and I˜ if and only if:
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1. For all s0 ∈ S0, there exists s˜0 ∈ S˜0 such that (s0, s˜0) ∈ H.
and for all (s, s˜) ∈ H:
2. For all p ∈ Φ˜ : γ(s, p) = γ˜(s˜, p)
3. For each state s′ ∈ S such that τ(s, α) = s′ for some α ∈ ACT , there exists s˜′ ∈ S˜
and α˜ ∈ A˜CT such that τ˜(s˜, α˜) = s˜′ and (s′, s˜′) ∈ H.
4. For each state s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i s′, there exists s˜′ ∈ S˜ such that s˜ ∼i s˜′ and
(s′, s˜′) ∈ H.
The above definition for simulation relation over the interpreted systems is similar
to the one for Kripke model [30], except that the relation for the epistemic relation is
introduced. If such simulation relation exists, we say that I˜ simulates I (denoted by
I  I˜).
If H is a function, that is, for each s ∈ S there is a unique s˜ ∈ S˜ such that (s, s˜) ∈ H,
we write h(s) = s˜ instead of (s, s˜) ∈ H.
Lemma 5.2. Let I  I˜, s1 ∈ S, s˜1 ∈ S˜ and (s1, s˜1) ∈ H whereH is the simulation relation
between I and I˜. Then for each path s1
α2−→ . . . in I, there exists a path s˜1 α˜2−→ . . . in I˜
such that for all i ≥ 1, (si, s˜i) ∈ H holds.
Proof. The proof is trivial by item 3 in definition 5.9 and induction over the state tran-
sitions.
Proposition 5.1. For every ACTLK formula ϕ over propositions Φ˜, if I  I˜ and I˜ |= ϕ,
then I |= ϕ.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we first prove if I  I˜ and H is the simulation relation,
then for all s˜ ∈ S˜ and s ∈ S where (s, s˜) ∈ H, (I˜ , s˜) |= ϕ implies (I, s) |= ϕ. We assume
ϕ is in NNF. The proof proceeds by induction over the structure of ϕ. Let s ∈ S, s˜ ∈ S˜
and (s, s˜) ∈ H.
• If (I˜ , s˜) |= p where p an atomic formula, then γ(s˜, p) = >. By item 2 in definition
5.9 we have γ(s, p) = > which implies (I, s) |= p. The case is similar for ϕ = ¬p.
• If (I˜ , s˜) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, then (I˜ , s˜) |= ϕ1 and (I˜ , s˜) |= ϕ2. By induction hypothesis we
have (I, s) |= ϕ1 and (I, s) |= ϕ2. Therefore, (I, s) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. The case is similar
for ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2.
• Assume (I˜ , s˜) |= AXϕ1. If s α−→ s′ is a path in I, then by Lemma 5.2 there exists
a path s˜
α˜−→ s˜′ in I˜ where (s′, s˜′) ∈ H. By the assumption we have (I˜ , s˜′) |= ϕ1.
Then the induction hypothesis implies (I, s′) |= ϕ1. Thus we can conclude that
(I, s) |= AXϕ1.
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• Assume (I˜ , s˜) |= A(ϕ1Uϕ2). Let s1 α2−→ . . . be a path in I where s1 = s and
s˜1
α˜2−→ . . . the corresponding path in I˜ where s˜1 = s˜. By the assumption, there
exists some i ≥ 1 where (I˜ , s˜i) |= ϕ2 and (I˜ , s˜i) |= ϕ1 for all j < i. By induction
hypothesis and Lemma 5.2, (I, s) |= ϕ1Uϕ2. As this property holds for all the path
starting at s, we can conclude (I, s) |= A(ϕ1Uϕ2).
• Assume (I˜ , s˜) |= A(ϕ1Rϕ2). The proof is similar to the case for (I˜ , s˜) |= A(ϕ1Uϕ2).
• Assume (I˜ , s˜) |= Kiϕ. We pick a state s′ ∈ S where s′ ∼i s. By item 4 in
definition 5.9, there exists s˜′ ∈ S˜ where s˜′ ∼i s˜ and (s′, s˜′) ∈ H. By the assumption,
(I˜ , s˜′) |= ϕ. Induction hypothesis implies that (I, s′) |= ϕ. As this property holds
for all the states with accessibility relation ∼i to s, we have (I, s′) |= Kiϕ.
Now, if I˜ |= ϕ or in the other words, for all s˜0 ∈ S˜0: (I˜ , s˜) |= ϕ, then by item 1 in
definition 5.9 and the above proof we have for all s0 ∈ S0: (I, s) |= ϕ or equivalently
I |= ϕ.
5.4.2 Variable hiding abstraction
Variable hiding is a popular technique in the category of existential abstraction. In our
methodology, we consider factorizing the concrete state space into equivalence classes that
act as abstract states by abstracting away a set of system propositions. In our approach,
the states in each equivalence class are only different in the valuation of the hidden
propositions. Also the transitions between the states of the abstract model are defined in
such a way that the abstract model simulates the concrete one. Our refinement procedure
will be splitting the abstract states by putting back some of the atomic proportions that
were hidden in the abstract model. We refine the model by analysing the counterexample
generated when verifying safety properties described in ACTLK logic. The model checker
will output a counterexample if the property does not hold.
Definition 5.10. (Local state relation) Let IC be an interpreted system derived from
policy C, Li and Φi be the set of local states and local propositions for the agent i, and
Φ˜i ⊆ Φi. The local relation <i is defined as:
for all l1, l2 ∈ Li : l1<il2 iff for all p ∈ Φ˜i : γi(l1, p) = γi(l2, p)
where γi is the local interpretation for the agent i. The function hi : Li → Li/<i is the
surjection which maps elements of Li into equivalence classes of <i.
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Definition 5.11 (Action classification). Let α : ε ← ` ∈ ACT and Φ˜ ⊆ Φ. We define
α′ : ε′ ← `′ ∈ [α] iff {±p ∈ ε′ | p ∈ Φ˜} = {±p ∈ ε | p ∈ Φ˜}, ∃(Φ\Φ˜).`′ ≡ ∃(Φ\Φ˜).` and
Ag(α′) = Ag(α).
In the above definition, the infix notation ≡ denotes the semantically equivalence
relation. Formally ∃x.f for a Boolean function f is defined as f [0/x] ∨ f [1/x] which
means f could be made to true by putting x to 0 or to 1. If X = {x1, . . . , xn}, then
∃X.f = ∃x1 . . . ∃xn.f .
Definition 5.12 (Abstract interpreted system). Given a policy C, let Ω,Φ and AuC be
deduced as described in section 5.3 and IC be the derived interpreted system. Let Φ˜ ⊆ Φ
and Ω˜ = Ω. We define Interpreted system I˜C as:
I˜C = 〈(L˜i)i∈Ω˜, (P˜i)i∈Ω˜, (A˜CT i)i∈Ω˜, S˜0, τ˜ , γ˜〉
where
1. L˜i = Li/<i where <i is defined in definition 5.10 over Li, and S˜ = L˜e× L˜1×· · ·× L˜n
2. A˜CT i = {[α] | α ∈ AuC and Ag(α) = i} and a joint action is a |Ω˜|-tuple such that
at most one of the elements is non-Λ - i.e. the system is asynchronous. As before,
each joint action is shown by its non-Λ element. If α˜ = [α], then the evolution rule
for α˜ is ε˜← ˜`where ε˜ = {±p ∈ ε | p ∈ Φ˜} and ˜`= ∃(Φ\Φ˜).`
3. S˜0 = {(hi(li(s)))i∈Ω˜ | s ∈ S0} where hi as in definition 5.10 maps the elements of Li
to L˜i
4. For all l˜ ∈ L˜i and for all p ∈ Φ˜i we have γ˜i(l˜, p) = γi(l, p) where l˜ = hi(l)
5. P˜i is the protocol for agent i where for all l˜ ∈ L˜i: P˜i(l˜) = A˜CT i
6. τ˜ is the transition function defined as follows: If α˜ is a joint action, s˜ ∈ S˜ and
Θ˜α˜ is the symbolic transition function for interpreted system I˜C and action α˜, then
τ˜(α˜, s˜) = s˜′ if Θ˜α˜({s˜}) = {s˜′}
Proposition 5.2. If IC is the interpreted system derived from policy C and I˜C is defined
as in definition 5.12, then IC  I˜C.
Proof. Let h : S → S˜ be a function where h(s) = (hi(li(s)))i∈Ω˜ and hi is defined as in
definition 5.10. We show that I˜C simulates IC under h. Item 1 in definition 5.9 trivially
holds by property (3). Item 2 holds by property (4) and the fact that if p ∈ Φ˜, then there





Figure 5.1: The counterexample provided by the abstract model may not be valid on the
concrete one. The labels represent the actions that result in the transitions.
Now assume that h(s) = s˜ and τ(α, s) = s′, which is equivalent to Θα({s}) = {s′}.
If α : ε ← ` can be performed in s, then we have (I, s) |= `. It is trivial to show that
(I, s) |= ∃(Φ\Φ˜).` using structural induction. Since the formula ∃(Φ\Φ˜).` only contains
the propositions in Φ˜, then by item 2 in definition 5.9 we have (I˜ , s˜) |= ∃(Φ\Φ˜).`. Let
α˜ = [α]. By definition 5.11, α˜ can be performed in s˜. From ε˜ ⊆ ε we infer that the
performance of α˜ on s˜ results in a state s˜′ where all the propositions in Φ˜ have the same
value in s˜′ as in s′. Hence, h(s′) = s˜′ as required for item 3 in definition 5.9.
Let us assume that h(s) = s˜ and s ∼i s′. Therefore li(s) = li(s′) which means that
for all p ∈ Φi : γ(s, p) = γ(s′, p). Since Φ˜ ⊆ Φ, then Φ˜i ⊆ Φi. By item 2 in definition
5.9, for all p ∈ Φ˜i : γ(s, p) = γ˜(s˜, p). Let us assume that h(s′) = s˜′. Then for all
p ∈ Φ˜i : γ(s′, p) = γ˜(s˜′, p). Hence we have for all p ∈ Φ˜i : γ˜(s˜, p) = γ˜(s˜′, p). Therefore
s˜ ∼i s˜′ as required for item 4.
Definition 5.13. We define hA : ACT → A˜CT as the surjection that maps the actions
in the concrete model to the actions in the abstract one.
Given a policy, by using Proposition 5.2 we can build up an abstract access control
system by hiding a set of propositions and abstracting the evolution rules. Now by
proposition 5.1, it is possible to verify ACTLK properties over the abstract model, and
refine the abstraction, if the property does not hold and the counterexample is found to
be spurious.
5.5 Automated Refinement
Our counterexample based abstraction refinement method consists of three steps:
• Generating the initial abstraction: It is done by examining transition blocks corre-
sponding to the variables and constructing clusters of variables which interfere with
each other via transition conditions. In our approach, we build the simplest possible
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initial abstract model by only retaining only the propositions appear in specification
ϕ that we aim to verify.
• Model-checking the abstract structure: Model-checking will be performed on the
abstract model for a specification ϕ. If the abstract model satisfies ϕ, then it can be
concluded that the concrete model also satisfies ϕ. If the abstract model checking
generates a counterexample, it should be checked if the counterexample is an actual
counterexample for the concrete model. If it is a spurious counterexample in the
concrete model as in figure 5.1, the abstract system should be refined by proceeding
to the next step.
• Refining the abstraction: The counterexample guided framework refines the abstract
model by partitioning the states in abstract model in such a way that the refined
model does not admit the same counterexample. For the refinement, we turn some
of the invisible variables into visible. After refinement of the abstract model, step 2
will be proceeded.
The process of abstraction and refinement will eventually terminate, as in the worst
case, the refined model becomes the same as the concrete one, which is a finite state
model. Therefore in the worst case, the verification will turn into the verification of the
concretised model.
5.5.1 Generating the initial abstraction
For automatic abstraction refinement, we build the initial model as simple as possible.
For an ACTLK formula ϕ, we keep all the atomic propositions that appear in ϕ visible in
the abstract model and hide the rest. The abstract model is built up by definition 5.12.
5.5.2 Validation of counterexamples
The structure of a counterexample created by the verification of an ACTLK formula is
different from the counterexample generated in the absence of knowledge modality. In an
ACTLK counterexample, we have epistemic relations as well as temporal ones. Analysis
of such counterexamples is more complicated than the counterexamples for temporal
properties.
A counterexample for a safety property in ACTLK is a loop-free tree-like graph with
states as vertices, and temporal and epistemic transitions as edges. Every counterexample













Figure 5.2: A tree-like counterexample generated by the verification of an ACTLK safety
property over the abstract model. In the diagram, s˜0, s˜
′
0 ∈ S0 and s˜1 ∼a s˜′2. As reachability
is a requirement for s˜1 ∼a s˜′2 and s˜1 is already reachable, the temporal path s˜′0
α˜′1−→ s˜′1
α˜′2−→ s˜′2
provides the witness for the reachability of s˜′2. Considering this witness is required in
counterexample checking.
corresponding action and epistemic transition is labelled with the corresponding epistemic
relation. We define a temporal path as a path that contains only temporal transitions. An
epistemic path contains at least one epistemic transition. Every state in the counterex-
ample is reachable from an initial state in the model, which may differ from the root. For
any state s, we write also s for the empty path which starts and finishes in s.
Counterexample formalism: A tree is a finite set of temporal and epistemic paths
with an initial state as the root. Each path begins from the root and finishes at a leaf. For
an epistemic transition over a path, we use the same notation as the epistemic relation
while we consider the transition to be from left to the right. For instance, the tree in the
figure 5.2 is formally presented by:
{s˜0 α˜1−→ s˜1 α˜2−→ s˜3, s˜0 α˜1−→ s˜1 ∼a s˜′2
α˜′3−→ s˜′3}
To verify a tree-like counterexample, we traverse the tree in a depth-first manner. An
abstract counterexample is valid in the concrete model if a real counterexample in the
concrete model corresponds to it.
We use the notation s→ s′ when the type of the transition from s to s′ is not known.
Definition 5.14 (Vertices, root). Let c˜e be a counterexample. Then Vert(c˜e) denotes
the set of all the states that appear in c˜e. Root(c˜e) denotes the root of c˜e. For a path pi,
Root(pi) denotes the state that pi starts with.
Definition 5.15 (Corresponding paths). Let I˜ be an abstract model of the interpreted
system I, h be the abstraction function, and hA be the function that maps the actions in I
to the ones in I˜. The concrete path pi = s1 → · · · → sn in the concrete model corresponds
to the path pi = s˜1 → · · · → s˜n in the abstract model, if
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TemporalCheck
h−1A (α˜) = {α1, . . . , αn}
(s˜






α˜′1−→ . . . α˜
′
m−−→ s˜′ is a temporal path to s˜′ where s˜′0 ∈ S˜0
(pi′, S0 ∩ h−1(s˜′0))⇒∗t (s˜′, st′) sˆt = {s ∈ st′ | la(s) ∈ La(st)}
(s˜ ∼a s˜′ ||pi, st)⇒e (pi, sˆt)
Figure 5.3: Temporal and epistemic transition rules. In EpistemicCheck rule, pi′ is the
witness for the reachability of s˜′ in the abstract model, and st′ is the concrete states
that are reachable through the concrete paths corresponding to pi′. In the case that the
model-checker returns all the abstract paths to s˜′, let us say Π˜′, then st′ will be calculated
as st′ =
⋃{st | pi′ = s˜′0 → · · · → s˜′ ∈ Π˜′, s˜′0 ∈ S˜0 and (pi′, S0 ∩ h−1(s˜′0))⇒∗t (s˜′, st)}.
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n : s˜i = h(si)
• If s˜i α˜i+1−−→ s˜i+1 is a temporal transition, we have si αi+1−−→ si+1 where hA(αi+1) = α˜i+1.
• If s˜i ∼a s˜i+1 is an epistemic transition, we have si ∼a si+1 and si+1 is reachable in
the concrete model.
Definition 5.16 (Concrete counterexample). Let c˜e be a tree-like counterexample in the
abstract model where Root(c˜e) ∈ S˜0. A concrete counterexample ce corresponds to c˜e if
Root(ce) ∈ S0 and there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the states and the
paths of the counterexamples ce and c˜e according to the definition 5.15.
To verify a path in the counterexample, we define two transition rules TemporalCheck
and EpistemicCheck denoted by ⇒t and ⇒e as in figure 5.3. For a path with the
transition s˜
α˜−→ s˜′ as the head and for the concrete states st, the rule ⇒t finds all the
successors of the states in st which reside in h−1(s˜′). If the head of the path is the
epistemic transition s˜ ∼a s˜′, then the rule ⇒e extracts all the reachable states in h−1(s˜′)
corresponding to pi′ as the witness of reachability of s˜′, which has common local states
with some states in st ⊆ h−1(s˜). Both the temporal and epistemic rules are deterministic.
Definition 5.17. We write⇒∗t to denote a sequence of temporal transitions⇒t. We use
⇒∗ to denote a sequence of the transitions ⇒t or ⇒e.
Proposition 5.3 (Soundness of ⇒∗t ). Let pi be a temporal path in the abstract model
which starts at s˜1 and ends in s˜n. If st1 ⊆ h−1(s˜1) and (pi, st1) ⇒∗t (s˜n, stn) for some
∅ ⊂ stn ⊆ S, then there exists a concrete path that starts from a state in st1 and ends in
a state in stn.
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Proof. We use induction over the length of the path.
Base case: pi = s˜1. Then there is no transition from (s˜1, st1) and therefore, the
concrete path is a state in st1.
Inductive case: Assume by inductive hypothesis that for all pi = s˜i
α˜i+1−−→ . . . α˜i+k−−→
s˜i+k of length k, if (pi, sti) ⇒∗t (s˜i+k, sti+k) for some sti, sti+k ⊆ S, then there exists a
concrete path which begins at a state in sti and ends in a state in sti+k. Consider that
pi′ = s˜i−1
α˜i−→ s˜i ||pi is a path of the length k+1 where (s˜i−1 α˜i−→ s˜i ||pi, sti−1)⇒t (pi, sti)⇒∗t
(s˜i+k, sti+k). By induction hypothesis, there exists a concrete path that begins at some
state si ∈ sti and ends in si+k ∈ sti+k. By the definition of ⇒t, every state in sti is the
successor of some states in sti−1. Therefore, there exists si−1 ∈ sti−1 and αi ∈ h−1A (α˜i)
such that {si} = Θαi({si−1}). So we select the corresponding transition in the concrete
model to be si−1
αi−→ si which allows si−1 to reach si+k by the existence of a concrete path
from si to si+k.
By proposition 5.3 and definition 5.16, if pi = s˜0
α˜1−→ . . . α˜n−→ s˜n is a path in the
counterexample where (pi, S0 ∩ h−1(s˜0)) ⇒∗t (s˜n, stn), then there exists a corresponding
concrete path beginning at an initial state s0 ∈ S0 ∩ h−1(s˜0) which ends at some state
sn ∈ stn.
Proposition 5.4 (Soundness of ⇒∗). Let pi = s˜1 → · · · → s˜n be a path in the abstract
model. If st1 ⊆ h−1(s˜1) and (pi, st1)⇒∗ (s˜n, stn) for some ∅ ⊂ stn ⊆ S, then there exists
a concrete path that starts from a state in st1 and ends in a state in stn.
Proof. For the general form of a path that contains both temporal and epistemic transi-
tions, we use the similar approach as in proposition 5.3.
Base case: pi = s˜1. Then there is no transition from (s˜1, st1) and therefore, the
concrete path is a state in st1.
Inductive case: Assume by inductive hypothesis that for all pi = s˜i → · · · → s˜i+k
of length k, if (pi, sti)⇒∗ (s˜i+k, sti+k) for some sti, sti+k ⊆ S, then pi has a corresponding
concrete path which begins at a state in sti and ends in a state in sti+k.
• Consider that pi′ = s˜i−1 α˜i−→ s˜i ||pi is a path of length k + 1 where (s˜i−1 α˜i−→
s˜i || pi, sti−1) ⇒t (pi, sti) ⇒∗ (s˜i+k, sti+k). By induction hypothesis, there exists a
concrete path that begins at some state si ∈ sti and ends in si+k ∈ sti+k. By
the same analysis as in the proof of proposition 5.3, there exists si−1 ∈ sti−1 and
αi ∈ h−1A (α˜i) such that si−1 αi−→ si. Hence, there exists a concrete path from si−1 to
si+k.
• Consider that pi′ = s˜i−1 ∼a s˜i ||pi is a path of length k+1 where (s˜i−1 ∼a s˜i ||pi, sti−1)⇒e
(pi, sti)⇒∗ (s˜i+k, sti+k). By induction hypothesis, there exists a concrete path that
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begins at some state si ∈ sti and ends in si+k ∈ sti+k. By the definition of ⇒e and
proposition 5.3, si is reachable from some initial states in the concrete model, which
is a requirement by definition 5.15. From la(si) ∈ La(sti−1) we conclude that there
exists si−1 ∈ sti−1 such that la(si) = la(si−1). Hence we select si−1 ∼a si as the
corresponding epistemic transition in the concrete model. Therefore, there exists a
concrete path from si−1 to si+k.
In the case that pi = s˜0 → · · · → s˜n is a path in the counterexample and (pi, S0 ∩
h−1(s˜0))⇒∗ (s˜n, stn), then there exists a corresponding concrete path beginning at some
initial state s0 ∈ S0 ∩ h−1(s˜0) which ends at some state sn ∈ stn.
Proposition 5.5 (Completeness of ⇒∗). Let pi = s˜1 → · · · → s˜n be a path in the
abstract model. If there exists a concrete path pi = s1 → · · · → sn corresponding to pi
and s1 ∈ st1 ⊆ h−1(s˜1), then (pi, st1)⇒∗ (s˜n, stn) for some ∅ ⊂ stn ⊆ S.
Proof. For the completeness proof, we use induction over the length of the counterexam-
ples.
Base case: pi = s˜1 and pi = s1. Then we will have no transition and the proposition
automatically holds.
Inductive case: Assume by inductive hypothesis that for all pi = s˜i → · · · → s˜i+k
of length k, if there exists a path pi = si → · · · → si+k which corresponds to pi and
si ∈ sti ⊆ h−1(s˜i), then (pi, sti)⇒∗ (s˜i+k, sti+k) for some ∅ ⊂ sti+k ⊆ S.
• Consider that s˜i−1 α˜i−→ s˜i ||pi is a path of length k + 1 which has the corresponding
concrete path si−1
αi−→ si || pi. Let sti−1 ∈ h−1(s˜i−1) be a set of states where si−1 ∈
sti−1. Then the transition (s˜i−1
α˜i−→ s˜i || pi, sti−1) ⇒t (pi, sti) leads to the set sti
as the successors of the states in sti−1 with respect to the actions in h−1A (α˜i). As
αi ∈ h−1A (α˜i), we have si ∈ sti. Therefore by inductive hypothesis, we have (s˜i−1 α˜i−→
s˜i ||pi, sti−1) ⇒t (pi, sti) ⇒∗ (s˜i+k, sti+k) or equivalently (s˜i−1 α˜i−→ s˜i ||pi, sti−1) ⇒∗
(s˜i+k, sti+k).
• Consider that s˜i−1 ∼a s˜i || pi is a path of length k + 1 which has the corresponding
concrete path si−1 ∼a si || pi. Let sti−1 ∈ h−1(s˜i−1) be a set of states where si−1 ∈
sti−1. Then the transition (s˜i−1 ∼a s˜i ||pi, sti−1) ⇒e (pi, sti) leads to the set sti
which contains the reachable states with the same local states as the states in sti−1.
Therefore, si ∈ sti and by inductive hypothesis we have (s˜i−1 ∼a s˜i ||pi, sti−1) ⇒e
(pi, sti)⇒∗ (s˜i+k, sti+k) or equivalently (s˜i−1 ∼a s˜i ||pi, sti−1)⇒∗ (s˜i+k, sti+k).
88

















Figure 5.4: The transition system on the top is the concrete model and on the bottom is
the abstract one obtained by making the propositions l and r invisible.
Forward transition rules in figure 5.3 are sufficient to check linear counterexamples or
equivalently, paths. To extend the counterexample checking to tree-like counterexample,
extra procedures are required. We show the problem in the following example:
Example 5.3. Figure 5.4 demonstrates the transition system for a concrete interpreted
system on top, and the abstract system on the bottom. The model contains two agents,
e as the environment and a as regular agent. States are shown as tuples where the
first element is the local state of e and the second is the local state of a. The diagram
distinguishes the states by using the value of local propositions as the subscript. The
abstract model is generated by making the local proposition l of environment and r of
agent a invisible.
We aim to verify AG(p→ (Kap∨AGq)) over the concrete model. This property holds
for the original model, while it does not hold for the abstract one. The counterexample
generated is:
c˜e = {(sp¯q, st¯) α˜1−→ (spq, st) α˜2−→ (spq¯, st), (sp¯q, st¯) α˜1−→ (spq, st) ∼a (sp¯q, st)}
To find out if there exists any concrete counterexample that corresponds to c˜e, we
check the paths in c˜e one by one. We show the paths in c˜e by pi1 and pi2. The paths pi1
and pi2 correspond to the concrete paths pi1 = (sp¯ql, srt¯)
α11−−→ (spql, srt) α2−→ (spq¯l, srt) and
pi2 = (sp¯ql, srt¯)
α12−−→ (spql¯, sr¯t) ∼a (sp¯ql, sr¯t). Although all the paths in the counterexample
have corresponding concrete paths, the tree does not correspond to a concrete tree. This is
because if we select (spql, srt) as the corresponding state for (spq, st), then the leaf (sp¯ql, sr¯t)
is not reachable from it. A similar situation happens when we select (spql¯, sr¯t). Therefore,
the tree-like counterexample is spurious.
To verify a tree-like counterexample, we introduce two transition rules BackwardTCheck
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BackwardTCheck
(pi, S0 ∩ h−1(Root(pi)))⇒∗ (s˜, st′)
h−1A (α˜) = {α1, . . . , αn} rs =
n⋃
i=1
Θ−1αi (st) ∩ st′
(pi || s˜ α˜−→ s˜′, st)⇐t (pi, rs) rs˜ := rs
BackwardECheck
(pi, S0 ∩ h−1(Root(pi)))⇒∗ (s˜, st′′)
pi′ = s˜′0
α˜′1−→ . . . α˜
′
m−−→ s˜′ is the temporal path to s˜′ where s˜′0 ∈ S˜0
(pi′, S0 ∩ h−1(s˜′0))⇒∗ (s˜′, st′)
sˆt = {s ∈ st′′ | la(s) ∈ La(st ∩ st′)}
(pi || s˜ ∼a s˜′, st)⇐e (pi, sˆt) rs˜ := sˆt
Figure 5.5: Backward temporal and epistemic transition traversal. Θ−1α (st) computes the
set of predecessors of the states in st with respect to the transitions made by action α.
and BackwardECheck denoted by ⇐t and ⇐e. The transition rules find all the prede-
cessors of the states in st (figure 5.5) with respect to the temporal or epistemic transitions
in a backward manner which reside in the set of reachable states through the path. We
write ⇐∗ to denote a sequence of backward transitions ⇐t and ⇐e.
Assume that pi = s˜0 → · · · → s˜n is a path in the counterexample c˜e which (pi, S0 ∩
h−1(s˜0)) ⇒∗ (s˜n, stn) for some ∅ ⊂ stn ⊆ S. stn contains all the states in the leaves of
the concrete paths corresponding to pi. The point is not all the concrete states that are
traveresed in ⇒∗ can reach the states in stn. If s˜ ∈ Vert(pi), then (pi, stn) ⇐∗ (s˜0, st0)
finds the set of states rs˜ which contains the reachable states in h
−1(s˜) that lead to some
states in stn along the concrete paths corresponding to pi. st0 contains the initial states
that lead to the states in stn. We use the notation r
pi
s˜ to relate rs˜ with the path pi. Note
that to find rpis˜ , we first need to find stn through ⇒∗ transition.
Assume that Π˜ ⊆ c˜e. If s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e) then we define rΠ˜s˜ = ∩pi∈Π˜rpis˜ . If s˜ 6∈ Vert(pi),
then we stipulate rpis˜ = h
−1(s˜). We also stipulate r∅s˜0 = S0 ∩ h−1(s˜0) where s˜0 = Root(c˜e)
and r∅s˜ = h
−1(s˜) for all s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e) where s˜ 6= s˜0.
Proposition 5.6 (Soundness of counterexample checking). A counterexample c˜e in the
abstract model has a corresponding concrete one if:
1. for each path pi ∈ c˜e, there exists ∅ ⊂ st ⊆ S such that (pi, S0 ∩ h−1(s˜0))⇒∗ (s˜′, st)
where s˜0 = Root(c˜e) and pi ends in s˜
′.
2. for all s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e) : rc˜es˜ 6= ∅.
Proof. By the soundness of⇒∗, all the paths in pi correspond to some concrete paths which
satisfy the requirements in the definitions 5.15 and 5.16. Now for each s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e), we
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pick a state s ∈ rc˜es˜ as the corresponding state. For each path in c˜e and between all the
corresponding concrete paths, we pick the one which contains the selected states as its
vertices. The union of the selected paths builds a concrete counterexample that satisfies
the requirements in definition 5.16.
Procedure 4 Counterexample checking algorithm
function CheckCE(c˜e, I, h)
. Input: c˜e is the counterexample, I is the concrete model and h is the abstraction
function
. Output: returns true if a concrete counterexample exists. Returns false other-
wise.
{s˜0, . . . , s˜n} = Vert(c˜e) . s˜0 = Root(c˜e)
Π˜ = ∅
rΠ˜s˜0 = S0 ∩ h−1(s˜0), rΠ˜s˜1 = h−1(s˜1), . . . , rΠ˜s˜n = h−1(s˜n)
for all pi ∈ c˜e do
if (pi, rΠ˜s˜0)⇒∗ (s˜′, st) and st 6= ∅ then . pi ends at the state s˜′
. there exists some concrete path corresponding to pi
for all s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e) do
determine rˆpis˜ from (pi, st)⇐∗ (s˜0, st′)








s˜ = ∅ then











Proposition 5.7 (Completeness of counterexample checking). Assume that c˜e corre-
sponds to a concrete counterexample ce. Then both the items 1 and 2 in proposition 5.6
hold.
Proof. By definition 5.16, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the paths of the
two counterexamples. By completeness of ⇒∗, item 1 holds for all the paths in c˜e. Now
Assume that s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e) and s is the corresponding state in ce. Then for all pi ∈ c˜e, we
have s ∈ rpis˜ , and therefore s ∈ rc˜es˜ . Hence we have rc˜es˜ 6= ∅, as required for item 2.
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Procedure 4 expresses the tree-like counterexample checking method in a more refined
manner. CheckCE iterates over the paths in c˜e and checks if they corresponds to some
paths in the concrete model by using proposition 5.4 and the transition rule ⇒∗. If pi
corresponds to some concrete paths, then for each state s˜ in pi, the algorithm finds all
the concrete states rpis˜ in h
−1(s˜) that lead to the leaf states of the concrete paths by
applying⇐∗ over pi. In each loop iteration, Π˜ stores the paths in c˜e that are processed in
previous iterations. The set rΠ˜s˜ stores the concrete states that are common between the
paths in Π˜ and should remain non-empty during the process of counterexample checking.
The procedure returns false if no corresponding tree-like counterexample for c˜e exists.
Otherwise it returns true.
Example 5.4. We recall the transition system in example 5.3. As also discovered in
the example, the paths pi1 and pi2 correspond to the concrete paths pi1 = (sp¯ql, srt¯)
α11−−→
(spql, srt)
α2−→ (spq¯l, srt) and pi2 = (sp¯ql, srt¯) α12−−→ (spql¯, sr¯t) ∼a (sp¯ql, sr¯t). By backward
traversing through the first path and for the states in h−1((spq, st)), we find that only
the state (spql, srt) leads to the final state on pi1 and so, r
pi1
(spq ,st)
= {(spql, srt)}. The same
approach for pi2 results in r
pi2
(spq ,st)
= {(spql¯, sr¯t)}. As rpi1(spq ,st)∩rpi2(spq ,st) = ∅, the state (spq, st)
can not be assigned to a concrete single state. Therefore, c˜e is spurious.
5.5.3 Refinement of the abstraction
If the counterexample is found to be spurious, then the abstraction should be refined. The
abstract model is generated by making some propositions in the concrete model invisible.
For the refinement, we split some states in the abstract model by putting some of the
invisible propositions back into the model. These propositions should be selected in such
a way that when verifying the refined model, the same counterexample does not appear
again. In this section, we provide the mechanism for refining the abstraction.
Let c˜e be a spurious counterexample. We define two transition rules TemporalTree
which is denoted by ⇒Π˜t and EpistemicTree denoted by ⇒Π˜e where Π˜ ⊆ c˜e in figure
5.6. As before, ⇒Π˜∗ denotes a sequence of temporal and epistemic transitions of the type
⇒Π˜t and ⇒Π˜e . We use the following technique in order to find the state in the spurious
counterexample which needs to be split:
The state s˜i ∈ Vert(c˜e) is a failure state if there exists Π˜ ⊆ c˜e and pi ∈ c˜e\Π˜ such
that:
1. For all s˜ ∈ Vert(Π˜) : rΠ˜s˜ 6= ∅
2. pi = pi1 || s˜i( α˜i+1−−→ | ∼a)s˜i+1 || pi2 such that (pi, rΠ˜s˜0) ⇒Π˜∗ (pi1, std) ⇒Π˜(t|e) (pi2, ∅) for
some std 6= ∅.
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TemporalTree
h−1A (α˜) = {α1, . . . , αn}
(s˜






α˜′1−→ . . . α˜
′
m−−→ s˜′ is a temporal path to s˜′ where s˜′0 ∈ S˜0
(pi′, S0 ∩ h−1(s˜′0))⇒∗t (s˜′, st′) sˆt = {s ∈ st′ ∩ rΠ˜s˜′ | la(s) ∈ La(st)}
(s˜ ∼a s˜′ ||pi, st)⇒Π˜e (pi, sˆt)
Figure 5.6: Transition rules for finding failure state in a tree-like counterexample.
For a spurious counterexample, such Π˜ and pi exists. Otherwise, we will have rc˜es˜ 6= ∅
for all s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e), which contradicts proposition 5.6.
Based on Item 1), the sub-tree Π˜ has a corresponding counterexample in the concrete
model. In item 2), pi traverses over the concrete states that belong to the set of concrete
trees corresponding to Π˜ and gets to the set of states std ⊆ h−1(s˜i) with no transition
to a state in rΠ˜s˜i+1 . In the standard terminology as in [30], s˜i is called failure state. We
use the term dead end state for the states in std which the concrete paths end up with
and can not go further. Bad states are the states in h−1(s˜i) that have transition to some




The process of finding a failure state in the counterexample c˜e proceeds as follows:
1. Set Π˜ to empty set at the beginning
2. Find rΠ˜s˜ for all s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e) (as also mentioned in section 5.5.2, r∅s˜0 = S0 ∩ h−1(s˜0)
where s˜0 = Root(c˜e) and r
∅
s˜ = h
−1(s˜) for all s˜ ∈ Vert(c˜e) where s˜ 6= s˜0)
3. Pick a path pi ∈ c˜e that does not exist in Π˜
4. Apply⇒Π˜∗ over (pi, rΠ˜s˜0) to find failure state. If a failure state exists over pi, then exit
and refine the model
5. Add pi to Π˜ and return to step 2. Note that we are considering that the counterex-
ample is found to be spurious (by the procedure 4) and therefore, such failure state
will be found before all the paths in c˜e are added to Π˜.
For the implementation, the above process can be easily incorporated into the proce-
dure 4.
To refine the model, we find the propositions that having them invisible results in
generating spurious counterexample. First assume that the transition from s˜i to s˜i+1 is
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temporal, say s˜i
α˜i+1−−→ s˜i+1. Two situations can result in a transition of type ⇒Π˜t from std
to an empty set of states:
• There exists no αi+1 ∈ h−1(α˜i+1) such that Θαi+1(std) 6= ∅. Therefore, no action
has the permission to be performed on the states of std. Assume that φd is the
formula that represents the set of states std. As the state space is finite, the formula
representing the states always exists. Therefore, for all αi+1 ∈ h−1A (α˜i+1) with `i+1
as the permission, we have φd ∧ `i+1 ≡ ⊥. We call `i+1 conflict formula and φd base
formula.
• For some αi+1 ∈ h−1(α˜i+1) we have Θαi+1(std) 6= ∅. By the definition of⇒t we have
Θαi+1(std) ∩ rΠ˜s˜′i+1 = ∅ where r
Π˜
s˜′i+1
6= ∅. If φ is the formula representing Θαi+1(std)
and ψ the formula representing rΠ˜s˜′i+1
, then we have ψ ∧ φ ≡ ⊥. We call φ conflict
formula and ψ base formula.
The other situation is when the transition s˜i and s˜i+1 is epistemic, say s˜i ∼a s˜i+1.
Three situations can result in the epistemic transition ⇒Π˜e to an empty set of states:
• pi′ as the witness of the reachability of s˜i+1 in ⇒Π˜e is spurious. Then the refinement
should be guided by analysing pi′ instead of the main spurious path.
• Suppose that pi′ has corresponding concrete paths, i.e. (pi′, S0∩h−1(s˜′0))⇒∗t (s˜i+1, st′)
where st′ 6= ∅. By the definition of ⇒e, the epistemic transition results in an empty
set of states if st′ ∩ rΠ˜s˜′i+1 = ∅. If φ is the formula representing st
′ and ψ the formula
representing rΠ˜s˜′i+1
, then we call φ conflict formula and ψ base formula.
• The third reason for the epistemic transition to an empty set is when no shared local
state exists between the states of std and st
′ ∩ rΠ˜s˜′i+1 where st
′ is the set of reachable
states according to the previous item and both the sets are non-empty. In the other
words, La(std)∩La(st′ ∩ rΠ˜s˜′i+1) = ∅. The formula representing the local states in std
with respect to the agent a is called base formula, and the formula representing the
local states of st′ ∩ rΠ˜s˜′i+1 is the conflict formula.
To refine the model, we return some hidden propositions to separate the set of dead end
states from the rest of the states. This can simply be done by adding all the propositions
occurring in conflict clauses to the abstract model.
Definition 5.18. (conflict clause) Let φ be the base formula and ψ the conflict formula.
Let cnf(ψ) denote the set containing all the conjuncts appear in conjunctive normal form
of ψ. Then c ∈ cnf(ψ) is a conflict clause if c ∧ φ ≡ ⊥.
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If the propositions that occur in one of the conflict clauses become visible, then the
spurious strategy will not happen in the refined model again. In the case of temporal
transition, we add the propositions in the conflict clauses for all the conflicting actions.
To have the smallest possible refinement, we should look for the conflict classes with the
smallest number of literals.
5.5.4 An example of student information system
We illustrate our abstraction refinement method by the example of student information
system (SIS) presented in chapter 4. In this section, the approach for finding conflict
clauses and the refinement of the abstract model is demonstrated using the same temporal
property as in query 4.5. This example is interesting for us as it is also used in [94] and [11]
to demonstrate the verification time and memory usage in their verification approach. The
refinement method for the case of epistemic properties similarly follows the instructions
in section 5.5.3.
Let Σ = ΣAg = {a1, . . . , a5}. We use the convention that the first parameter of an
action is the agent that performs it. The action rules in SIS simple policy are as follows:
assignDemonstrator(u, d, s) :
{+demonstratorOf(d, s)} ← lecturer(u) ∧ higher(d, s)∧¬higher(s, d)
resignAsDemonstrator(u, s) :
{-demonstratorOf(u, s)} ← demonstratorOf(u, s)
The first action rule states that if u is a lecturer and d is in higher level than s,
then u can assign d as the demonstrator of s. The second one stipulates that if u is the
demonstrator of s, then u can resign as the demonstrator.
The policy C is the set of actions derived by instantiating the above rules with the ob-
jects in ΣAg. Assume that at the beginning, the agents a1 and a2 are not the demonstrator
of each other. Then IC is the interpreted system derived from C where
(IC, s0) |= ¬demonstratorOf(a2, a3) ∧ ¬demonstratorOf(a3, a2)
The safety property we are interested in verifying is “is it not possible to get into a
state where a2 and a3 are allocated as the demonstrators of each other?”, represented by
the CTL formula AG(¬(demonstratorOf(a2, a3) ∧ demonstratorOf(a3, a2))).
For the initial abstraction, we only keep the propositions demonstratorOf(a2, a3) and
demonstratorOf(a3, a2) in the system. Substituting the parameters in the rules with the
appropriate objects creates the set of actions. For instance and in the following action in
(IC, agent a1 assigns a2 as the demonstrator of a3:
95
assignDemonstrator(a1, a2, a3) :
{+demonstratorOf(a2, a3)} ← lecturer(a1) ∧higher(a2, a3) ∧ ¬higher(a3, a2)
Hiding the propositions lecturer(a1), higher(a2, a3) and higher(a3, a2) will turn the
evolution rule into {+demonstratorOf(a2, a3)}← >.
As the initial abstraction hides lecturer(a1), . . . , lecturer(a5), then all the actions
assignDemonstrator(a1, a2, a3), . . . , assignDemonstrator(a5, a2, a3) have the same per-
mission and the same effect, and therefore they belong to the same equivalence class. Now
we build up the abstract model using the rules in section 5.3 and verify the abstract model.
The verification produces the following counterexample:
c˜e = { s˜0 [assignDemonstrator(a1,a2,a3)]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s˜1 [assignDemonstrator(a1,a3,a2)]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s˜3}
where
(I˜C, s˜0) |= ¬demonstratorOf(a2, a3) ∧ ¬demonstratorOf(a3, a2)
(I˜C, s˜1) |= demonstratorOf(a2, a3) ∧ ¬demonstratorOf(a3, a2)
(I˜C, s˜2) |= demonstratorOf(a2, a3) ∧ demonstratorOf(a3, a2)
The first transition in c˜e has five corresponding transition as the result of performing
the concrete actions in [assignDemonstrator(a1, a2, a3)]. For the next step and from the
successor set of states, none of the actions in the equivalence class of assignDemonstrator
(a1, a3, a2) can be performed. We can see that the conflict clause higher(a3, a2) is com-
mon between all the actions in that equivalence class. Addition of the proposition
higher(a3, a2) prevents the same counterexample to occur in the refined model. Only
one refinement step is sufficient to show that the safety property is true in the abstract
model and hence, is true in the concrete one.
5.5.5 Going beyond ACTLK
While this section develops a fully automated abstraction refinement method for the ver-
ification of temporal-epistemic properties that reside the category of ACTLK over an
access control system which is modelled by an interpreted system, some important epis-
temic safety properties does not reside in this category. For instance and in a conference
paper review system, it is valuable for policy designers to verify that for all reachable
states, an author of a paper cannot find out (¬K) who is the reviewer of his own paper
(see the first property in example 5.2). Although we are able to verify such properties in
the concrete model, we cannot apply automated counterexample-guided abstraction and
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refinement for such properties.
Let us explore the problem. Assume that for the abstract system I˜, abstract state s˜
and agent a, (I˜ , s˜) |= ¬Kaϕ. That means there exists a state s˜′ such that s˜′ ∼a s˜ and
(I˜ , s˜′) |= ¬ϕ. If s is a state in the concrete model where h(s) = s˜, then the satisfaction
relation (I˜ , s˜) |= ¬Kaϕ implies (I, s) |= ¬Kaϕ if it guarantees the existence of a reachable
state s′ ∈ h−1(s˜′) such that s′ ∼a s and (I, s′) |= ¬ϕ.
First of all, if such s′ exists, the satisfaction relation (I˜ , s˜′) |= ¬ϕ still does not imply
(I, s′) |= ¬ϕ when ϕ is ACTLK except if ϕ is simply a propositional formula which
is the case for many of the properties that we are interested in. Second, the relation
s˜′ ∼a s˜ in the abstract model does not imply s′ ∼a s in the concrete model for some
reachable state s′ ∈ h−1(s˜′). In the case that (I˜ , s˜′) 6|= ¬ϕ, the model-checker produces a
counterexample that can be checked using the method that is developed in this section
and then the abstract model can be refined. In the case that the satisfaction relation
holds, the model-checker does not produce any witness.
To complete our work for the properties that deal with the negation of knowledge
operator, we restrict the formula in scope of the knowledge operators to propositional
formulas. Then we use an interactive refinement procedure in the following way: we
abstract the interpreted system in the standard way that we described. If the property
does not hold in the abstract model, the counterexample will be checked in the concrete
model and the abstract model will be refined if it is required. If the property turned
to be true in the abstract model as a result of the satisfaction of ¬Ka (for which there
is no witness in the abstract model), then we refine the local state of the agent a in
an interactive manner. In this way, the tool asks the user to selects a set of invisible
local propositions to be added in the next round if required. This process will continue
until a valid counterexample is found, or the local state becomes concretized. In the case
that the safety property does not hold in the concrete model (where information leakage
vulnerability exists), then there is a chance to find it out with the abstract model when
the local states are still abstract.
Query 5.6 in section 5.6 demonstrates such an approach. Our experimental results
show that while the verification time in interactive approach depends on the choices of
the user, in general, the whole verification process is still much lower than verifying the
concrete model at the beginning. Moreover, this interactive approach can turn to a fully
automated way if the tool can use a heuristics based on the policy which can identify the
hidden propositions with higher dependencies to the property and add them automatically
to the abstract model for the refinement.
In our implementation and in the cases when the knowledge is the result of reading
system information and not reasoning, it is sufficient to keep only the local state propo-
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sitions which support the readability of that information. Therefore, the local state will
remain in the least possible abstract form and is not required to be refined when the
property does not hold. Query 5.3 in section 5.6 demonstrates such a property.
5.6 Case studies and experimental results
The policy verification method is implemented in Microsoft F#. The implementation
uses MCMAS as the model checker for interpreted systems. A policy written in the
language proposed in chapter 3 will be translated into ISPL (MCMAS script language)
and verified. In the case of applying abstraction and refinement, an abstract interpreted
system is generated in ISPL and then, MCMAS is invoked to verify the model. If MCMAS
produces a counterexample as the witness of a failing property, the counterexample is
checked to have a corresponding one in the concrete model. If it is spurious, a refined
abstract model will be generated automatically. To find conflict clauses for the refinement,
we use Microsoft Z3 SMT Solver [39].
We use the query of the form init : ϕ where init is the formula representing the initial
states and ϕ is the property we aim to verify. We compare runtime and memory usage
for different case studies and queries with and without applying abstraction. We also
compare the results with other verification methods (RW and PoliVer) when the property
allows us.
5.6.1 Case study: a student information system (SIS)
We recall the student information system policy introduced in section 5.5.4 as the case
study. For such a system, it is important to ensure that no two students can be assigned
as each other’s demonstrator. If a2, a3 ∈ ΣAg, then query 5.1 checks the safety property
that states no two students can be assigned as the demonstrator of each other.
Query 5.1.
¬demonstratorOf(a2, a3) ∧ ¬demonstratorOf(a3, a2) :
AG(¬(demonstratorOf(a2, a3) ∧ demonstratorOf(a3, a2)))
As described in section 5.5.4, only the propositions demonstratorOf(a2, a3) and
demonstratorOf(a3, a2) remain visible in the initial abstract model. Our method proves
the correctness of the property for 10 agents in only one refinement round and by the
addition of proposition higher(a3, a2) to the initial abstract model.
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This query is similar to the query 6.8 in [94]. Becker [11] has compared the verification
time between a planner, theorem prover and RW for this query for 10 agents and we will
do the same comparison in experimental results section. As also mentioned in [11], it may
not be a right comparison as the RW takes knowledge states into account and MCMAS is
also somehow slower than conventional LTL/CTL model-checkers or planners. But still
the comparison provides a view of how abstraction and refinement dramatically reduces
the amount of memory and time in most of applications.
5.6.2 Case study: a conference paper review system (CRS)
We recall the conference paper review system example in chapter 4. Comparing to chap-
ter 4, we apply the abstraction and refinement when verifying temporal and epistemic
properties. In query 5.2, we verify the temporal property as in query 4.1 in the presence
of abstraction refinement. Query 5.3 evaluates a non-ACTLK epistemic property using
automated abstraction by approximating knowledge by the readability. This query is
similar to the query 4.3 in the previous chapter. In section 5.6.4, we will verify several
epistemic properties over the conference paper review system which can not be evaluated
by PoliVer, RW or similar verification tools.
Assume that in the system, a1 ∈ ΣAg and p1 ∈ Σ is a paper. We aim to get sure that
if a principal is the author of a paper, then it is not possible for him to be assigned as the
reviewer of his own paper. Query 5.2 asks if such safety condition holds in CRS:
Query 5.2.
author(p1, a1) ∧ ¬reviewer(p1, a1) : AG(¬reviewer(p1, a1))
The initial abstract model contains only the proposition reviewer(p1, a1). Our tool
finds the satisfaction of the property in one refinement step and by making the proposition
author(p1, a1) visible.
Another interesting query is the one that verifies if an agent has read the review of a
paper, then it is not possible for him to submit a review for that paper later. Query 5.3
asks such question:
Query 5.3.
¬submittedreview(p1, a1) ∧ reviewer(p1, a2) :
AG(Ka1review(p1, a2)→ AG(¬submittedreview(p1, a1))
The above epistemic property is not ACTLK. But we are still able to use abstraction
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and refinement over the model. Firstly, knowledge about a review in the context of our
system is derived by reading the review as a PC member knows the content of a review if
he has already read the review. By this assumption, we only need to keep the supporting
local propositions of agent a1 for reading review(p1, a2). Therefore, we do not need to
apply abstraction over the local state of a1. Hence by the discussion in section 5.5.5, the
automated abstraction and refinement method still works for the query 5.3.
This property does not hold in the system. For this query, the initial abstract model
contains the propositions review(p1, a2) and submittedreview(p1, a1). The initial ab-
straction results in a spurious counterexample, and the verification in total contains five
refinement steps (in our implementation). Finally, we will have the following counterex-
ample, which also holds in the concrete model: a1 as a PC member first reads the review
submitted by a2 when he is not the reviewer of p1. Then the chair (a3) allocates a1 as the
reviewer of p1. At the end, a1 submits his review of the paper.
5.6.3 Case study: an employee information system (EIS)
We demonstrate the abstraction refinement technique when verifying temporal properties
of employee information system presented in chapter 4.
Assume that in the system a1 ∈ ΣAg and a1 is a manager. Query 5.4 checks if in the
case that there is no director at the beginning, none of the agents can set a bonus for a1:
Query 5.4.∧
i
¬director(ai) ∧ manager(a1) ∧ ¬bonus(a1, b1) : AG(¬bonus(a1, b1))
The initial abstract model only contains the proposition bonus(a1, b1) which appears
in the query. The verification requires only one refinement round which makes the propo-
sitions manager(a1), director(a1), . . . , director(an) visible (n is the number of agents).
The counterexample is: a1 resigns as a manager, and then a2, which is already a manager,
allocates him the bonus b1.
The following query asks if it is impossible that some agent allocates a bonus to a1
and a1 remains a manager, assuming that no director exists in the system:
Query 5.5.∧
i
¬director(ai) ∧ manager(a1) ∧ ¬bonus(a1, b1) : AG(¬(bonus(a1, b1) ∧ manager(a1)))
The refinement has only one round. At first, the propositions bonus(a1, b1) and
manager(a1) remain visible. For the refinement, the propositions director(a1), . . . ,
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director(an) will be added to the initial abstract model. This property does not hold
in the system because if a1 resigns as manager and a2 allocates a bonus to him, then no
agent in EIS is able to promote him again as a manager.
5.6.4 Case studies for reasoning about knowledge
We recall the conference paper review system in section 5.6.2 and add some extra rules
to the policy. Let us add the following rules:
• All the PC members have access to the list of the papers assigned to other reviewers
except the papers that they are the authors.
• The number of papers assigned to each reviewer is publicly available to all the PC
members.
Query 5.6 investigates if it is possible for an agent, which is also an author of a paper
in the conference to find out which reviewer is assigned to his paper after all the papers
are assigned:
Query 5.6.
author(p1, a1) : AG(AllPapersAssigned ∧ reviewer(p1, a2)→ ¬Ka1reviewer(p1, a2))
The proposition AllPapersAssigned in query 5.6 denotes a propositional formula that
when evaluates to true, it shows all the papers are assigned to the reviewers. For a reader,
it may look trivial that the property in query 5.6 does not hold in the system. Human
brain uses reasoning to analyse the situation: reviewer a1 has access to the number of
papers assigned to reviewer a2 and the list of assigned papers. So, if the papers of a2
that show up for a1 is less than the total number assigned to a2, then a1 knows that a2 is
the reviewer of p1. In the above, the property holds when the knowledge modality K is
treated as the knowledge gained by accessing the information. But when the knowledge
is treated as reasoning about information, the property does not hold in the system.
Query 5.6 is not ACTLK as it contains the negation of knowledge modality. Therefore
we apply an interactive refinement for the verification. In this approach, we build up
the abstract model and refine it whenever a spurious strategy is found. Each time the
property holds in the abstract model, the tool checks the local state of the agent a1. If the
local state is still abstract, we can not be sure that the property also holds in the concrete
model. Hence, the tool returns the list of invisible local propositions for a1. In each
interactive refinement step, the user can select one or more propositions that he believes
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may help the agent in finding if reviewer(p1, a2) is true. Our interactive verification of
query 5.6 proves that the property does not hold in the model. The final abstract model
contained 28 Boolean variables compared to the 71 variable for the concrete one.
The concept of knowledge by reasoning can not be modelled by temporal properties.
In the above query, a1 does not have direct access to the reviewer of his own paper. So,
the verification frameworks like RW, PoliVer and DynPAL fail to show that the property
in query 5.6 does not hold. Using interpreted systems make verifying such properties
possible, which shows the value of the proposed approach.
The following query shows that reasoning about the assigned reviewer is always pos-
sible in our CRS:
Query 5.7.
author(p1, a1) : AG(AllPapersAssigned ∧ reviewer(p1, a2)→ Ka1reviewer(p1, a2))
Our tool proves that the property holds in the model in 10 refinement rounds. The
initial abstraction begins with the proposition reviewer(p1, a2) and all the propositions
included in the propositional formula of AllPapersAssigned. Each refinement step adds
at least one proposition to the model. For 3 agents and 2 papers, the final abstract model
contains 19 Boolean variables, while the number of variables in the concrete model is
71. This difference demonstrates the huge reduction of state space in the abstract model
compared to the concrete one.
Some safety properties deal with detectability of an evidence in the system. As a prac-
tical example, in EasyChair conference paper review system, a PC member can update
his profile information like email address. Updating user information is also possible by
the chairs and can be done in a legal or illegal way. In all the cases, it is crucial that PC
members can find out if their profile information in updated in order to trace illegal ac-
tivities. This is a weakness in EasyChair implementation as the following safety property
does not hold in easy chair:
Query 5.8.
PCMember(a1) ∧ ¬profileUpdated(a1) : AG(profileUpdated(a1)→ Ka1profileUpdated(a1))
This property is ACTLK and abstraction and refinement algorithm is applicable for
its verification1.
1We have not modelled easyChair in our implementation.
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10 Agents 3 Papers, 7 Agents 2 Papers, 4 Agents 6 Bonus, 12 Agents 6 Bonus, 12 Agents
Query 5.1 Query 5.2 Query 5.3 Query 5.4 Query 5.5
Figure 5.7: Comparison of the verification time for the queries 1 to 5 between MCMAS
with abstraction, PoliVer and RW. Verification time for abstraction and refinement with
MCMAS contains the time for model generation, invoking MCMAS (under Cygwin) and
generating output. Queries 5.6 and 5.7 are not applicable for PoliVer and RW as they are
not concerned about reasoning.
Concrete model Abstraction and refinement
time(s) BDD vars time(s) Max BDD vars last ref time
Query 5.6 6576.5 180 148.3 80 3.28
Query 5.7 6546.4 180 174.1 98 21
Figure 5.8: A comparison of query verification time (in second) and runtime memory usage
(in MB) between the concrete model and automated abstraction refinement method. last
ref time reflects the verification time for the last refined model.
5.6.5 Experimental results
One of the main motivations is to compare the memory usage and verification time in the
concrete model and in the presence of abstraction. We performed the experiments on an
Intel Core2 Dou 2.40GHz workstation with 2GB RAM running windows 7 64-bit.
Figure 5.7 demonstrates the comparison between interpreted systems model using
abstraction and refinement, PoliVer and RW in a logarithmic scale. Except query 5.3, all
the queries deal with temporal properties. Query 5.3 contains knowledge modality which
we treat as knowledge by reading. Therefore, it is still possible to compare the tools
for such a query. It is important to note that in abstraction and refinement method, a
high percentage of evaluation time spends on generating the whole concrete model at the
beginning, invoking executable MCMAS which also invokes Cygwin library, generating
abstract model and verifying the counterexample. In most of our experiments, verification
of the final abstract model by MCMAS takes less than 10ms.
Verification of the queries 5.6 and 5.7 by PoliVer and RW returns different results
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comparing with the interpreted systems model. PoliVer and RW are unable to detect
information leakage in CRS policy because author(p1, a1) is always true in the model,
and the agent a1 never finds a chance to sample reviewer(p1, a2). Therefore for the
query 5.6, safety property holds in the system. Modelling in interpreted systems reveals
that a1 can reason who is the reviewer of his paper. For query 5.6, the tool also outputs
the counterexample which demonstrates the sequence of actions that allows the author to
reason about the reviewer of his paper.
The unique feature of incorporating temporary read permissions into the interpreted
systems and verifying with MCMAS has a big limitation: the number of evolution lines
in MCMAS input script grows exponentially when knowledge for extra propositions is
introduced. We have compared the memory usage and verification time for the queries 5.6
and 5.7 in the concrete model and the abstract one in figure 5.8. Comparing to the concrete
model verification, the results show the considerable reduction in time and memory usage
when applying the proposed abstraction and refinement method which shows its practical
importance (fully automated refinement for the query 5.6 and interactive refinement for
the query 5.7).
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a framework for verifying temporal and epistemic prop-
erties over access control policies. In order to verify knowledge by reasoning, we used
interpreted systems as the basic framework and MCMAS (model-checker for multi-agent
systems) as the model-checking engine. Although we are able to find information leak-
age vulnerabilities in this approach, our experiments show that verifying the knowledge
gained by reasoning increases the time and memory usage. In order to make the verifica-
tion more practical for medium to large systems, we perform fully automated abstraction
and refinement when dealing with safety properties. Our optimization method adopts
counterexample-guided refinement known as CEGAR and extends it for ACTLK prop-
erties. Case studies and experimental results show a considerable reduction in time and
space when abstraction and refinement is in use. We also apply an interactive refinement
for some useful safety properties that does not reside in ACTLK like the ones that contain
the negation of knowledge modality.
Most of the required properties that need to be verified are temporal or deal with
the knowledge that is the result of reading system information. Those properties can
be verified much more efficiently with PoliVer or DynPAL. This part of the research
is the complimentary of our approach in chapter 4 i.e. we can find information leakage
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vulnerabilities that is difficult or impossible to be captured by PoliVer but uses more
resources. We believe that both the approaches should be used together in order to prove
that the policy complies with organization security requirements.
When defining the equivalence classes for the actions, we consider the agent that
performs the action as a parameter for classification (definition 5.11). In general and
when the model is too abstract, there may exists other agent’s action resulting in a
similar transition in the system which can be bundled in the same equivalence class
and make the model simpler. Our approach makes the whole process of abstraction
and refinement faster in practice, while it results in a bigger abstract model in model-
checker’s scripting language. But our experimental results show that the verification
time of the abstract models construct a small portion of the whole verification process.
Therefore, our approach results in faster process of abstract model generation, verification
and refinement.
When the abstract model is small, there may exist several agents with similar be-
haviour in the system. As a possible enhancement, we can remove the redundant agents
using symmetry reduction techniques. These techniques may also enable us in verifying
models with unbounded number of agents. We leave this approach as future work. We
would also like to work on a more intelligent heuristic when we find several candidates as
the conflict clauses in future.
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CHAPTER 6
INFORMATION LEAKAGE VERIFICATION IN
DATALOG-BASED POLICIES
This chapter contains research on information leakage verification of access control policies
which is done during my internship at Microsoft Research Cambridge as a part of my PhD.
This research is done in collaboration with Moritz Becker, my supervisor in Microsoft
Research. In this research, we were interested in verifying information leakage in stateless
credential-based access control policies. We adopt Datalog as the policy language, which
is the basis of various policy languages [70, 50, 51, 13]. We proposed the first sound and
complete algorithm to find if a property is opaque (or detectable) in Datalog-based trust
management system.
In 2009, Becker [12] introduced probing attacks in Datalog-based trust management
systems, where an attacker submits a set of credentials together with access requests called
probes and by analysing the response, reasons about confidential information. Becker
proposed an inference system to verify the detectability of properties in a policy. There
are some problems with the approach in [12]: (1) The detectability verification method is
sound, but not provably complete (2) The method is found to be difficult to implement.
Considering the previous approach, we work on a verification method that fixes the
problem of completeness and is feasible to automate. So, we design on a new approach
which deals with opacity (also known as non-detectability). The inference system that we
propose is not only sound (can detect if a property is opaque in the policy), but is also
complete (if a property is opaque in a policy, the inference system will detect it). The
algorithm is also simple enough to be automated. We have implemented the tool in F#
functional language and introduced several optimization methods that effectively reduce
the memory usage and calculation time of the algorithm.
This chapter is structured as follows: section 6.1 introduces the concept of probing
attack in credential-based policies, section 6.2 provides the formal definitions, section 6.3
explains the structure of Datalog-based policies, in section 6.4, a delegation policy will
be introduced, which will be the basis of out case studies, section 6.5 contains the opac-
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ity verification algorithm and corresponding lemmas and theorems, section 6.6 describes
the implementation and optimization methods, section 6.7 is experimental results and
summary is provided in section 6.8.
6.1 Introduction
To show how probing attacks work, consider a banking service which contains the follow-
ing assertions in SecPAL policy syntax [13]:
Bank says x canAccessTransactions if x isClerk.
Bank says centralCA canSay x isClerk.
In the banking system, the central certificate authority is a trusted party, which can
state (in practice by issuing a certificate) that a principal is a clerk. The keyword canSay
in the second assertion states that bank has delegated the authority over the predicate
isClerk to the centralCA.
The fact that an agent is an inspector in the banking system is confidential and not
visible to the bank clerks. Now assume that Eve is interested in finding whether Bob is
an inspector or not. Eve follows the following procedure:
1. By collaborating with centralCA, Eve owns two credentials:
centralCA says Eve isClerk if Bob isInspector.
centralCA says Bank canSay Bob isInspector.
2. For the first probe, Eve submits the two credentials together with the query “centralCA
says Eve canAccessTransactions?”, which is granted.
3. For the second probe, Eve submits the second credential together with the same
query. The access is denied in this case.
Based on the above observations, Eve can find that the first credential is crucial for
the successful access request. The credential affects the evaluation of the query only if
the left hand side evaluates to true, which is only possible if Bank says Bob isInspector.
Therefore by cleverly selecting the probes, an attacker may be able to reason about some
confidential facts in the system.
In this research, we present a formal framework for probing attacks in credential
systems. Similar to the work in this thesis for dynamic access control policies, we use the
concept of observational equivalence to define opacity and detectability in access control
107
policies. Given the set of available probes for an adversary, we present an algorithm to
verify if a given query is opaque in a policy to the adversary. The algorithm is provably
sound and complete.
Another important feature of the algorithm is that it provides the witness when the
property is found to be opaque. Only the existence of a witness, which may be a non-
logical policy is enough for a property to be opaque. But in the case of non-realistic
witness, the attacker can ignore the witness or assign a probability which is an informal
degree of likelihood, to the opacity of the property. The algorithm allows enumerating all
possible witnesses for the opacity.
6.2 Probing attacks framework
Definition 6.1 (Policy, language, probe). A policy language is a triple (Pol, Prb,`),
where Pol and Prb are sets called policies and probes, respectively, and ` is a binary infix
relation from Pol × Prb, called decision relation.
Let A ∈ Pol and pi ∈ Prb. If A ` pi we say that pi is positive in A; otherwise (A 6` pi),
pi is negative in A.
This definition is abstract and does not enforce any restriction on the structure of
policy and probe languages. A probe is a pair that contains a set of credentials and an
access request, called query. A positive probe leads to an access grant, and a negative
one leads to access denial.
Different policy languages like SecPAL [13], DKAL2 [51] and XACML [77] have dif-
ferent policy formats. For example, SecPAL policy is a set of assertions of the form
〈Principal〉 says 〈Fact〉 (see section 2.2.3 for more details). A probe pi is of the form
〈A,ϕ〉 where A is the set of assertions and ϕ is the query. If A0 is the system policy, then
we say A0 ` pi iff ϕ is deducible from A0 ∪ A.
The access queries in credential systems like DKAL2 and XACML are not easily
evaluated against the union of system policy and submitted credentials. in DKAL2, the
credentials called infon terms first will be modified into another form of credentials, and
then will be added to the system policy. Also DKAL may filter out some of the credentials
submitted by the user to the system according to the permissions. XACML policies have a
hierarchical structure of policy-sets, policies and rules (refer to the section 2.2.1). Hence,
the submitted credentials need to be transformed into the hierarchical structure before
adding up to the policy.
To abstract away the language-dependent details like filtering assertions and translat-
ing the queries into other forms, we define the concept of available probes.
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Definition 6.2 (Alikeness and available probes). An adversary is defined by an equiva-
lence relation ' ⊆ Pol × Pol and a set Avail ⊆ Prb of available probes. If A1 ' A2 for
two policies A1 and A2, we say that A1 and A2 are alike.
The definition of alikeness states that two policies are alike if the visible assertions
are syntactically equivalent. There could be another definition of the alikeness which
considers the semantically equivalence of the visible assertions.
Definition 6.3 (Observational equivalence). Two policies A1 and A2 are observationally
equivalent (A1 ≡ A2) iff
1. A1 ' A2, and
2. ∀pi ∈ Avail : A1 ` pi ⇐⇒ A2 ` pi
An attack to a policy can be of the type passive and active. A passive adversary only
reads the visible assertions of system policy and can not distinguish between the policies
that are alike. An active adversary is able to distinguish the policies not only by reading
the visible assertions, but by evaluating his available probes against them. The two active
and passive attacks over the policy provide a partial knowledge for the attacker, which
can enable him to reason about confidential facts or rules in the system.
Definition 6.4 (Detectability, opacity). A predicate Φ ⊆ Pol is detectable in A ∈ Pol iff
∀A′ ∈ Pol : A ≡ A′ ⇒ Φ(A′)
A predicate Φ ⊆ Pol is opaque in A ∈ Pol iff it is not detectable in A, or in the other
words, iff
∃A′ ∈ Pol : A ≡ A′ ∧ ¬Φ(A′)
By the above definition, a property Φ is detectable is a policy A if Φ holds in all possible
policies which behave the same against submitted probes. Otherwise, Φ is opaque in A.
Opacity is the negation of detectability. A property is opaque in a policy if there exists
another policy which is observationally equivalent to the first one, but Φ does not hold.
On the similarities between the knowledge-based verification of state-based
policies and opacity verification in Datalog-based policies
The concept of alikeness and observational equivalence in credential-based systems is
similar to the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i introduced in section 5.2.2. If s1 and s2
are two global states, then s1 ∼i s2 if the observational part of s1 and s2 for agent i, which
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is called local state of i, is the same. In other words, agent i can not distinguish between
the states s1 and s2.
The definition of detectability in trust management systems is closely related to the
definition of knowledge which is denoted by operator Ki. Agent i knows if Φ in state s
is true (KiΦ) if all the reachable states (similar to availability) that have the same local
state as in s (observationally equivalent) satisfy the property Φ.
6.3 Datalog-based policies
Many existing policy languages including SecPAL [13], RT [70], Cassandra [17], SD3 [62]
and Binder [41] use Datalog as their semantic bases. Datalog can be seen as Prolog
without function symbols (see section 2.2.2 for more details).
The language is parameterized by a function-less first-order signature containing a
countable set of predicate names and a countable set of constants. This gives rise to
atoms P of the form p(~e), where p is a predicate symbol and ~e a sequence of expressions
or terms (i.e., first-order variables or constants) of p’s arity.
The central construct in Datalog is a clause. A clause a is of the form
P0 ← P1, . . . , Pn
where n ≥ 0. The atom P0 is called the head and the sequence of atoms ~P =
〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 the body. The arrow ← is usually omitted if n = 0. We write Cls to denote
the set of all clauses. We write hd(a) to denote a’s head and bd(a) to denote its body.
Given a set of clauses A ⊆ Cls , we write hds(A) to denote the atom set {hd(a) | a ∈ A}.
A query ϕ is either true, false or a ground (i.e., variable-free) boolean formula (i.e.,
involving connectives ¬, ∧ and ∨) over atoms. We write Qry to denote the set of all
queries.
Given a query ϕ ⊆ Qry and set of assertions A, we write A ` ϕ if ϕ evaluates to
true in A, and A 6` ϕ or equivalently A ` ¬ϕ otherwise. In Datalog, ` is the smallest
relation such that the following holds:
• A ` true.
• A ` P0 if there exists atoms P1, . . . , Pn (for some n ≥ 0) such that P0 ← P1, . . . , Pn
is a ground instance of some clause in A and A ` Pi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• A ` ¬ϕ if A ` ϕ does not hold.
• A ` Φ ∧ Φ′ if A ` ϕ and A ` ϕ′.
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• A ` Φ ∨ Φ′ if A ` ϕ or A ` ϕ′.
For our proofs, a more operational definition is useful that is based on the intuition
that Datalog clauses are inductive definitions.
Definition 6.5 (Consequence operator). Given a policy A, we define the consequence
operator TA as a monotonic mapping between sets S of ground atoms. In the following
definition, let γ be a ground substitution (a total mapping from variables to constants).
TA(S) = { P ′0 | ∃γ ∃(P0 < −P1, ..., Pn) ∈ A,
γ({P1, ..., Pn}) ⊆ S,
P ′0 = γ(P0) }
The following definition introduces a number of terms that are fundamental to the al-
gorithm described in Section 6.5. Lemma 6.1 establishes an important connection between
probes and clause containment.
Definition 6.6 (Monotonicity, containment, equivalence). A query is monotonic iff it is
equivalent to one without negation. A probe 〈A,ϕ〉 ∈ Prb is monotonic iff ϕ is monotonic.
A policy A is contained in a policy A′ (we write A  A′) iff for all ground atoms P and all
sets S of ground atoms: A ` 〈S, P 〉 ⇒ A′ ` 〈S, P 〉. Two policies A and A′ are equivalent
(we write A
.
= A′) iff A  A′ and A′  A.
Lemma 6.1. Let A ⊆ Cls , ~P be a set of ground atoms and P a ground atom. A ` 〈~P , P 〉
iff {P ← ~P}  A.
Proof.
(⇐) This direction is straightforward.
(⇒) Suppose the contrary. Let n > 0 be the smallest integer such that there exists a
set S of ground atoms and a ground atom Q with Q ∈ Tn{P←~P}∪S(∅) and Q 6∈ TwA∪S(∅).
Then there must be a ground instance Q ← ~Q of a clause in {P ← ~P} ∪ S such that
~Q ⊆ Tn−1{P←~P}∪S(∅) ⊆ T
w
A∪S(∅). This clause cannot be in S, or else Q ∈ TwA∪S(∅).
Therefore, the ground instance is P ← ~P , and thus ~P ⊆ Tn−1{P←~P}∪S(∅) ⊆ T
w
A∪S(∅).
Hence TwA∪S(∅) = TwA∪S∪~P (∅). But from A ` 〈~P , P 〉 it follows that P ∈ TwA∪S∪~P (∅), and
hence P = Q ∈ TwA∪S(∅), which contradicts the initial assumption.
Now we can instantiate the abstract Definitions 6.1 and 6.2. For evaluating probes,
we adopt the simple model where the query of a probe is evaluated against the union of
the service’s policy and the credentials (i.e., clauses) of the probe.
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Definition 6.7 (Datalog instantiation). We instantiate Polto the powerset of clauses,
℘(Cls). A (Datalog) policy is hence a set A0 ⊆ Cls . A (Datalog) probe pi is a pair
〈A,ϕ〉, where A ⊆ Cls and ϕ ∈ Qry. Hence Prbis instantiated to the set of all such
probes. A probe is ground iff it does not contain any variables. We write ¬〈A,ϕ〉 to
denote the probe 〈A,¬ϕ〉. The decision relation `⊆ Pol × Prb is defined as follows:
A0 ` 〈A,ϕ〉 ⇐⇒ A0 ∪ A ` ϕ
Definition 6.8 (Adversary, Datalog alikeness). An adversary is defined by a set Avail ⊆
Prb and a unary predicate Visible ⊆ Cls . If Visible(a) for some a a ∈ Cls , we say that
a is visible.
We extend Visible to policies by defining the visible part of A, Visible(A), as {a ∈
A | Visible(a)}, for all A ⊆ Cls .
Two policies A1, A2 ⊆ Cls are alike (A1 ' A2) iff Visible(A1) = Visible(A2).
Definition 6.9 (Probe detectability and opacity). A probe pi ∈ Prb is detectable in
A ∈ Pol iff
∀A′ ∈ Pol : A ≡ A′ ⇒ A′ ` pi
A probe pi ∈ Prb is opaque in A ∈ Pol iff it is not detectable in A, or equivalently, iff
∃A′ ∈ Pol : A ≡ A′ ∧ A′ 6` pi
This definition is a specialization of the definition 6.4 where Φ is instantiated with
{A ⊆ Cls | A ` pi}.
6.4 Example: a delegation policy
We define a realistic example of an authorization policy in Datalog, which also is used
for our test cases later.
The example uses a grid computing scenario. The scenario consists of a compute
cluster that allows users to run computing jobs. To execute a job, it may be required to
access some data stored in a data centre. Both the policies of cluster and data centre,
which govern who can run a job or access data delegate authority to a trusted third party.
The following is the set of assertions which represent the policy of the grid, where the
first parameter of the predicate is the principal that “says” or in the other word, signs a
fact. For instance, canExec(Cluster,x,j) means Cluster says principal x can execute
the job j.
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The first rule explains that principal x can execute job j on Cluster if x is member
of cluster, x owns the job j (signed or accepted by Cluster), and data centre Data allows















Data can delegate the authority over ownership to a trusted third party:
owns(Data,x,j) ← (5)
owns(y,x,j),isTTP(Data,y).
In the scenario of grid policy, CA is known as a trusted third party. Therefore, the
following facts also belong to the policy:
isTTP(Cluster,CA). (6)
isTTP(Data,CA). (7)
The policy A0 consists of the assertions (1) - (7).
Now, assume that Eve possesses the following credentials issued by CA:
owns(CA,Eve,Job). (8)
isMem(CA,Eve). (9)
and Eve issued a credential (self-issued) that allows Cluster to read Job:
canRead(Eve,Cluster,Job). (10)
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Now, the mission of Eve is to find out if Bob is a member of the Cluster. Hence, she
issues another self-issued credential to which allows Cluster to read the job Job with the
condition that Bob is a member of Cluster:
canRead(Eve,Cluster,Job) ← (11)
isMem(Cluster,Bob).
The set of credentials that is possessed by Eve denoted by AEve is the credentials (8)
- (11). The set of available probes that Eve can run against A0 is
Avail = {〈A,ϕEve〉 | A ⊆ AEve}
where ϕEve = canExec(Cluster,Eve,Job).
We assume that no assertion in the policy is visible for Eve, or equivalently visible = ∅.
The observations of Eve are as follows:
1. The probe 〈AEve, ϕEve〉 is positive in A0. In the other words A0 ` 〈AEve, ϕEve〉. The
derivation goes in the following way:
(a) isMem(Cluster,Eve) which denotes the membership of Eve in Cluster is
deducible from (6), (9) and (3).
(b) owns(Cluster,Eve,Job) is deducible from (6), (8) and (2).
(c) owns(Data,Eve,Job) is implied from (8), (7) and (5).
(d) canRead(Data,Cluster,Job) is deducible from (10), (c) and (4).
(e) The query canExec(Cluster,Eve,Job) implies from (a), (b) and (d).
2. A0 ` 〈{(8) − (10)}, ϕEve〉. In the context of this thesis, a probe similar to this one
is called minimally positive, where any strictly smaller set of assertions result in a
negative probe.
3. A0 6` 〈A,ϕEve〉 for all A ⊆ {(8), (9), (11)}. In the other words, replacing probe (10)
in item 2) with (11) results in a negative probe.
4. All the policies A′0 that are observationally equivalent to A0 satisfy the property A
′
0 6`
isMem(Cluster,Bob). Assume the contrary where A′0 ` isMem(Cluster,Bob). By
item 2, we know that ϕEve holds in A
′
0 ∪ {(8)− (10)}. If we replace the clause (10)
with (11), ϕEve still holds in A
′
0 ∪ {(8), (9), (11)} as the body of the clause (11) is
true in A′0 and therefore, the replacement does not make any difference. But this
contradicts item 3).
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5. It is clear that the probe 〈∅,¬isMem(Cluster,Bob)〉 is detectable in A0. Note that
this probe is not available for Eve.
6. The probe pi = 〈{(9), (11)}, canRead(Data,Cluster,Job)〉 is opaque in A0. The
opacity of pi is not trivial as A0 ` pi. But there exists a policy A′0 build by removing
clause (4) and replacing Data in clause (1) by x, which A′0 6` pi.
6.5 Opacity verification algorithm
Given a Datalog policy A0 ⊆ Cls and an adversary which is defined by a set of avail-
able probes Avail ⊆ Prb and visibility function Visible where Visible(A0) ⊆ A0, the
algorithm determines if a given ground probe pi0 ∈ Prb is opaque (or detectable) in A0.
The limitation of the algorithm is the ground input probes, which is reasonable in real
applications as the probes are generally issued for a specific principal and purpose.
As discussed before, a probe pi is opaque in A0 iff there exists a policy A
′
0 which is
observationally equivalent to A0 and pi is negative in A
′
0. Therefore, to prove the opacity
of a probe, we attempt to construct A′0 as the witness. To prove if pi is detectable, we
show that no such A′0 exists.
6.5.1 Query decomposition
Consider a probe pi = 〈A,ϕ1∨ϕ2〉 ∈ Avail which is positive in A0. We look for the policy
A′0 such that A
′
0 ` pi or equivalently A′0 ∪ A ` ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. Therefore, it is equivalent to
finding A′0 such that A
′
0 ` 〈A,ϕ1〉 or the one in which A′0 ` 〈A,ϕ2〉. So, a disjunction
in the query of a probe results is a branch in the search of A′0. In the case of negative
probes in A0, since A0 6` pi is equivalent to A0 ` ¬pi, we convert all the negative probes
to positive ones and then deal with the disjunctions.
The algorithm starts by computing all disjunctive branches by first computing the
equivalent disjunctive normal form of the queries in the set of available probes. Then the
algorithm constructs a Cartesian product of the disjuncts.
Definition 6.10 (Disjunctive normal form). Let dnf(ϕ) denote the disjunctive normal









Example 6.1. Let ϕ = (p∧q∧¬s)∨(¬p∧¬q∧s). Then dnf(ϕ) = {({p, p}, s), ({s}, {p, q})}.
115
Lemma 6.2. Let 〈A,ϕ〉 ∈ Prb. Then A0 ` 〈A,ϕ〉 iff
∃(S+, S−) ∈ dnf(ϕ) : A0 ` 〈A,
∧
S+〉 and A0 6` 〈A,
∨
S−〉
The function flattenA0 accepts a set of probes. For each probe in the set, if the probe
is negative in A0, it converts it to a positive probe by negating the query inside the probe.
flattenA0 constructs a set of pairs of probe sets, where each pair corresponds to a set of
disjunctive search branch.
Definition 6.11 (Flatten). Let Π ⊆ Prb. Then flattenA0(Π) is a set of pairs (Π+,Π−)
of sets of probes defined inductively as follows:
flattenA0(∅) = {(∅, ∅)}.
flattenA0(Π ∪ {〈A,ϕ〉}) = {(Π+,Π−) |
∃(Π+0 ,Π−0 ) ∈ flattenA0(Π), (S+, S−) ∈ dnf(ϕ˜) :
Π+ = Π+0 ∪ {〈A,
∧
S+〉} and
Π− = Π−0 ∪ {〈A,
∨
S−〉}}
where ϕ˜ = ϕ if A0 ` 〈A,ϕ〉, and ϕ˜ = ¬ϕ otherwise.
Lemma 6.3. Let A′0 ⊂ Cls and Π ⊆ Prb.
∀pi ∈ Π : A′0 ` pi ⇐⇒ A0 ` pi iff
∃(Π+0 ,Π−0 ) ∈ flattenA0(Π) : (∀pi ∈ Π+0 : A′0 ` pi) and (∀pi ∈ Π−0 : A′0 6` pi)
Proof. (⇒) Assume ∀pi ∈ Π : A′0 ` pi ⇐⇒ A0 ` pi. For the sake of contradiction, suppose
the negation of the right hand side where true. By the definition of flatten, there exits
pi = 〈Api, ϕ〉 and (S+, S−) ∈ dnf(ϕ˜) (where ϕ˜ = ϕ if A0 ` 〈A,ϕ〉, and ϕ˜ = ¬ϕ otherwise)
such that A′0 6` 〈Api,
∧
S+〉 or A′0 ` 〈Api,
∨
S−〉.
If A0 |= pi, then by Lemma 6.2 we have A′0 6|= pi which contradicts the initial assump-
tion. If A0 6|= pi then by Lemma 6.2 we have A′0 6` 〈Api,¬ϕ〉 and hence A′0 ` pi, which is
again a contradiction. Therefore, the right hand side of the equivalence holds.
(⇐) Assume that the right hand side of the equivalence is correct. Let pi = 〈Api, ϕ〉 ∈
Π. Suppose A0 ` pi. Then by the assumption and the definition of flatten, there exists
(S+, S−) ∈ dnf(ϕ) such that A′0 ` 〈Api,
∧
S+〉 and A′0 6` 〈Api,
∨
S−〉. From Lemma
6.2 it follows that A′0 ` pi as required. Now suppose A0 6` pi. Then we can show that
A′0 ` 〈Api,¬ϕ〉 and hence A′0 6` pi as required.
Example 6.2. Suppose Avail = {pi1, pi2} where pi1 = 〈A1,¬p ∨ q〉 and pi2 = 〈A2,¬p ∧ q〉.
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Suppose further that A0 ` pi1 and A0 6` pi2. Let pip1 = 〈A1, p〉, piq1 = 〈A1, q〉, pip2 =
〈A2, p〉 and piq2 = 〈A2, q〉. Then flattenA0(Avail) contains four pairs of the probe sets:
({pip2}, {pip1}), (∅, {pip1, piq2}), ({piq1, pip2}, ∅), ({piq1}, {piq2})
Apart from observational equivalence, opacity also requires that pi0 = 〈A,ϕ〉 be nega-
tive in A′0. By Lemma 6.2, this is equivalent to picking a pair (S
+, S−) ∈ dnf(¬ϕ) such
that A′0 ` 〈A,
∧
S+〉 and A′0 6` 〈A,
∨
S−〉.
Let pi0 = 〈A,ϕ〉 be a probe and (S+, S−) ∈ dnf(¬ϕ). The probe pi0 is opaque in the
policy A0 if there exists A
′
0 such that:
1. A′0 ' A0
2. There exists a pair (Π+0 ,Π
−
0 ) ∈ flattenA0(Avail) such that:
(a) all probes in Π+0 ∪ {〈A,
∧
S+〉} are positive, and
(b) all probes in Π−0 ∪ {〈A,
∨
S−〉} are negative.
If such A′0 exists, then we call A
′
0 as witness for the opacity of pi0 in A0.
The high level overview of the search strategy is as follows: taking the requirement
of policy alikeness, the algorithm starts with the policy Visible(A0). To satisfy the
requirement (a), we go through each probe in Π+ one by one and for each probe and we
add one or more clauses to the witness candidate. Monotonicity of ` guarantees that
addition of the clauses does not violate (a). To satisfy the requirement (b), after each
addition, we check if (b) still holds. If not, we need to backtrack and try a different way
to satisfy (a). When all probes of Π+ have been considered, the candidate is guaranteed
to be a witness.
6.5.2 Preserving alikeness
Addition of clauses may violate the alikeness requirement A′0 ' A0 when the newly
added clause a 6∈ A0 while Visible(a) = >. To ensure that only invisible clauses are
added, we use a nullary predicate pHi that does not occur in A0, nor in pi0 nor in Avail .
Therefore, if pHi occurs in clause a ∈ Cls , then ¬Visible(a). Addition of pHi as a freshly
chosen predicate to the witness does not make any difference in terms of observationally
equivalence. Therefore, instead of adding P ← ~P to the witness, we add P ← pHi, ~P
which preserves the alikeness. The following Lemma formalizes the discussion:
Lemma 6.4. Let A ⊆ Cls such that pHi does not occur in A. Then there exists Aˆ ⊆ Cls
such that Aˆ
.
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{Pk ← hds({a1, . . . , ak−1})} ∀pi ∈ Π− : A′ ∪ A′′ 6` pi
〈Π+ ∪ {〈A,
∧
~P 〉},Π−, A′〉 〈A,
∧ ~P 〉−−−−→ 〈Π+,Π−, A′ ∪ A′′〉
Figure 6.1: Transition system for verifying opacity
Proof. Let Aˆ = {(P ← pHi, ~P ) | (P ← ~P ) ∈ A} ∪ {pHi}. Consider any atom P and
set of atoms ~P , and let A1 = {P ← pHi, ~P} ∪ {pHi} and A2 = {P ← ~P} ∪ {pHi}. A
simple induction on n shows that for all sets S of ground atoms, TnA1∪S(∅) = TnA2∪S(∅),
and hence, A1
.
= A2. Therefore, Aˆ
.
= A ∪ {pHi}.
6.5.3 Initial states
The algorithm is presented in a non-deterministic state transition system where a state
is a triple 〈Π+,Π−, A〉. Π+ and Π− are sets of ground probes and A is the policy. Π+
is the set of positive probes that are not considered yet, Π− are the set of probes that
should be negative in the witness and A is the witness candidate. Each state transition
(non-deterministically) removes a positive probe from Π+ and adds the resulting clauses
to the witness. A final state is of the form 〈∅,Π−, A′0〉. If the final state is produced by
a series of transitions starting from an initial state, the policy A′0 is guaranteed to be a
witness for the opacity of pi0 in A0, and such a final state exists iff pi0 is opaque in A0.
Definition 6.12 (Initial state). The rule (Init) in Fig. 6.1 defines a set Init(Π0) of
states, parametrised by a set of probes Π0. We write Init to denote Init(Avail), the set
of initial states.
Lemma 6.5 (Soundness and completeness of (Init)). The following two statements are
equivalent:
1. pi0 is opaque in A0.
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2. There exists 〈Π+,Π−,Visible(A0)〉 ∈ Init and A′0 ⊆ Cls such that pHi does not
occur in A′0 and Visible(A0)  A′0 and
∀pi ∈ Π+ : A′0 ` pi and ∀pi ∈ Π− : A′0 6` pi
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2) If A0 6` pi0 then the statement holds for A′0 = A0. Now assume that
A0 ` pi0 and let pi0 = 〈Api, ϕpi〉. Then there exists A′0 ∈ Cls such that pHi does not occur
in A′0 and Visible(A0)  A′0 and
∀pi ∈ Avail : A′0 ` pi ⇐⇒ A0 ` pi and
A′0 ` ¬pi0
By the definition of opacity and Lemma 6.3:
∃(Π+0 ,Π−0 ) ∈ flattenA0(Avail) : (∀pi ∈ Π+0 : A′0 ` pi) and (∀pi ∈ Π−0 : A′0 6` pi)










Init as required by 2).
(2 ⇒ 1) If A0 6` pi0, then 1) is trivially true. Now assume A0 ` pi0. Then by (Init)
and Lemmas 6.3 and 6.2:
∀pi ∈ Avail : A′0 ` pi ⇐⇒ A0 ` pi and
A′0 ` ¬pi0
Since pHi occurs neither in Avail nor in ¬pi0, there exists Aˆ0 ⊆ Cls such that, by
Lemma 6.4, Aˆ0
.
= A′0 ∪ pHi and Visible(Aˆ0) = ∅.
Now consider Aˆ′0 = Aˆ0∪Visible(A0). Clearly, Aˆ′0 ' A0. By (Init), A = Visible(Aˆ0),
so by assumption, Visible(A0)  A′0  Aˆ0. Therefore, Aˆ′0 .= Aˆ0.
Since pHi occurs neither in A
′
0 nor in pi0 nor in Avail l, we have
∀pi ∈ Avail : Aˆ′0 ` pi ⇐⇒ A0 ` pi and
Aˆ′0 ` ¬pi0
Hence Aˆ′0 ≡ A0 and Aˆ′0 6` pi0, as required.
6.5.4 Algorithm termination: minimal witnesses
Potentially, for every probe 〈Π+,Π−,Visible(A0)〉 ∈ Init there are infinitely many A′0 
Visible(A0) such that all the probes in Π
+ are positive. To prove the termination of
algorithm, we need to get sure there is finite number of searches for proving that pi0 is not
opaque.
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Our algorithm computes a finite set of minimal witness candidates that is sufficient
to prove the opacity. The candidates are minimal in the sense that for every policy A′0
that makes the probes in Π+ positive, there exists a policy A′′0 in the set of computed
witnesses in which A′′0  A′0. By the anti-monotonicity of 6`, if A′0 makes the probes in
Π− negative, A′′0 also makes them negative. This property is the basis for the prove of
completeness and termination of the algorithm.
6.5.5 Computing the witnesses
The transition system considers one positive probe in each state transition. Consider a
state 〈Π+∪{pi},Π−, A′〉. We aim to find all minimal ways of extending A′ to some A′∪A′′
such that A′ ∪ A′′ ` pi. By the monotonic construction of positive probes, we can ignore
A′ and simply find all minimal A′′ such that A′′ ` pi.
Assume that pi = 〈A,ϕ〉 is positive in A′′. Then there should exists a subset of clauses
A˜ ⊆ A which are relevant in making the probe positive. To build up the witness, we
need to consider all 2|A| possible cases, since each A˜ results in a different witness that
are incomparable by the relation . The choice of the subset in each state results in a
different state. Therefore, the transition system is non-deterministic.
Now assume the positive probe pi = 〈A,∧ ~P 〉 ∈ Π+. We look for the minimal clauses
A′′ under the assumption that A˜ ⊆ A is relevant. Since A˜ is relevant, all the clauses
P0 ← P1, . . . , Pn ∈ A˜ are actively involved in the derivation of A′′ ∪ A˜ `
∧ ~P . This is
possible if the body atoms are derivable, and derivation of
∧ ~P depends on all the heads
of clauses in A˜. Lets demonstrate the process with an example:
Example 6.3. Suppose that ~P = z and A˜ = {p ← q., r ← s., u ← v.}. We aim to find
all minimal A′′ such that A′′ ∪ A˜ ` z.
The simplest case is when all the body atoms in A˜ is true in A′′ and z is derived from
the heads in A˜ (stage 1):
A′′1 = {q., s., v., z ← p, r, u}
For the next stage, we assume all the configurations in which A′′ contains the body
atoms of A˜’ clauses, and the heads of the clauses combine with the clauses in A′′ to make
the body atoms in A˜ true.
We have six other solutions, where in three of them, A′′ contains only one body atom,
and in other three, A′′ contains two body atoms. Two of the solutions are as follows:
A′′2 = {q., s← p., v ← p., z ← p, r, u}
A′′5 = {q., s., v ← p, r., z ← p, r, u}
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For our example, we have the following six solutions for different permutations of A˜,
in which are contained in all other candidates for A′′:
A′′8 = {q., s← p., v ← p, r., z ← p, r, u}
A′′9 = {q., v ← p., s← p, u., z ← p, r, u}
A′′10 = {s., q ← r., v ← p, r., z ← p, r, u}
A′′11 = {s., v ← r., q ← r, u., z ← p, r, u}
A′′12 = {v., q ← u., s← p, u., z ← p, r, u}
A′′13 = {v., s← u., q ← r, u., z ← p, r, u}
The solution A′′8 is contained in () A′′1, A′′2 and A′′5. For each solution in {A′′1, . . . , A′′7},
there exists a solution from {A′′8, . . . , A′′13} which is contained in the first one. So, we only
require considering the solutions in stage three. This is because if one of the clause in
the other solutions makes all the probes in Π− negative, then this will be the case for the
corresponding solution in stage three. It is possible to show that this observation holds
in the general case [14].
Lemma 6.6 (Soundness of
pi−→). If 〈Π+ ∪ {pi},Π−, A′〉 pi−→ 〈Π+,Π−, A′ ∪A′′〉, then A′′ ` pi.
Proof. By (Probe), pi must be of the form 〈A,∧ ~P 〉. We will prove the following, stronger,
statement.






{Pk ← hds({a1, ..., ak−1})} (6.1)
we have A′′0 ∪ A˜ `
∧
hds(A˜).
This implies the statement of the lemma since, by the definition of (Probe), A′′ =
A′′0 ∪{P ← hds(A˜)} is precisely the set of assertions added to the state in a pi−→ transition;
furthermore, for all P ∈ ~P : (P ← hds(A˜)) ∈ A′′ and A˜ ⊆ A, and therefore:
A′′ ∪ A˜ `
∧
hds(A˜)⇒ A′′ ∪ A `
∧
~P ⇒ A′′ ` pi. (6.2)
The proof proceeds by induction on n. In the base case, A˜ = hds(A˜) = ∅. Then hds(A˜) =
∅, so the statement trivially holds.
In the inductive case, n = |A˜| > 0. Consider any 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ Perm(A˜). Let A′′0 be
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defined as in (6.1). Then we have A′′0 = A
′′










{Pk ← hds({a1, ..., an−1}})}.
By the induction hypothesis, A′′1 ∪{a1, . . . , an−1} `
∧
hds({a1, . . . , an−1}). By monotonic-
ity of `, it also holds that
A′′0 ∪ A˜ `
∧
hds({a1, . . . , an−1}). (6.3)
It remains to show that A′′0 ∪ A˜ ` hd(an).
By the definition of A′′2 and by (6.3), and since A
′′
2 ⊆ A′′0, we have A′′0 ∪ A˜ `
∧
bd(an).
Since an = (hd(an)← bd(an)) ∈ A˜, this implies A′′0 ∪ A˜′ ` hd(an), as required.
Lemma 6.7 (Completeness of
pi−→). Let A1 and A2 be the policies with n = |A2|, and ~P a
set of ground atoms. If A1 ` 〈A2,
∧ ~P 〉 and for all A′2 ( A2 : A1 6` 〈A′2,∧ ~P 〉, then there
exists 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ perms(A2) and
• ~Pi = bd(ai), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
• ~Pn+1 = ~P
such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}:
∀Pi ∈ ~Pi : (Pi ← hds({a1, . . . , ai−1}))  A1
Proof. Let Φ(A1, A2, ~P ) denote the parametrized statement of the lemma. The proof
proceeds by induction on n = |A2|. If n = 0, the statement trivially holds.
Now assume n > 0. By assumption, A2 is minimal. Therefore, there exists a smallest
integer m such that hds(A2) ⊆ TmA1∪A2(∅). Furthermore, m ≥ 1, since n > 0. Hence
there exists A˜2, the largest subset of A2 such that hds(A˜2)∩Tm−1A1∪A2(∅) = ∅, and such that
k = |A˜2| ≥ 1.
Let ~P ′ be the set of all body atoms of clauses in A˜2. By construction of A˜2 and
since hds(A˜2) ⊆ hds(A2) ⊆ TmA1∪A2(∅), we have that ~P ′ ⊆ Tm−1A1∪A2(∅), and again by
construction of A˜2, we also have ~P
′ ⊆ Tm−1
A1∪(A2\A˜2)(∅). Since |A2 \ A˜2| = n − k < n, we
can assume the inductive hypothesis Φ(A1, A2 \ A˜2, ~P ′), and in particular, the existence
of 〈a1, ..., an−k〉 ∈ Perm(A2 \ A˜2) with the stated properties.
Let 〈an−k+1, ..., an〉 be any permutation of A˜2. We thus have constructed a permutation
〈a1, ..., an〉 ∈ Perm(A2). This permutation gives rise to sets S0, ..., Sn and ~P1, ..., ~Pn+1 as
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defined in the lemma.
For i ∈ {1, ..., n− k}, the desired property follows directly from the inductive hypoth-
esis. Furthermore, the inductive hypothesis states that
∀P ′ ∈ ~P ′ : (P ′ ← hds({a1, ..., an−k}))  A1.
Then for i ∈ {n− k + 1, ..., n}, we get (since ~Pi ⊆ ~P ′):
∀Pi ∈ ~Pi : (Pi ← hds({a1, ..., ai−1}))  (Pi ← hds({a1, ..., an−k}))  A1.
It thus remains to consider the case i = n + 1. From A1 ` 〈A2,
∧ ~Pn+1〉 and A2 
hds(A2) we get ∀Pn+1 ∈ ~Pn+1 : A1 ` 〈hds(A2), Pn+1〉, and hence by Lemma 6.1,




A = {p← q., r ← s., u← v.},
Avail = {〈A′, z〉 | A′ ⊆ A},
A0 = {q., s., v., z ← p, r, u.},
Visible(A0) = ∅, and
pi0 = 〈∅, q ∨ s〉.
We are interested in finding if pi0 is opaque or detectable in A0. It is clear that the
only probe that is positive in A0 is pi = 〈A, z〉 and all other probes in Avail are negative.
Since the queries in the available probes do not have any disjunction, flattenA0(Avail)
contains one pair of probe sets ({pi},Avail\{pi}). Also dnf(¬(q ∨ s)) = {(∅, {q, s})}.
Therefore, Init contains one initial state σ0 = 〈Π+,Π−, ∅〉 where Π+ = {pi} and Π− =
Avail\{pi} ∪ {〈∅, q ∨ s〉}.
Beginning for σ0, the only possible transition is when A˜ = A, as for all A˜ ( A,
〈A˜, z〉 ∈ Π−. For all six different permutations of A˜, we have the candidates A′′8 − A′′13.
The first four fail to make 〈∅, q ∨ s〉 ∈ Π− negative. But A′′12 − A′′13 pass the test. Hence,
〈∅,Π−, A′′12〉 (in the case of selecting A′′12) is a final state and therefore pi0 is opaque. To
make A′′12 observationally equivalent to A0, we can easily inject the atom pHi into the
bodies of the clauses in A′′12.
123
6.5.7 Soundness and completeness of the algorithm
In this section, we provide the soundness and completeness of the algorithm. The proofs
are fully presented in [14].
Definition 6.13 (Reachability). We write σ → σ′ to denote σ pi−→ σ′ for some pi ∈ Prb
and states σ, σ′. We write σ∗ for the reflexive-transitive closure of →. We write ` σ if
σ0 →∗ σ for some σ0 ∈ Init.
Lemma 6.8 (Soundness). If ` 〈∅,Π−0 , A〉, then pi0 is opaque in A0.
Proof. If ` 〈∅,Π−0 , A〉, their exists σI = 〈Π+,Π−,Visible(A0)〉 ∈ Init such that σI →∗
〈∅,Π−0 , A〉, where Π+,Π− are specified as in (init), and Π− = Π−0 .
There is a series of (Probe) applications starting from σI , with one
pi−→ transition
for each pi ∈ Π+, leading to 〈∅,Π−0 , A〉. Hence by repeated application of Lemma 6.6,
we have ∀pi ∈ Π+ : A ` pi. From the definitions of (init) and (Probe) it follows that
∀pi ∈ Π− : A 6` pi, and that pHi does not occur in A. Furthermore, Visible(A0) ⊆ A.
Therefore, by Lemma 6.5, pi0 is opaque in A0.
Lemma 6.9 (Completeness). If pi0 is opaque in A0, then there exists Π
−
0 ⊆ Prb and
A ⊆ Cls such that
` 〈∅,Π−0 , A〉
Proof. If pi0 is opaque in A0, then by Lemma 6.5, there exists σI = 〈Π+0 ,Π−0 , AI〉 ∈ Init
and A′ ⊆ Cls such that AI  A′ and ∀pi ∈ Π+ : A′ ` pi and ∀pi ∈ Π− : A′ 0 pi.
By Lemma 6.3, there exists (Π+,Π−) ∈ flattenA0(Avail) such that ∀pi ∈ Π+ : A′ ` pi
and ∀pi ∈ Π− : A′ 0 pi. Furthermore, by Lemma 6.2, there exists (Π+S ,Π−S ) as defined
in (init) such that ∀pi ∈ Π+S : A′ ` pi and ∀pi ∈ Π−S : A′ 0 pi. Let Π+0 = Π+ ∪ Π+S and
Π−0 = Π
− ∪ Π−S . Then σI = 〈Π+0 ,Π−0 , ∅〉 ∈ Init.
We now prove that for all Π+1 ⊆ Π+0 , there exists A  A′ such that
〈Π+1 ,Π−0 , AI〉 →∗ 〈∅,Π−0 , A〉.
The proof proceeds by induction on m = |Π+1 |. If m = 0, the statement holds trivially.
If m > 0, there exists pi = 〈Api,
∧ ~P 〉 ∈ Π+1 . By the inductive hypothesis, there exists
A1  A′ such that 〈Π+1 \ {pi},Π−0 , AI〉 →∗ 〈∅,Π−0 , A1〉. By inspection of (Probe), we also
have 〈Π+1 ,Π−0 , AI〉 →∗ σ = 〈{pi},Π−0 , A1〉. It remains to show that there exists A  A′
such that σ
pi−→ 〈∅,Π−0 , A〉.
Since pi ∈ Π+0 , we have A′ ` pi. Then there exists a minimal A˜ such that A˜ ⊆ Api and
A′ ` 〈A˜,∧ ~P 〉. Let n = |A˜|. Then by Lemma 6.7, there exists 〈a1, ..., an〉 ∈ Perm(Api) and
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there exist
~Pi = bd(ai), for i ∈ {1, ..., n}, and
~Pn+1= ~P
such that for all k ∈ {1, ..., n+ 1} and all Pk ∈ ~Pk





Pk∈~Pk{Pk ← hds({a1, ..., ak−1})}  A′, and thus there exists A =
A1 ∪A′′  A′. By anti-monotonicity of 0, we get ∀pi′ ∈ Π−0 : A 0 pi′. Hence all conditions
of (Probe) are satisfied.
Therefore, σi →∗ σ pi−→ 〈∅,Π−0 , A〉.
The above lemmas allow us to prove the following soundness and completeness theo-
rem:
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness and completeness). pi0 is opaque in A0 iff there exists Π
− ⊆ Prb
and A ⊆ Cls such that ` 〈∅,Π−, A〉.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 6.8 and 6.9.
We are also able to find an upper bound for the number of transitions.
Theorem 6.2. The number of





where n = |A|.
Proof. The number of A˜ ⊆ A of size m is (n
m
)
, and for each such A˜, there are m! per-














6.6 Implementation and optimizations
We implemented the algorithm based on the state transition system in figure 6.1 in F#
functional programming language. We compute Init in lazy enumeration and then per-
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form depth first search based on the transition rule (Probe). The back end is a Datalog
engine, which computes the evaluation relation `. The front end contains a parser for the
problem which includes four blocks for A0, Visible(A0), Avail and pi0. The GUI displays
the witness, in the case that the probe is found to be opaque. In our implementation, it
is possible for the users to go through all the witnesses one after each other.
What does the feature of enumerating over the witnesses buy us? In our experiments,
there were several cases when we expected a property to be detectable in a policy, but
the algorithm reported opacity. When we investigated the witnesses, we found that they
are all “improbable” cases. Therefore, this constructive method allows us to detect a
property in a policy with a rather high likelihood.
Theorem 6.2 shows that the number of transitions and therefore, search space is very
high. This makes the algorithm to be practically infeasible even for small policies. There-
fore, we need to come up with implementing some optimization methods to reduce the
search space.
6.6.1 Order independence
One of the important features of the algorithm that significantly reduces the search state
is that the order of processing the probes in Π+ is irrelevant. This feature reduces the
search space by the order of |Π+|!. Hence, it is sufficient to fix a particular order for the
probes at the initial state.
Lemma 6.10 (Order independence). If σ0
pi1−→ σ1 pi2−→ σ2 then three exists σ′1 such that
σ0
pi2−→ σ′1 pi1−→ σ2.
Proof. The proof of the lemma directly follows from the definition of (Probe).
6.6.2 Redundant probes
If pi = 〈A,ϕ〉 ∈ Avail , it is possible for the adversary to send all the probes of the form
{〈A′, ϕ〉 | A′ ⊆ A〉}. We call pi a downward closed probe and simply mark it by a plus sign
in the specification of Avail .
Definition 6.14. Let pi = 〈A,ϕ〉 and pi′ = 〈A′, ϕ′〉. We write pi ⊆ pi′ iff ϕ = ϕ′ and
A ⊆ A′. Similarly, we write pi ( pi′ iff pi ⊆ pi′ and pi 6= pi′.
If pi1 ⊆ pi2, by the monotonicity of `, it is clear that if pi1 is a positive probe, then pi2 is
also positive. A similar argument exits for the probes in Π−. We formalize this intuition
by the following lemma.
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Lemma 6.11. Let pi1, pi2 be two monotonic probes such that pi1 ⊆ pi2.
• ∃A′ : 〈Π+ ∪ {pi1, pi2},Π−, A〉 →∗ 〈∅,Π−, A′〉 iff
∃A′′ : 〈Π+ ∪ {pi1},Π−, A〉 →∗ 〈∅,Π−, A′′〉 and A′′ ` pi2.
• ∃A′ : 〈Π+,Π− ∪ {pi1, pi2}, A〉 →∗ 〈∅,Π− ∪ {pi1, pi2}, A′〉 iff
∃A′′ : 〈Π+,Π− ∪ {pi2}, A〉 →∗ 〈∅,Π− ∪ {pi2}, A′′〉 and A′′ 6` pi1.
Proof. The lemma is trivially true if pi1 = pi2. We now assume pi1 ( pi2.
1. (⇒) From the definition of (Probe) and the left hand side of the equivalence, the
existence of A′′, such that the first part of the right hand side holds, is clear. By
Lemma 6.6, we have A′′ ` pi1, which, by monotonicity of ` and pi1 and pi2, implies
A′′ ` pi2.
(⇐) The right hand side of the equivalence implies 〈Π+ ∪ {pi1, pi2},Π−, A〉 →∗
〈{pi2},Π−, A′′〉, and in particular, within this chain there exists a transition σ pi1,~a−−→
σ′ for some states σ, σ′,~a. Since pi1 ( pi2, we have 〈{pi2},Π−, A′′〉 pi2,~a−−→ 〈∅,Π−, A′〉,
where A′ = A′′.
2. (⇒) Assuming the left hand side of the equivalence, the existence of A′′, such that
the first part of the right hand side holds, is clear. From the definition of (Probe),
we have A′′ 0 pi2, which, by antimonotonicity of 0 and the monotonicity of pi1 and
pi2, implies A
′′ 0 pi1.
(⇐) The right hand side of the equivalence implies that A′′ 0 pi1 and A′′ 0 pi2, and
hence 〈Π+,Π− ∪ {pi1, pi2}, A〉 →∗ 〈∅,Π− ∪ {pi1, pi2}, A′〉, where A′ = A′′.
We use Lemma 6.11 to eliminate redundant probes from the initial states. If 〈Π+0 ,Π−0 , A〉 ∈
Init, then it will be transformed to the state 〈Π+1 ,Π−1 , A〉 where
• Π+1 = {pi ∈ Π+0 | ¬∃pi′ ∈ Π+0 : pi′ ( pi}, and
• Π−1 = {pi ∈ Π−0 | ¬∃pi′ ∈ Π−0 : pi ( pi′}.
6.6.3 Conflicting probes
We can discard the initial states σ0 = 〈Π+,Π−, A〉 ∈ Init in which there exists monotonic
probes pi1 ∈ Π+, pi2 ∈ Π− such that pi1 ⊆ pi2. The following lemma proves that no
transition from this initial state exists.
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Lemma 6.12. Let pi1, pi2 be monotonic probes such that pi1 ⊆ pi2. There exists no state
σ such that 〈Π+ ∪ {pi1},Π−{pi2}, A〉 pi1−→ σ.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Then there exists σ = 〈Π+,Π−∪{pi2}, A′〉 with the property
as stated. Moreover, A′ ` pi1, by Lemma 6.6, and A′ 0 pi2, by (Probe). Since pi1 ⊆ pi2,
the former implies A′ ` pi2, which contradicts the latter.
6.6.4 Minimally positive probes
We first define the concept of minimally positive probes in our algorithm.
Definition 6.15 (Minimally positive). A probe pi = 〈A,ϕ〉 ∈ Prb is minimally positive
in A′ ⊆ Cls iff ϕ is monotonic and A′ ` pi and for all pi′ ( pi : A′ 6` pi.
We use to notation σ
pi,~a−→ σ′ to parameterize the transition with the corresponding
permutation of clauses in A˜ (~a ∈ perms(A˜)). Lets assume that pi+ is a minimally positive
probe. The definition of minimally positive shows that the only possible transition for
σ
pi+,~a−−→ σ′ is when a ∈ perms(A), or in the other words A˜ = A.
Therefore, if a probe pi+ is marked as minimally positive probe in the set Avail , the rule
(Probe) will be replaced with a much simpler one, when the selection of A˜ is deterministic
and A˜ = A. This optimization reduces the number of transition from a particular state
by the factor of 2|A|.
6.7 Experimental results
We compared the computational time for the opacity verification algorithm for several test
cases, and compared the results when applying the three different optimization methods.
6.7.1 Test cases
We performed our tests based on the delegation policy introduced in section 6.4. We
derived six test cases (TC1-TC6) from the policy and measured the computation times
and the number of calls to Datalog engine. Our experiments show that the verification
time is directly related to the number of calls to the Datalog engine. We run our exper-
iments in four different configurations: (1) verification without applying any optimization
method (2) eliminating conflicting probes (section 6.6.3) (3) eliminating redundant probes
(section 6.6.2) (4) applying both optimizations in (2) and (3) together. We performed the
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experiments on an Intel Core2 Dou P9500 2.53GHz workstation with 4GB RAM running
windows 7 32-bit.
TC1. We consider the policy A0 to be the basic delegation policy (clauses (1) - (7))
and Visible(A0) = ∅. The adversary possesses the credentials AEve = {(8) − (11)} and
the query is:
ϕEve = canExec(Cluster,Eve,Job)
The set of available probes contain 24 probes: Avail = {〈A,ϕEve | A ⊆ AEve〉}. We are
interested weather Eve can detect if Bob is a member of Cluster. The input probe pi0 is
specified as
pi0 = 〈∅,¬isMem(Cluster,Bob)〉
which allows us to conclude A0 ` ¬isMem(Cluster,Bob). The probe pi0 is detectable
in A0.
TC2. We add the atomic clause isMem(Cluster,Bob) to A0. Therefore, Bob is now
a member of Cluster. We change pi0 to 〈∅, isMem(Cluster,Bob)〉. Our experiments
show that the probe containing the clauses (8), (9) and (11) is positive, while the probe
containing the clauses (8) and (9) is negative. Therefore, the probe (11) is relevant. It is
only possible if its body atom isMem(Cluster,Bob) is derivable.
The tool reports the probe pi0 is (correctly) opaque. In the witnesses, there is a clause
which is rather unlikely:
isMem(Cluster,Bob)←
isMem(CA,Eve), owns(CA,Eve,Job).
Therefore, we can conclude that isMem(Cluster,Bob) in the policy with a high prob-
ability.
TC3. We add three irrelevant clauses {p1., p2., p3.} to AEve in order to increase the
number of probes in Avail by the factor of 8.
TC4. We manually prune the set Avail in TC3 in order to build the sufficient set of
probes for detecting pi0:
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Figure 6.2: Verification time (striped) and number of calls to the Datalog engine (plain)
on log scales. Numbers above bars denote the number of initial states.
〈{(8), (9), (10)}, ϕEve〉∗
〈{(8), (9), (11), p1., p2., p3.}, ϕEve〉
〈{(9), (10), (11), p1., p2., p3.}, ϕEve〉
〈{(8), (10), (11), p1., p2., p3.}, ϕEve〉
Only the first of the above probes is positive. The structure of the probes 2-4 allow us
to select the first probe as the minimally positive, which makes the verification process
more efficient.
TC5. We use the same policy as in TC1, but change the query to
ϕEve = canExec(Cluster,Eve,Job) ∧ ¬isBanned(Cluster,Eve).
pi0 is still detectable in A0.
TC6. We prune the probes in TC5 to the sufficient set for proving detectability:
〈{(8), (9), (10)}, ϕEve〉
〈{(8), (9)}, ϕEve〉
〈{(8), (9), (11)}, ϕEve〉
From the above probes, only the first one is positive. As ϕEve is not monotonic, we
can not use the minimally positive probe optimization.
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The query ϕEve in TC1-TC4 does not contain negation and therefore, no conflicting
probe exists after flattening process. This is clearly shown in figure 6.2 that conflicting
probe optimization does not have any effect on verification time and Datalog engine
calls.
TC2 runs 40% faster than TC1. This is because the property in TC1 is detectable.
Therefore, the program traverses all the possible states to prove its detectability. For
TC2, the program stops when it finds the first witness.
TC3 shows how the number of available probes dramatically increases the verification
time (here by the factor of 8) when no optimization is used. Optimization increases the
performance by the factor of 8.
The most effective strategy to decrease the verification time is manually picking the
relevant probes, or in the other words, manually pruning the set of available probes. TC4
and TC5 are the cases that demonstrate such an intuition. TC4 decreases the time by
the factor of 3,150 compared to TC3 in non-optimized configuration. TC6 decreases the
time by the factor of 19,000 compared to non-optimized TC5 and 150 non-optimized
configurations.
TC5 shows for non-monotonic probes, applying the conflicting probes optimization
significantly reduces the number of initial states (in our case, from 16,384 to only 1).
This will result in considerable increase in performance.
Our last experiment demonstrates the effect of the size of Avail in verification time.
We created two set of available probes, one created by adding a number of trivially
positive probes, and the other one by adding negative ones. The verification time increases
exponentially when the number of positive probes increases (which is predictable, as it
increases the number of states), but increases linearly when the number of negative probes
increases. This is also expected, as the negative probes do not result in branching.
6.8 Summary
In this research, we first proposed a general framework of probing attacks, and formalized
the notions of policy, probe and adversary. We instantiated our framework into Datalog,
which is the basis of many existing policy languages.
The main contribution of the research is the answer for the following open question:
Is the problem of opacity in Datalog policies decidable?
We answered this question in the positive by presenting a complete decision procedure
for opacity. The algorithm tries to find the witnesses to prove the opacity of a property
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(or in general, a probe) in the policy. The witnesses masquerade the original policy the
way that they behave the same against submitted probes, but the property is not true in
them.
We also provide the opportunity to consider possibilistic information flow in a policy.
The algorithm and the implementation is designed in a way that it can enumerate over all
possible witnesses for the opacity. The adversary can verify the possibility that a witness
contain realistic assertions. Therefore, with a specific probability, an adversary can detect
a property in a policy, which is reported as opaque.
The algorithm has two limitations: (1) the set of available probes contain only ground
probes. Although it is a realistic assumption, there may be some cases where the attacker
self-issues non-ground credentials. (2) The set of available probes is finite. As before, this
assumption is realistic in many cases, but it should be useful to prove the opacity in the
cases that adversary has access to infinitely many probes. We consider solving the above




Confidentiality of sensitive data and prevention of unauthorized access to the resources
is one of the main concerns in multi-agent collaborative systems. Access control is the
mechanism to enforce the security requirements for accessing information in the system.
To provide the assurance that the security requirements are correctly enforced, the system
should be evaluated against required properties.
In this thesis, we developed several techniques that enable us to investigate temporal-
epistemic properties of access control systems in an automated way. The key contributions
are:
• We implemented a model-checking method in order to verify properties of access
control systems considering the knowledge of the coalition of agents which is gained
by reading system information. The output of this research is implemented as a
verification tool called PoliVer [66, 65] which comparing to the similar verification
framework RW [94] has increased verification time and memory efficiency. This
improvement is achieved by replacing the knowledge states in RW (which are used
to introduce a memoryful approach) with system states. Although PoliVer does not
retain memory (history of reading), extra variables for storing the history of reading
information can be simply incorporated into the policy when it is required.
• The abstraction of the knowledge in PoliVer increases the efficiency of model-
checking while there is still a category of information leakage vulnerabilities that
PoliVer is not able to detect. Therefore, we introduce a complimentary framework
in order to identify information leakage as a result of reasoning in dynamic policies
which is based on the interpreted systems. To increase the efficiency, we devel-
oped a counterexample-guided abstraction refinement technique for the verification
of temporal and epistemic properties.
• We finally and as a research on stateless policies, proposed a sound and complete
method for detecting information leakage in Datalog-based policies [15, 16].
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This chapter discusses the outcomes of this research and future work.
7.1 Summary
We have divided the research of temporal-epistemic evaluation of dynamic access control
policies into two major parts: first, we estimate knowledge with the information that is
gained by reading system information, and second, we study the verification of knowledge
which is gained by reasoning.
7.1.1 PoliVer
We developed PoliVer based on the model-checking method we proposed for the verifica-
tion of temporal-epistemic properties in chapter 4. Given a set of rules, initial condition
and a goal, PoliVer checks if a coalition of agents can achieve the goal through a finite
sequence of actions. The specifications of PoliVer are categorized as follows:
• Expressive policy language: Action rules and read permission rules in PoliVer
policy language can express the laws in a wide variety of access control systems.
Compared to RW [94, 95], the policy language allows updating a group of propo-
sitional variables when executing an action. The permission for an action allows
quantification and negation and therefore is flexible enough to express separation of
duty, mutual exclusion between the roles and role inheritance. Variable bulk update
plays an important role to support integrity of constraints.
• Query language: The query asks if a set of agents can collaborate to achieve a
goal, defined as a property, through a sequence of actions beginning from a set of
initial states. The query language is also flexible from the point of collaborative
goals, temporal properties and epistemic properties in the form of reading system
propositions. For instance, a goal that contains 〈review(p, b)〉 looks if the coalition
in the goal can reach to a state that at least one of them is able to read the value
of review(p, b). Nested goals are also supported by the query language.
• Model-checking algorithm: The model-checking formalism of PoliVer finds the
reachability of a goal, together with evaluating the knowledge of the agents over the
information they require to know in order to be able to achieve the goal. The initial
knowledge of the coalition is determined in the query and the knowledge in each
state is the accumulation of the knowledge gained by performing actions or reading
system information along the strategy.
134
In general, PoliVer verifies epistemic properties by approximating the knowledge by
readability. Our experimental results show that the time and memory efficiency increases
by this approximation, which is sufficient to detect a high percentage of vulnerabilities.
7.1.2 Reasoning about knowledge in access control systems
To cover the evaluation of information leakage vulnerability that can not be detected by
PoliVer, this thesis introduces a complimentary formalization based on interpreted sys-
tems. Using interpreted systems allows us to verify the knowledge expressed by the modal
logic KT45n. We have shown that there are some information leakage vulnerabilities that
can not be detected by the state of art verification tools line RW, DynPAL [11] and Po-
liVer. The major obstacle of modelling an access control system using interpreted systems
framework is the state explosion problem. In order to make the verification more efficient,
we introduced a fully automated abstraction and refinement technique when the property
is ACTLK. The method is an extension of CEGAR (Counterexample guided abstraction
refinement) [30]. Using this method, we are able to check a tree-like counterexample
generated by the model-checker in order to find if it is also valid in the concrete model.
While the original CEGAR only supports linear counterexamples produced by verifying
temporal properties, our method covers tree-like counterexamples produced by verifying
temporal-epistemic properties. The method is implemented in Microsoft F# and uses the
model-checker for multi-agent systems MCMAS as the model-checking engine.
Some important safety properties that include the negation of knowledge modality do
not fit into the category of ACTLK. For such cases, our tool uses an interactive refine-
ment which is described in chapter 5. Therefore, it is valuable to automate abstraction
refinement such for such safety properties together with appropriate refinement heuristics.
7.1.3 Information leakage in Datalog-based policies
In the category of stateless policies and as an independent research in Microsoft Research
Cambridge, we looked at information leakage vulnerability of Datalog-based credential
systems. The problem of opacity in Datalog-based policies was an open problem [12]. In
our research, we proposed a sound, complete and terminating algorithm that given a set
of available probes (refer to chapter 6), it is able to decide whether a property is opaque
in the policy or detectable. The algorithm uses the concept of observational equivalence
similar to the one we used for dynamic policies. When a property is found to be opaque,
our implementation allows the security analyst to traverse through all the witnesses. This
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may informally judge the likelihood of opacity of a property as some witnesses may be
far from a practically real policy.
7.2 Future work
In this thesis, we demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of the developed techniques
using small size case studies that were used by other researchers. But it is very important
to evaluate large size real systems like Facebook, EasyChair and Google docs, which we
will consider for the future work. Evaluating such systems also requires overcoming the
limitations of the model-checker for multi-agent systems to handle large scale models.
In the general case, Access control systems can have unbounded numbers of states,
since objects can be created dynamically. Unfortunately, unbounded state model-checking
in general is undecidable, therefore we can model-check only finite systems. To address
this problem, in this thesis and for evaluating dynamic policies, we adopt the “small
scope hypothesis” defined by the authors of Alloy [61] that is suitable for finding a high
proportion of errors and can be expanded to the large model. Also experimental results
show that a sufficient scope can be found in order to provide the confidence of having no
bug in the system [6]. So, by selecting a sufficient scope, we are able to simulate an access
control system with unbounded numbers of states with a finite state one and verify the
required properties over it.
But still evaluating a system with unbounded number of objects is valuable and more
promising. To study the evaluation of access control systems for unbounded number of
objects through model-checking, we need to apply the appropriate abstraction techniques.
One of the techniques that can possibly help in achieving such a goal is symmetry reduction
technique. Using such technique, we will be able to remove the agents that behave in a
similar way, which may be potentially infinite. Therefore, the original model will be
reduced to a finite state model and model-checking problem becomes decidable.
Furthermore and as we discussed before, another work that is left for the future in this
thesis is the appropriate heuristics for abstraction refinement when verifying the properties
with the negation of knowledge modality. Improving the heuristics for the cases that we







In section 4.2, the pre-states are defined as a set of states that satisfy the properties in
the definition 4.5. For the implementation, we need to find the transition function based
on binary decision diagram presentation.
A.1 An overview of binary decision diagrams
Binary decision diagrams are a method of representing Boolean functions. Boolean func-
tions are the functions with the arguments of type Boolean variables, and return a Boolean
value. BDDs are a class of binary decision trees where the non-terminal nodes represent
Boolean variables and terminal nodes are Boolean values (0 and 1). Each binary decision
tree represents a Boolean function of the variables that appear as non-terminal nodes.
BDDs are capable of getting compact by removing of duplicated terminal nodes, and
removing redundant and duplicate non-terminals. We call these compact diagrams as
reduced BDDs.
Ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD) are the diagrams that are imposed by a
variable ordering. The ordering prevents a variable to occur several times along a path.
Another important feature of OBDDs is that the reduced OBDD (denoted by ROBDD)
that represents a Boolean function is unique.
Several algorithms are defined for ROBDDs: the algorithm reduce applies the re-
duction rules over a BDD. The algorithm apply implements the operations ∧, ∨ and
⊕ (XOR) on binary decision diagrams. If Bf is a BDD representing formula f , then
restrict(0, x, Bf ) is equivalent to f [0/x] and restrict(1, x, Bf ) is equivalent to f [1/x].
The algorithm exists removes the constraints on a subset of variables. If f is a Boolean
formula, then ∃.f is defined as f [0/x]∨ f [1/x]. Therefore, the algorithm exists is equiv-
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alent to:
apply(∨, restrict(0, x, Bf ), restrict(1, x, Bf ))
In symbolic model-checking, sets of states are presented by BDDs. In a transition
system, each state is assigned by a vector of Boolean variables. Note that in our policy
verification method, the states are represented by the valuation of system propositions,
which are Boolean variables by themselves.
In CTL model-checking and in our approach, we need set operations like intersection,
union and complementation. These set operations are equivalent to ∧, ∨ and ¬ in BDD
operations using the algorithm apply (note that negation is implementable via ⊕1). The
core function that we use in our algorithm is PRE∃α(X). This function is a special case of
the standard function pre∃(X) which takes a subset X of states and returns all the states
that have transition to some states in X. PRE∃a is dedicated for the transitions made by
performing action α in our action-based transition system.
Let pˆ denote the vector of Boolean variables (p1, . . . , pn). If B→ is the OBDD repre-
senting transition relation, BX is the OBDD for the set of states X, and primed version
of the variables denote the variables in the successor states in the transitions, then the
OBDD exists(pˆ′, apply(∧, B→, BX′)) computes the pre∃(X) where BX′ is the OBDD of
BX where all the variables are replaced with their primed versions.
A.2 Transition relation calculation
We use the conventional method of finding pre-states in order to calculate PRE∃a . We
represent the Boolean formula to show how the general calculation works. This formula
will be encoded to OBDD in implementation phase.
Let action a be defined as α : ε← ` and X be a set of states. Consider fPRE∃α(X) as the
formula satisfying PRE∃α(X) and {p1, . . . , pn} = prop(fX). fPRE∃α(X) can be calculated
by the following method:
fPRE∃α(X) = ∃p′1 . . . ∃p′n.(θα ∧ fX [p′i/pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n])
fX [p
′
i/pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n] is the primed version of the formula representing the set of states X




















where Lit∗ be the set of literals that are tagged by ∗ in the query. The last conjunction
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In chapter 5 section 5.3, we introduced a symbolic transition function for forward traver-
sal of the paths in the counterexamples returned by the model-checker. For the im-
plementation, we need to find the transition function based on binary decision diagram
presentation.
If ψ is a formula, then ψ′ denotes the primed version of ψ if all the propositions in ψ
are substituted with the primed ones (ψ′ = ψ[p′i/pi : pi ∈ prop(ψ)]). When performing
the action α : ε ← ` in the states stφ (using the same notation as in chapter 4), the
transition only performs on the states of stφ ∩ st` = stφ∧`. In the resulting states, the
propositions that do not appear in ε remain the same as in the states that the transition
begins. If {p1, . . . , pn} = prop(φ ∧ `), the transition function Θα is calculated in the
following way:
Θα(stφ) = st∃p′1,...,p′n. η(α,φ)
where












LABELLED TRANSITION SYSTEMS AND
INTERPRETED SYSTEMS
In this appendix, we show that the labelled transition system described in chapter 4 is a
special case of interpreted systems.
Consider that MC = 〈S lts , Actlts , S lts0 , P lts , τ lts , γlts〉 is a labelled transition system de-
rived from policy C with ΣAgent as the set of agents. Given Ω = e ∪ ΣAgent, we define
a special case of interpreted systems IM = 〈(LMi )i∈Ω, (PMi )i∈Ω, (ACTMi )i∈Ω, SM0 , τM , γM〉
where
• LMe = S lts and LMi = {l} for all i ∈ ΣAgent where l is a single local state, and the
set of states SM is the Cartesian product of the local states
• SM0 = {(s, l, . . . , l) | s ∈ S lts0 }
• For all sM = (sMe , l, . . . , l) ∈ SM , p ∈ P lts : γM(sM , p) = γMe (sMe , p) = γlts(sMe , p)
• ACTMe = {Λ} and ACTMi = {α ∈ Actlts | Ag(α) = i} for all i ∈ ΣAgent. The joint
action ACTM is the set of any Ω-tuple in the Cartesian product of the local actions
with only one non-Λ action
• PMi (lMi ) = ACTMi for all i ∈ Ω and lMi ∈ Li
• For all sM ∈ SM and αM ∈ ACTM , if s = lMe (sM) and α is the non-Λ ele-
ment of αM , then τM(sM , αM) is defined if τ lts(s, α) is defined, and τM(sM , αM) =
(τ lts(s, α), l, . . . , l).
Given policy C and the query init → φ as defined in section 4.1.2, we define the
satisfaction relation for interpreted system I as follows:
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(I, s, C) |= p ⇔ γe(le(s), p) = >
(I, s, C) |= ¬φ ⇔ (I, s, C) 6|= φ
(I, s, C) |= φ1 ∨ φ2 ⇔ (I, s, C) |= φ1 or (I, s, C) |= φ2
(I, s, C) |= 〈p〉 ⇔ there exists a read permission ρ : p← ` ∈ C
such that Ag(ρ) ∈ C and (IC, s, C) |= `
(I, s, C) |= C ′ : (φ) ⇔
there exists a path s1
α1−→ . . . αn−1−−−→ sn such that s = s1 and
(1) For all 1 ≤ i < n: Ag(αi) ∈ C ′
(2) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n: (IC, si, C ′) |= p if p∗ ∈ init and (I, si, C ′) 6|= p if ¬p∗ ∈ init
(3) (I, sn, C
′) |= φ
(I, s, C) |= C ′ : (φ1 THEN φ2) ⇔
there exists a path s1
α1−→ . . . αn−1−−−→ sn such that s = s1 and
(1) For all 1 ≤ i < n: Ag(αi) ∈ C ′
(2) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n: (I, si, C ′) |= p if p∗ ∈ init and (I, si, C ′) 6|= p if ¬p∗ ∈ init
(3) (I, sn, C
′) |= φ1 and (I, sn, C ′) |= φ2
We use the notation I |= g if for all s0 ∈ S0 : (I, s0, ∅) |= g.
Lemma C.1. Given the query init → g, let IC be an interpreted system derived from
policy C as in definition 5.7 where the set of initial states contains all the states with the
environment local state defined by init . If MC is the labelled transition system derived
from C with the local states defined by init , then IC |= g iff IM |= g.
Proof. We first prove that for all s ∈ S and sM ∈ SM where le(s) = lMe (sM), if C is a
coalition of agents, then (IC, s, C) |= g iff (IM , sM , C) |= g.
The set of propositions P lts in MC contains all the policy propositions and therefore
P lts = ΦC = Φe (see definition 5.7). So, as the local states are specified by the valuation
of the local propositions, the relation le(s) = l
M
e (s






If p ∈ Φe (g is defined over Φe), then the proof proceeds by structural induction over the
structure of g.
Base case:
• (⇒) (IC, s, C) |= p iff (IM , sM , C) |= p From (IC, s, C) |= p we have γe(le(s), p) = >.
By le(s) = l
M
e (s
M) we have γMe (l
M
e (s








M). Also assume the same for ϕ1 and ϕ2.
• The proof is trivial for the cases ¬ϕ and ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 and 〈p〉.





By the definition of satisfaction relation, there exists a path s1
α1−→ . . . αn−1−−−→ sn
such that s = s1 where the conditions (1) - (3) hold. We first prove that given
the above path, there exists a path sM1
αM1−−→ . . . α
M





n ), and the path complies with the conditions (1) and (2).




1 ) which implies
slts1 = le(s1). We start from the first transition along the path, which is s1
α1−→ s2.




– Ag(α1) = Ag(α
lts
1 ),
– If the permission of α1 holds in le(s1), then the permission of α
lts
1 also holds
on le(s1) (note that action permissions in the policy are defined over policy
propositions which are the same as environment propositions in IC), and
– α1 updates the environment propositions in the same way as in α
lts
1 .
By item 2 and slts1 = le(s1), the permission of α
lts
1 holds on s
lts
1 . By item 3, s
lts
1
evolves to a state slts2 where the values of the propositions are the same as in le(s2)
(in the other words, slts2 = le(s2)) if the transition is allowed.
The transition slts1
αlts1−−→ slts2 has another requirement which states that (MC, slts2 , C) |=
p if p∗ ∈ init and (MC, slts2 , C) 6|= p if ¬p∗ ∈ init . This follows by condition (2) in
satisfaction relation for IC and the base case.
The path slts1
αlts1−−→ . . . α
lts
n−1−−−→ sltsn can be constructed inductively using the same
procedure. By the same discussion we have sltsn = le(sn). This proves the existence
of a path sM1
αM1−−→ . . . α
M
n−1−−−→ sMn in IM where sMi = (sltsi , l, . . . , l), and αMi is an Ω-tuple
with Ag(αltsi )-th element to be α
lts
i and the rest are Λ, which satisfies the conditions
(1) and (2) in satisfaction relation. Condition (3) holds by inductive hypothesis.






By the definition of satisfaction relation, there exists a path sM1
αM1−−→ . . . α
M
n−1−−−→ sMn
in IM such that sM = sM1 where the conditions (1) - (3) hold. We prove that given
the above path, there exists a path s1





n ), and the path complies with the conditions (1) and (2).
We start from the first transition sM1
αM1−−→ sM2 . Assume that policy action αlts1 is the
non-Λ element of αM1 . Procedure 3 generates a set of actions from α
lts
1 that will be
used in constructing the joint actions in IC. The actions are generated from αlts1 in
a tree-like manner. Starting from αlts1 as the root, each node has one branch (when
the proposition to be read and its read permission are not affected by the action),
two branches (when the proposition to be read is affected by the action) or three
branches (when only the read permission is affected by the action). In the case of one
branch, action remains unchanged. In the case of three branches (also applicable
to the cases with two branches), if α : ε ← ` is the parent and αc1 : εc1 ← `c1,
αc2 : εc2 ← `c2 and αc3 : εc3 ← `c3 are the children, then `c1 ∨ `c2 ∨ `c3 ≡ `.
Moreover, pairwise conjunctions of `c1, `c2 and `c3 are equivalent to ⊥. Hence, the
permission of exactly one of the child actions holds in le(s
M
1 ), and as the permissions
are independent of other agents’ local states, the permission of that child holds in




1 ). As ε1, ε2, ε3 ⊆ ε, the children update the
environment local variables the same as α.
So, there exists an action α1 in IC where the Ag(αlts1 )-th element is one of leaf
actions generated form αlts1 in which the permission holds in s1. Moreover, if the
transition s1
α1−→ s2 is allowed, then le(s2) = lMe (sM2 ).
It is also trivial to show that the last requirement for the transition s1
α1−→ s2, which is
condition (2) in satisfaction relation, also holds. Therefore the path s1
α1−→ . . . αn−1−−−→





and the path complies with the conditions (1) and (2). Condition (3) holds by
inductive hypothesis.
• The proof for (IC, s, C) |= C ′ : (ϕ1 THEN ϕ2) iff (IM , sM , C) |= C ′ : (ϕ1 THEN ϕ2) is
similar to the proof for the previous item.
As the environment initial local states in both IC and IM are defined by the same
rule, for all s0 ∈ S0 there exists sM0 ∈ SM0 where le(s0) = lMe (sM0 ), and vice versa. Since
satisfaction of goal g in its general form is independent of the coalition parameter in the
left hand side of the satisfaction relation, then for all s0 and s
M





we have (IC, s0, ∅) |= g iff (IM , sM0 , ∅) |= g, which implies IC |= g iff IM |= g.
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